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Abstract
This thesis is a comparative study of the role of the accused in the systems of
English and Islamic criminal justice. It seeks to explore the underlying
relationship between the individual and the state through an historical, structural
and contextual analysis of their rules relating to questioning and of confessions.
The analysis of the English system covers the period 1800 to 1984, with
particular reference to developments during the nineteenth century when the
foundations for the modern English state were established. The analysis of the
Islamic system combines traditionally Islamic and modern methods, assessing the
"Islamisation" movement in Malaysia through a religico-structural understanding
of juristic opinion from the four main schools of Sunnite jurisprudence.
The thesis contributes to existing knowledge on a number of levels: first, it
questions and revises the "myth" of "progress" that has dominated observations
of the history of the English criminal justice system; second, it elucidates the
relationship between Islamic law in theory and the law that is applied and
proposed in its name in Muslim states; third, it provides an analytical framework
for drawing comparisons between the underlying values of the systems of English
and Islamic criminal justice.
While acknowledging fundamental differences in terms of outlook and
articulation, the author concludes there are important similarities expressed
through such notions as "suspect" in the English system and "kafir"I"fasiq" in the
Islamic. These act as intermediate constitutional categories to whom the state
owe less protection. But the author notes also that these similarities are not
observed necessarily in the "law" which is implemented or proposed in Muslim
states; exact correspondence depends upon the over-arching political structure
and the institution of Caliphate.
The thesis is divided into six chapters: chapter one sets out the conventional view
of the historical development of English criminal procedure and evidence;
chapter two subjects that to a critique and chapter three offers a revised thesis.
Chapter four, explores methods for interpreting and explaining Islam; chapter
five sets out rules relating to confessions and questioning according to the four
Sunni schools; chapter six puts them into "context" through an examination of
the "Islamisation" process in Malaysia.
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Introduction
The famous comparatist lawyer, Basil Markesinis, spoke recently of the
similarities between law and art. In both disciplines, he said, "most things that
had to be said had, in some form or another, already been expressed by someone;
and that often the only way one could stamp one's individuality on a subject or a
theme was through the way one chose to express it." His observation, while
general in its terms, was made in the context of Anglo-American and European
cultures; cultures which, though different, share a common Christian heritage as
well as a secular ideology of "enlightenment."
But in comparative studies of cultures that are essentially alien to each other, other
comparatists suggest2that the differences are so great that their legal cultures
cannot be compared. According to this view, the present study would not serve a
useful purpose. English and Islamic systems of criminal justice appear to operate
in different cultural spheres. The former is secular, man-made and seems to
change constantly; the latter is religious, sent by God and fixed. The task of the
academic would be to describe the "other" but not to compare. In fact, this has
been the conventional approach in academic discussions of Islam ("orientalism")
It has been described, observed, dissected and critiqued; rarely compared.
Generally speaking, the degree to which their criticisms of Islamic law could have
been directed at their own systems has not been considered.
'"Foreign Law and Comparative Methodology: A Subject and a Thesis," in Foreign Law &
Comparative Methodology, (1997), Oxford, Hart, p. 1.
2See, for example, the recent work by Van Hoecke and Warrington: "Legal Cultures, Legal
Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law," (1998),
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 47, pp. 495-536.
2The current study attempts to move beyond this insularity, and perhaps
ethnocentrism, 3 to embrace a broader cultural view which seeks to locate aspects
of the "other" within the "self." This should not be understood to imply a search
for a new "natural law", but a means by which communication barriers between
different cultures can be lifted, common agendas pursued and informed reflection
encouraged.
This cross-cultural dialogue takes place in the context of the role played by
accused persons and the relationship this expresses between the individual and the
state. In theory, I could have set out this relationship by examining any of the
rules relating to evidence and proof, as they all, in some degree, reflect the
underlying values of a system. My focus, however, has been on the rules relating
to questioning and confessions. I suggest that these rules are the most appropriate
for comparison because: (1) they inevitably regulate or facilitate the ability of
certain representatives of the organised community (the state) to extract evidence
from accused persons; and (2) the recent concern over the relationships between
confessions and miscarriages of justice.4
The thesis thus examines in both systems the function(s) of these rules and the
relationship which they exhibit between the individual and the organised
community in which the latter exists. This is drawn out in English law through an
3 See generally:B.S. Sayyid, (1997), A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricism and the Emergence of
Islainism, London and New York, Zed Books.
4See: Walker, C. and Starmer, K (1993), Justice in Error, London, Blackstone Press; McConville,
M. and Bridges, L. (1994), Criminal Justice in Crisis, Aldershot, Edward Elgar; McConville, M.,
3historical and structural analysis of the period 1800-1984, with particular
emphasis on developments in the nineteenth century when the foundations for the
modern English legal system were being laid. This section of the thesis
contextualises English case law and statutes within contemporary ideologies and
historical movements.
In the analysis of Islamic criminal justice, the relationship between the individual
and the state is elucidated through a comparison of traditional juristic
interpretation of the religious texts and the structural context for which they were
intended, with subsequent attempts by a Muslim-dominated polity to implement
an "Islamic" order. These attempts are explained through a case study of
"Islamisation" in the Malaysian peninsula, charting the impact and degree of
implementation of Islamic law with particular reference to the post-independence
period.
In chapter one, I set out the conventional view of the historical development of
English criminal procedure and evidence which conceptualises the role played by
the accused in terms of linear progress and societal development: from
"subject"(pre-1640) to "citizen" (1800-1852) and then to "suspect" (post-1852).
In chapter two, I subject this to a critique, suggesting that it lacks the necessary
data and systematic methodology to support it. In chapter three, I re-evaluate the
evidence and present a different picture which sees the role played by the accused
as incidental rather than fundamental to the workings of the English system.
Sanders, A. and Leng, R. (1993), The Case for the Prosecution- Police Suspects and the
Construction of Criminality, London, Routledge, pp. 1-3.
4Although fears of intrusion and of the need to protect the accused from violations
by the state are expressed during the nineteenth century, I argue that there is no
stage at which the accused is constructed as a "citizen." Rather, there are judicial
disagreements throughout the nineteenth century, reflecting the controversy of
transition from a devolved, patriarchal regime to a more centrally-controlled and
welfarist state; a process which is not complete until after the collapse of laissez-
faire in the 1930s by which time the accused is constructed as the intermediate
constitutional category "suspect."
In chapter four, I set out and examine methods to overcome controversies between
text and context in the presentation of Islamic criminal justice in order to establish
appropriate data for drawing meaningful comparisons with the English system. I
maintain these data must be taken from traditional juristic interpretation of the
Qur' an and Sunnah, and juxtaposed with a structural analysis of efforts to put
them into practice. In chapter five, I explore the variety of Islamic juridical
opinion and explain their categorisations of the individual are religious rather than
secular in nature, and that the role played by the accused is determined by a
hierarchy of religious criteria that reflect individual choices and prior behaviour.
Yet, whether or not this is realised in practice depends on the over-arching
political structure and the institution of the Caliphate (Khilgfah). In chapter six , I
explore the consequences of developing on the periphery of or external to the
Caliphal framework. I argue that in the Malaysian context, this has allowed
influences anti-thetical to Islam to seep into its operating culture and to subvert the
religious essence of its rules thereby serving the secular interests of traditional
authority.
In the concluding chapter, I reflect on the difficulties of comparative analysis,
rebut misconceptions and assess the degree of commonality and difference
between the two systems. In particular, I observe how both systems categorise the
individual to account for law and order concerns; for the English system, it is the
"suspect"; for the Islamic, it is the "k4fir"(non-Muslim) and "fasiq" (Muslim big-
sinner).
6Ouestioning of the Accused and the Construction of the Individual in English
Law
Chapter one
Introduction:
The rules relating to questioning of the accused have a long detailed history in
English Law, and have considerable importance for those accused or suspected of
criminal offences. Although the statements of an accused or of a suspect in
response to questions may be exculpatory, often they are introduced at trial
because they incriminate the accused in some material respect. This may be
through a full confession, an admission, a statement leading to real evidence that
connects the accused with the crime, or through an inconsistency with the
accused's testimony. Even apparently exculpatory statements can be used to
incriminate the accused at trial. 1 That confession can then form the basis of a valid
conviction under English law, even in the absence of corroborating evidence.2
It is crucial, therefore, to determine what, if any, are the limitations to questioning
of the accused and the evidential consequences for breaching those limits. The
power to question and the ability of the prosecution to use statements of the
accused in evidence, depends on the existing statutory framework and case law.
As this and subsequent chapters will indicate, the content of this law is not fixed,
'For a good example, see the Canadian decision of Piche [1970] 1 CCC 257; (1970) 11 DLR (3d)
700.
7but is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation in the courts according to
different sets of values that govern the proper relationship between the individual
and the state.
The parameters of that relationship, I suggest, are best discovered by examining
the historical development of questioning of the accused and its interrelationship
with the law of confessions; in particular with the developments that took place
after 1800 when different notions of the constitutional relationship between the
individual and the state were being canvassed. Over the next three chapters, I will
attempt to set out the trends in judicial thinking after 1800, spanning the
publication of the Judges' Rules and its subsequent interpretation.
In this chapter, I will set out the conventional explanations put forward by leading
writers on evidence law and by legal historians. In any historical analysis,
previous projections of history cannot be ignored. History does not consist of
objective accounts in which the facts speak for themselves. Rather, facts are
selected, interpreted and constructed within evaluative frameworks. 	 This
generates an "image" of history which can have fundamental implications for the
way a given (legal) culture is perceived and projected, particularly where that
"image" carries the weight of a consensus. The extent to which any consensus has
been achieved forms the subject matter of this chapter. That will be subjected to a
substantive and methodological critique in chapter two. An historical re-
evaluation will be set out in chapter three.
2 Wheeling(1789) 1 Leach CC3I1n.
8Let us begin this chapter, however, with a brief historical outline of the position up
to the beginning of the nineteenth century. This will provide not only an
opportunity to lay out important statutory provisions that still governed
questioning of the accused in 1800, but also an identification of important
structural movements, their causes and the underlying values of the system which I
draw out more fully in chapter three.
The History of Interrogation and Confessions Before 1800
The general picture emerges that up to 1640 interrogation of the accused both
inside and out of court was common place, and in some cases even accompanied
by torture, for purposes of social and crime control, as well as for the suppression
of political dissent. 3 There were no restrictions on the type of questions that could
be asked, by whom nor for what purpose. Judicial interrogation could take place
before the trial in the Star Chamber without the accused being notified of the
charge against him. Examination was upon oath and compulsory. Any refusal to
take the oath was punishable by torture. 4 If the accused confessed under
examination, he was subject to further interrogation in private and not on oath in
the hope of obtaining more confessions to crimes not yet admitted. 5 Judges also
carried out preliminary examinations of the accused in the Common Law courts6
3See: J.H. Langbein (see Torture and the Law of Proof- Europe and England in the Ancien
Regine, (1977),Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, p. 81); David Jardine , A
Reading on the Use of Torture in the Criminal Law of England Previously to the Commonwealth
(1837), London, cited in Langbein p. 74; but contrast Wolchover and Heaton-Armstrong,
Confession Evidence (1996), London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 108.
4For an example, see Lilburn (1637) 3 St. Tr. 1315.
5 See Williams, G. (1963), The Proof of Guilt, London, Stevens & Sons, p. 40.
6See Udall (1590) 1 St. Tr. 1271.
9and it was not uncommon to question him/her at the trial itself, 7
 although an
accused could not be punished for refusing to answer those questions.8
Pre-trial interrogation of the accused was also carried out by Justices of the Peace,
who dealt with the cases that were less politically sensitive. By the middle of the
sixteenth century, they became the pivotal figures in the collection of evidence
from the accused9 as well as the enforcement agency of the ruling classes) 0 The
aftermath of the Wars of the Roses, industrial transformation and the emergence
of a mobile and rapidly expanding population, which was largely unpoliced,
generated fears of disorder among the landed gentry and mercantile classes who
looked to the Crown for a more complete system of social control. This was
secured by the King's Council who appointed justices from among the most
reliable of the landed gentry and gradually equipped them with an armoury of
powers, which included the authority to issue warrants of arrest, to examine
suspects, to grant bail and to summarily convict in minor cases.11
Concentration of power in the hands of the Justices was precipitated by the decline
of the medieval self-informing Jury whose efficacy in making decisions of fact on
the basis of their personal knowledge of the accused and of witnesses had been
undermined by the rapid growth in population and the loosening of community
7See Williams, op. cit., p. 42.
8 See Coke CJ's judgment in Burrowes v Court of High Commision (1605) 3 Bulst. at 50, 81 E.R. at
43.
9Bryan, I. (1997), Interrogation and Confession- A Study of Progress, Process and Practice,
Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 49.
'°Ibid., p. 47.
Ibid; Langbein, J.H. (1974), Prosecuting Crime in the Renaisance- England, Germany, France,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, p. 6.
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ties) 2 Systemically, this required a re-structuring and an enhanced role for the
Justice of the Peace. This was achieved by the Marian statutes of 1554'3and
1555 ' 4which sought to redress the weaknesses of the community-based process for
detection' 5 that had obtained since the Statute of Winchester in 1285.16
The "Bail Statute"of 1554 was the pre-cursor to the "Committal Statute" of 1555
which established the preliminary inquiry upon committal where bail had been
denied.' 7
 The two enactments granted similar examination powers to the Justices,
but in different contexts. The former purported to collect evidence from the
accused in order to evaluate the correctness of the Justices' decision to grant bail,
if the accused took flight;' 8the latter, instructed them to collect evidence against
the accused for the purposes of prosecution.' 9
 The 1555 enactment provided:
"[F]rom henceforth such Justices or Justice before whom any person shall
be brought for Manslaughter or Felony, or for suspicion thereof, before he
or they shall commit or send such Prisoner to Ward, shall take the
examination of such Prisoner, and information of those that bring him, of
the fact and circumstance thereof and the same or as much thereof as
shall be material to prove the Felony shall [be] put in writing, within two
'2lbid., p. 48.
' 3 i & 2 Phil. & M. c. 13 (the Bail Statute).
'2 & 3 Phil. & M. c. 10 (the Committal Statute).
5lbid., p. 49.
' 6See T.A. Critchley (1967), A History of Police in England and Wales, p. 7.
' 7Langbein, op. cit., p. 5.
' 8 lbid., p. 16. The ostensible object of the enactment was to avoid collusion between suspects and
the justices; see: Shapiro, B .J. (1991), Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause - Historical
Perspectives on the Anglo-A inerican Law of Evidence, Oxford, University of California Press, p.
149.
' 9Bryan, op. cit., p. 50. See also, Holdsworth, W. (1945), A History of English Law, London,
Methuen/Sweet & Maxwell, Vol. 4, p. 529.
11
days after the said examination, and the same shall certify in such manner
and form and at such time as they should and ought to do is such Prisoner
so committed or sent to Ward had been bailed or let to Mainprise, upon
such pain as in the said former Act is limited and appointed for not taking
or not certifying such examinations as in the said former Act is expressed"
(emphases added).
According to Shapiro, the object of the examination of the accused was not to
assist the prosecution in constructing its case, but "to prevent lethargy and the
biased dropping of charges." 2° She maintains that the lack of attendance of justices
of the peace at quarter sessions and assizes indicated the absence of any
prosecutorial function. 2 ' Yet this argument conflicts with the wording of the
committal statute, for it instructs the justices to "take the examination of such
Prisoner. .of the fact and circumstance thereof. .or as much thereof as shall be
material to prove the Felony." As Bryan observed, the justices were thus
empowered to collect evidence against the accused and for the prosecution.
Although oral evidence was preferred at trial, the absence of any hearsay
evidential rule ensured that victim-prosecutors could supplement any deficiencies
in their case through the pre-trial examinations of the accused taken and recorded
by the justices. 22 Furthermore, contemporary accounts indicate that pre-trial
questioning of the accused was not limited and that a Justice of the Peace would
200p. cit., p. 151.
21Ibid., p. 150. She refers to Lambarde, and to contemporary practice manuals to support her
assertion.
220p. cit., pp. 50-5 1.
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try to obtain a confession wherever possible, and that this examination would then
be read over to the jury at the trial.23
In additions to Judges and Justices of the Peace, clergymen were also given
powers to interrogate the accused and to inflict punishment through the
Ecclesiastical Courts. Out of court, other officers or individuals involved in law
enforcement, such as constables, watchmen, gaolers, bailiffs, etc., were able to
interrogate the accused.24
Up to 1640, therefore, it appears that the accused was subject to wide powers of
interrogation. Moreover, the law of confessions had only a minor influence in
restricting those powers. 25 By the beginning of the seventeenth century, a judge
was obliged to refuse to enter a guilty plea where a confession had been obtained
by "fear, menace or duress,"26but there was no rule of evidence to exclude such a
confession at trial. All confessions were admissible in evidence against an
accused no matter how they were obtained.
After 1640, the political and legal climate changed. In 1640 Parliament was
recalled which gave an opportunity to its members to reassert the "rights and
23Thomas Smith, Commonwealth of England (1583), pp 90-99, cited in Williams, p. 44. See also:
Langbein (1973), "The Origins of Public Prosecutions at Common Law," 17 American Journal of
Legal History, p. 313; Beattie, J.M. (1986), Crime and the Courts in England, 1600-1800, Oxford,
Clarendon, p. 271.
241n the Select Pleas of the Crown 1200-1225, for example, it was recorded that Simon of
Shedricks, who was arrested for the murder of John of Crewkerne, was questioned subsequently by
the King's Bailiff who received his confession. The record tersely concluded: "And because the
king's bailiff produces suit to prove the confession made before him, let him [Simon] be hanged,"
Maitland (ed), F.W. (1887), The Publications of the Selden Society, Vol. 1, p. 118, para 184.
251an Bryan notes that extra-judicial confessions did not receive attention from the judiciary until
the early eighteenth century; op. cit., p. 51.
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liberties of Englishmen" enshrined in Magna Carta that had been violated during
the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts. One of the consequences was the abolition in
1641 of the hated Star Chamber and the prohibition of any court in the future that
would "exercise the same or the like jurisdiction as is or hath been used, practised
or exercised in the said court."27
What happened over the next 150 years has not been well documented. It would
appear, however, that the fears of eroding the "rights and liberties of Englishmen"
had some impact on judicial procedure in the Common Law courts which began to
exhibit the trappings of due process. So by the early 1700s, the practice of judicial
questioning had died out at the ordinary criminal trial where the accused was tried
for non-political offences. 28
 The "trial" was a public affair and for reasons of
legitimacy, it was inappropriate for the judiciary to be seen adopting inquisitorial
methods. In the latter part of the eighteenth century we also see the judiciary
formulating rules of evidence to act as an indirect check on certain questioning
practices. Thus, by the time o Warickshall in 1783, the court was prepared to
state:
a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope or by the
torture of fear comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be
26Staundford, Pleas of the Crown, b. 2, c. 51(1607), cited by Wigmore, H. (1904), Evidence in
Trials at Common Law, Vol. 3, p. 292.
2716 Car. c. 10 (1640), s. 4. See also 16 Car.c. 11(1640) and 16 Car. c. 27 (1640), which removed
all powers from the clergy to administer punishment for any crime or to empower others to make
presentment of any crime. Henceforth, the clergy were stripped of all temporal jurisdiction and
authority.
28Fox, J.C. (1927), The History of Contempt of Court, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 75. Fox
maintained (p. 76) that preliminary examination of prisoners charged with "state offences" by
members of the Privy Council continued up until 1840; see the case of Oxford (1840) State Trials,
N.S., iv, 497.
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considered as the evidence of guilt that no credit ought to be given to it;
and therefore it is rejected" (emphasis added).29
Judicial concern for voluntariness and for the freedom of the individual appeared
to dominate the need for crime control and social order. Confessions prompted by
"hope" or "fear" were deemed inadmissible without qualification and irrespective
of the discovery of real evidence that suggested their reliability.30
Yet, this judicial development had little impact on pre-trial questioning of the
accused by Justices of the Peace. 3 ' The Marian statutes had been left untouched by
the upheavals of the seventeenth century. Justices of the Peace, not the judges,
were now the central figures in the collection of evidence from the accused.32
Although a practice had developed in preliminary examinations before a JP to
administer a caution before questioning the accused, 33 the impact on procedure
was not uniform. The examining powers of the JP and his ability to extract
confessions from accused persons remained. A confession obtained in such
circumstances was still deemed voluntary and the best indication of guilt. Indeed,
it received judicial sanction.34
291 Leach C.C.263.
300n the facts of the case, real evidence was discovered as a result of the confession but had no
effect on the latter's admissibility. This appears to contradict Peter Mirfield's assertion that the
court rejected the confession on grounds of reliability; see Confessions (1985), London, Sweet &
Maxwell, p. 48. Cases subsequent to Warickshall support this voluntarist position. See: Thompson
(1785) 1 Leach C.C. 291; Cass (1784) 1 Leach CC 293n.
31 Bryan notes that questioning itself was not explicitly included within the Warickshall framework
which appeared to concentrate on "threats" and "promises"; op. cit., p. 69.
32See Bryan, op. cit., p. 52; p. 63.
33See Abrahams, G. (1964), Police Questioning and The Judges' Rules, London, Oyez, p. 9.
34See the comments of Grose J in Lwnbe (1791), 2 Leach Cr.L. (3rd ed), 625, 628. See also: R V
Thomas (1794), 2 Leach Cr.L. (3rd ed), 727, 729.
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By the turn of the century, therefore, protection of the accused through the
voluntariness principle was limited in its scope. Although the accused was
protected during ordinary trials from torture and compulsory self-
incrimination, 35the obtaining of confessions through magisterial or extra-judicial
questioning was regulated only in part. The voluntariness rule, although
conceptually connected, was divorced from the power to question which enabled
local justices to further needs for crime and social control without judicial
interference.
The scope of the voluntariness rule and its oscillating application to confessions
and powers of questioning through the nineteenth century and into the twentieth,
form the subject matter of the remainder of this chapter and the subsequent two.
Setting out the consensus - 1800-1912
It will emerge from the following accounts that there exists a generally accepted
view that between 1800 and 1852 the courts universally applied the voluntariness
principle and extended the voluntariness "rule" to protect the accused from all
manner of questioning. Between 1852 and 1912, however, the conventional
wisdom seems to suggest, with one exception, that the judicial pendulum had
swung the other way.
35See Bryan, op. cit., p. 67.
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This consensus is set out in the writings of James Fitzjames Stephen, John Henry
Wigmore, Glanville Williams and Peter Mirfield. Not all of these authors have
given the subject the same amount of attention because of the varying purposes of
their different treatises. Stephen's observations on confessions and interrogation,
for instance, form only a small part of a work devoted to the entire history of the
Common Law. We cannot expect the author, therefore, to give the same amount
of detail as Mirfield whose book is devoted solely to confessions. Nevertheless,
these differences in approach have been taken into account and are reflected in the
amount of text that I have set aside for their separate opinions.
Jmes Fitzjames Stephen:
In relation to judicial questioning of the accused during the nineteenth century, it
was Stephen's considered opinion that the courts were very protective and would
try to avoid at all costs the conviction of an innocent man. Stephen wrote:
"I think it probable that the length to which this sentiment has been
carried out in our criminal courts is due to a considerable extent to the
extreme severity of the old criminal law, and even more to the
capriciousness of its severity and the element of chance which.. .was
introduced into its administration."36
36(1883), A History of the Cri,nina1Lw of England, Vol. 1, pp. 438-439.
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Judicial acknowledgement of the harshness of the old English criminal law and
procedure was the reason why the courts had made the accused incompetent as a
witness and immune from judicial questioning. Initially, this was subject to two
qualifications: first, in cases of felony where the accused appeared unrepresented;
second, in preliminary examinations before a magistrate or JP who was
empowered, under the Marian statutes, to take the examination of the accused.
According to Stephen, the first exception was no longer operative after 1836
when the accused was given the right to counsel in cases of felony. The second
exception was then removed in 1848 by the Indictable Offences Act (Jervis'
Act), 37 which Stephen maintained had curtailed the ability of a magistrate to
interrogate the accused because it required the magistrate to administer a full
caution. Section 18 stated:
"after the examinations of all the witnesses on the part of the prosecution
as aforesaid shall have been completed, the Justice of the Peace or One of
the Justices by or before whom such examination shall have been so
completed as aforesaid, shall, without requiring the attendance of the
witnesses, read or cause to be read to the accused the depositions taken
against him, and shall say to him these words, or words to the like effect:
'Having heard the evidence do you wish to say anything in answer to the
charge? you are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but
whatever you say will be taken down in writing, and may be given against
you upon your trial; and whatever the prisoner shall then say in answer
thereto shall be taken down in writing, and read over to him.....and
i I & 12 Vict., c. 42.
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afterwards, upon the trial of the said accused person the same may, if
necessary, be given in evidence against him, without further proof thereof,
unless it shall be proved that the justice or justices purporting to sign the
same did not in fact sign the same: Provided always, that the said justice or
justices before such accused person shall make any statement shall state to
him, and give him clearly to understand, that he has nothing to hope from
any promise of favour, and nothing to fear from any threat which may have
been holden out to him to induce him to make any admission or confession
of his guilt but that whatever he shall then say may be given in evidence
against him upon his trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat:
Provided nevertheless, that nothing herein enacted or contained shall
prevent the prosecution in any case from giving in evidence any admission
or confession or other statement of the person accused or charged, made at
any time, by which Law would be admissible as evidence against such
person."
Stephen concluded:
"The result of the whole is that as matters stand the prisoner is absolutely
protected against all judicial questioning before or at the trial... .It is, I
think, highly advantageous to the guilty."38
With regard to powers of extra-judicial questioning, Stephen mentions very little.
He sums up his position in one paragraph as follows:
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"At one time the courts were disposed to take almost any opportunity to
exclude evidence of confessions, almost anything being treated as an
inducement to confess. In 1852, however, the law was considerably
modified by the decision of R. v Baidry, since which time the disposition
has been rather the other way."39
John Henry Wigmore:
Wigmore tackles the history of questioning of the accused, both judicial and extra-
judicial, and its evidential consequences, under the general heading of
"Confessions" in his treatise Evidence in Trials at Common Law.4°
Wigmore observed four distinct stages in the history of confession evidence. In
the first stage, from the time of the Tudors and Stuarts up to the second half of the
1700s, he discerned no restriction whatsoever on the admissibility of confessions.
In the second stage, comprising the second half of the 1700s, some confessions
were excluded if they were untrustworthy. In the third stage, comprising the
1800s, "the principle of exclusion is developed, under certain influences, to an
380p.cit., p. 441.
391b1d., p. 447.
°(19O4), revised by Chadbourn, 1970, Vol. 3.
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abnormal extent, and exclusion becomes the rule, admission the exception." 4 ' In
the fourth stage, constitutional considerations predominate.42
Wigmore's third stage, which appears to end at Baidry in 1852, is deemed the high
water-mark of voluntarism and sentimentality. He commented:
"There was a general suspicion of all confessions, a prejudice against
them as such, and an inclination to repudiate them upon the slightest
"43pretext.
The courts had so "disfigured the law of admissibility of confessions" that their
decisions had given "an appearance of sentimental irrationality to the law."44
Almost anything was regarded as inducement to confess and tantamount to
compulsion.	 In support, he cited four examples45which he regarded as
characteristic of the age and "absurd" because of the apparently trifling nature of
the threats or inducements. These included: a promise to give a glass of gin 46; a
statement from the prosecutor that, if the prisoner would only give him his money,
'he might go to the devil if he pleased' 47 ; a handbill, offering a few pounds reward
41Ibid., pp. 29 1-292. It should be noted at this point that these observations are general in their
application; there is no restriction on the type of confession, the circumstances in which it was
obtained, nor the person to whom it was made.
42Wigmore's fourth stage will not be examined in this thesis because it refers only to the
"nationalization" of the American law of confessions; sees. 820d, pp. 306-307.
431b1d., p. 297.
44Ibid., p. 298.
45Ibid., p. 297.
46R v Sexton, infra.
47R v Jones, infra.
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for evidence, posted in the magistrate's office 48 ; and a statement to the prisoner
that 'what he said would be used against him' 49 (his emphasis).
At page 474, under the sub-heading of Assurance that 'what you say will be
used for,' or 'against you', Wigmore again stated that the courts were executing
"an extravagant policy of exclusion" and cited four cases in the footnotes which
excluded confessions in circumstances he thought "ridiculous"; namely: Drew
(1837),50Morton (1843),' Furley (1843)52 and Harris (1844).
In Drew's case, Coleridge J excluded the confession because the prisoner was told
that what he said would be used for him. In Morton, the same judge excluded a
confession by the accused because he had been told by a police constable that
"anything he did say in his defence would be listened to, or assistance would be
summoned." In Harris, Maule J excluded a confession because the accused had
been told "whatever" he said would be taken down and used against him.54
In addition to case law, Wigmore offered some sociological insights as evidence
for this "sentimental irrationality."55 He gave three: first, social conditions and the
class divide may have led judges to believe that out of respect, submission and
stupidity, poor defendants would have confessed to anything that their superior
charged them with; second, in the absence of a right of appeal in criminal cases,
v Blackburn, infra.
49R v Furley, infra.
°8 Car & P. 140.
'2 Moo. & Rob. 514.
521 Cox CC 76.
i Cox CC 106.
54me offending statement in Furley has been mentioned above.
550p. cit., pp. 298-301.
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isolated judges at Nisi Prius made their decisions without consultation and on
independent responsibility. 56 They often wanted to avoid delays and long
consultations with colleagues, and preferred to eliminate the evidence altogether
thereby avoiding the problem; third, judges were redressing an inherent unfairness
in the criminal procedure at the time which prevented an accused from testifying
in his own defence but which allowed his own statements to be used against him.
The balance was restored by excluding confessions upon every available pretext.
Wigmore concluded that although the exclusionary rule could be legitimately
applied in certain rare cases, it had been manipulated by the judiciary during the
first half of the nineteenth century to suit their own purposes.
The position after 1852 is not dealt with in any detail by Wigmore. Nevertheless,
he seemed to suggest that the principle of exclusion no longer operated to the same
degree after that date, when a more rational approach was taken. He attributed the
change in mood to "the improvements that had taken place in criminal procedure"
and to a desire to "harmonize the accumulated and inconsistent precedents."57 The
"improvements" in criminal procedure are not stated specifically, but probably he
was referring to the statutory recognition of the right to be represented by counsel
in 183658 and the cautioning procedure for the magistrates set out by the Jervis'
Act of 1848.
6In his footnotes he mentions, as a proof, twenty Nisi Prius rulings on confessions for every full-
bench decision (p. 299).
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Glanville Williams:
In his book, The Proof of Guilt, 59 Williams provided an historical overview and
critique of the Common Law's approach to interrogation and questioning of the
accused in a chapter entitled: "The Right not to be Questioned." He admitted that
his focus was limited as it concentrated on questioning of the accused at trial
rather than pre-trial. 6° In spite of the limited scope of the work, Williams offered a
generalised account of questioning of the accused which included the pre-trial
position. He stated:
"In England, there is no power to interrogate accused persons, whether
before the trial or at the trial itself, unless they volunteer to speak."6'
This embrace of the voluntariness principle was expressed by the Indictable
Offences Act of 1848 and by the practices of magistrates at the time of Bentham.
It was a natural consequence of the animosity to interrogation that had grown up
since the days of the Star Chamber. He wrote:
"The exclusion of interrogation at trial naturally 62had its effect on the
preliminary enquiry, and by Bentham's day some magistrates were making
a habit of nullifying the enquiry so far as the accused himself was
570p. cit., p. 297.
58The Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836, 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114.
590p. cit.
600p. cit., p. 49.
61Ibid.
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concerned, by telling him that he was not bound to answer. This was given
statutory compulsion in 1848, when it was enacted in effect that the
primary function of the justices was to hear the witnesses against the
accused, and having done so, they should warn the accused that he was not
bound to say anything in answer to the charge, though he was invited to do
so."63
The basis for his assertion that magistrates had "a habit of nullifying the enquiry as
far as the accused was concerned" came from Jeremy Bentham's work: A Treatise
on Judicial Evidence. 64Writing during the 1 820s, Bentham had observed:
"The magistrates exercise despotic power, and can show favour or rigour
as they choose. It places in their hands a disguised but arbitrary power of
pardon. If the magistrate intends to do justice, he conducts the examination
according to the will of the legislator; if he wishes to make a parade of
clemency, or show partial favour to the accused, he follows the rule of the
common law, and even tells the prisoner to be on his guard, and to say
nothing which may turn to his disadvantage."65
In his interpretation of this passage, Williams took Bentham to mean that as a
general rule, magistrates were telling "the prisoner to be on his guard" and not to
62This argument of historical inevitability applies also to the perceived extension of the rule against
questioning to police officers; see Williams (1960), "Questioning by the police: Some practical
considerations," Crim. LR, pp. 325-346, at p. 338.
630p. cit., p. 45.
64(1825) Vol. 2, p. 242.
65Ibid.
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say anything "which may turn to his disadvantage." A protective cloak had thus
enveloped the accused and protected him allegedly from all questioning.
As with Wigmore, Williams had his explanations for these protections. 66 First, it
was natural for English judges to seek a moral high ground to distance themselves
from the "hateful spectacle of torture" practised on the Continent, and from
similar practices in England carried out by the Star Chamber. 67 Second, almost all
felonies in the early 1800s were punishable with death, but it was not practicable
to carry out the number of executions that legal theory required. The inevitable
consequence was the acquittal of guilty felons via protective rules of evidence. 68
Third was the importance placed on procedural propriety and fair play ("mere
sentiment"69); that the rules of the criminal trial should resemble the rules of
private combat. It was thought unfair to get an accused to give evidence against
himself because it was like hitting a man when he was down.7°
Peter Mirfield:
Unlike Williams, Mirfield attempts a more comprehensive analysis of the history
of pre-trial questioning of the accused and the limitations that were placed upon it
during the nineteenth century in chapters two and three of his book, Confessions.7'
66These are also reliant upon observations made by Bentham, op. cit., pp. 243-245.
67Pro of of Guilt, op. cit., pp. 49-50, citing Bentham, op. cit., p. 243. Bentham does not cite any
evidence for this particular assertion.
680p. cit., p. 51. This is based on a Bentham statement, op. cit. p. 243.
9Proof of Guilt, op. cit., p. 51.
70This is also based on a Bentham statement, op. cit., p. 245.
'(1985), London, Sweet & Maxwell.
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Chapter two tackles the history of confessions from 1800 up to the decision of
Ibrahim (1914)72. In this chapter he mentions the general historical trend of
decisions and the judicial response to statements obtained from the accused in a
variety of circumstances. He divides the case law into two periods using the
decision of Baidry (1852) as the dividing line: the first, he characterises as "the
age of sentimental irrationality;" the second period, up to the close of the
nineteenth century, he terms the "progeny" of Baldry. What he means by this and
whether he thought there was any real distinction before and after 1852 will be
mentioned below. At the end of the chapter, he also mentions the judicial
response to police interrogation of the accused. This is not included in the general
historical analysis. In chapter three, during a discussion of the nemo debet
principle, Mirfield also refers to the powers of examining magistrates to
interrogate the accused. His analysis is dealt with in one paragraph and stops at
1854.
In Mirfield' s assessment of the judicial response to questioning of the accused, he
seems to view the period 1800-1852 as generally protective. He states that
"judges seem, for the most part, to have been keen to exclude confessions."74
There were two triggers which, if pressed, would lead to exclusion of a confession
in most cases. First, the existence of a threat or a promise simpliciter; and second,
where there was something so improper in the questioning of the suspect that his
statement should be excluded. The results of this approach, he urges, "were
72[19141 AC 599.
730p. cit.
740p. cit., p. 50.
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sometimes ridiculous,"75and quoting Wigmore, "gave an appearance of
sentimental irrationality to the law."76
In support of this view, Mirfied cites three cases directly: Enoch and Pulley
(1833), Croydon (l846),78 and Sexton (l823). Of these cases, Enoch and
Pulley and Croydon are used to exemplify the first trigger he identifies in judicial
reasoning, and Sexton is used to illustrate the second. In Enoch and Pulley, a
woman who had Pulley in her custody told her that "it would be better to tell the
truth or it would lie upon her and the man [her co-accused] would go free." Park J
excluded Pulley's subsequent confession "as it was made after an inducement".
According to Mirfield, this decision was "irrational" because the court had not
asked themselves whether this inducement would have been likely to induce a
false confession. He writes: "It is difficult to see how such an inducement could
cast doubts on the reliability of the confession."8°
In Croydon, the court excluded the confession of the accused because a person had
told him: "I dare say you had a hand in it; you may as well tell me about it." Platt
B. ruled that the words used amounted to a sufficient inducement. Mirfield deems
his decision "ridiculous" because "there is no attempt... to decide how the
particular accused would have been likely to interpret the statement; the attractions
of a simple, formulaic approach were obviously too great."8'
75Ibid., p.51.
76Ibid., p. 52.
775 C & P 539.
780p. cit.
790p. cit.
800p. cit., p. 50.
81 Ibid., p.51.
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Mirfied regards the case of Sexton as providing the best example of exclusion for
reasons of impropriety. The accused was suspected of burglary and, while in the
charge of a policeman, had told the latter he would tell him all about it if given a
glass of gin. Best J refused to admit his subsequent confession on the ground
"police officers must not be permitted to tamper with prisoners to induce them to
make confessions." He was afraid that "an over zealous constable might defeat
the humane provisions of the law" and resort to "every sort of trick" if he were to
admit evidence that had been so "very improperly obtained." Mirfield does not
express his own opinion of the judgement directly, but includes the decision
within his framework of "sentimental irrationality." He also mentions, without
qualification, the criticisms of Wigmore, Deacon and Joy.
During his discussion of the decision in Baidry, Mirfield cites another four cases82
that exhibited judicial "excessive tenderness"; namely: Drew (1837),83 Morton
(1843),84 Furley (l844) and Harris (1844).86 In all of these cases, the confession
was excluded by the court and, according to Mirfield, "merely because the infant
police caution had been administered to the suspect in a garbled manner." 87
In order to give more weight to his observations of this period, Mirfield then
proceeds to repeat Wigmore's three reasons for the existence of this "sentimental
irrationality."
82For the facts of these cases, see the account of Wigmore, op. cit.
830p. cit.
840p. cit.
85Op. cit.
860p. cit.
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Mirfield's assessment of the judicial response to questioning of the accused after
1852 is not easy to assess from his text. At one point he seems to suggest that
Baidry represented a change in judicial thinking that exhibited less sympathy
towards the accused. He cites at length the dicta delivered by the Court of Crown
Cases Reserved, that they could not "without some shame.. .consider what
objections have prevailed" and that "justice and common sense [had] been
sacrificed..., at the shrine of guilt." He also refers to the "progeny" of Baidry:
Sleeman (1853), 88Jarvis (1867)89, and Reeve and Hancock (1872),° in which
confessions were admitted in spite of the existence of what might have been
termed "inducements".
At a later point, however, Mirfield cites cases which exhibited pre-Baidry
sentiment, such as Fennell (1881). 91 Excluding the statement of the accused,
Coleridge LCJ had stated, a confession
"must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however, slight, nor by the exertion of any
improper influence."
He then precedes to cite a number of cases dealing with police questioning of
suspects, such as Gavin (1885),92Histed (1898)93and Knight and Thayre
870p. cit., pp. 54-55.
886 Cox CC 245.
89LR 1 CCR 96.
90LR 1 CCR 362.
917 QBD 147.
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(1 905)94where the courts were also protective of the accused by restricting the
ability of the police to ask questions.
Mirfield's observations on the judicial approach to pre-trial questioning of the
accused can be summarised as follows: up to 1852, the courts are very protective
of the accused in general and are prepared to exclude a confession in
circumstances where there is little doubt in its veracity; after 1852, the courts
appear less protective but not unambiguously so.
As for the interrogation powers of magistrates, Mirfield shares the same opinion
as Stephen and Williams. He maintains that by 1850 "the prisoner is absolutely
protected against all judicial questioning."95 He states that this was the combined
effect of section 18 of the Indictable Offences Act 1848, which required
examining justices to caution the accused that he was not obliged to say anything,
and the decision in Berriman (1854)96which took the view that the magistrate was
prohibited from questioning the accused other than in terms specifically allowed
by the Act itself. As an historical explanation, he maintains that the magistrates
had assumed a more judicial role and, like judges before them, were anxious to
avoid any association with the procedures of the Star Chamber.
9215 Cox CC 656.
19 Cox CC 16.
942OCoxCC711.
950p. cit., p. 67.
966 Cox CC 388.
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Conclusion:
In this chapter, I have set out individually the views of four writers each of whom
has been a leading commentator in his generation, and has presented a history of
English criminal justice through the rules relating to confessions and questioning
of the accused. One might have expected that over a period of more than one
hundred years, different conceptions and interpretations of history would have
evolved, taking into account the new understandings of the time. Yet, if we look at
these presentations of history collectively, a consensual view over the role of the
accused is apparent. Hence, between 1800 and 1852, Stephen, Wigmore, Williams
and Mirfield all argue that the courts took a protective approach to pre-trial
questioning of the accused. They maintain that the courts had placed procedural
fetters on magistrates to caution the accused against self-incrimination, and had
excluded both judicial and extra-judicial confessions upon the slightest pretext.
This was deemed to be the product of a "sentimental irrationality" that had
emerged following the collapse of the Star Chamber.
Although the position after 1852 is not as clear and far less details are provided by
the writers, all agree that the accused is protected against judicial questioning.
They differ only as to the extent of the protection against extra-judicial
questioning. Even here, however, there appears to be a general position that the
courts were less protective after 1852. Williams is the lone voice proclaiming the
accused is protected from all forms of pre-trial interrogation.
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In their presentation of the role of the accused, it seems that conventional wisdom
has constructed the individual within a dialectical history of "progress" and "social
evolution." During the reigns of the Tudors and Stuarts where freedom, due
process and the Rule of Law were barely recognized, the consensus views the
individual as a "subject" of royal power. As a result of constitutional conflict
during the seventeenth century, a new construction of the individual based on
"sentiment" emerges: the "citizen." The "citizen" is equipped with an armoury of
rights which protects the freedom of all individuals, including accused persons,
from violations by the "state." During the second half of the nineteenth century
(post-1852), "sentiment" conflicts with "reason," producing an "enlightened"
construction of the individual that separates the "citizen" from the "criminal": i.e.
the "suspect."
I suggest that this conceptualisation of history, this presentation of the formative
values of the English criminal justice system and the role which the accused is
perceived as playing, cannot be accepted at face value. An honest and accurate
account of history requires a re-evaluation of the data upon which such theories
are built. In chapter two, therefore, I examine in detail the building blocks and
evidential foundations of the consensus.
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Questioning of the Accused and the Construction of the Individual
Chapter two
1. Introduction:
In the last chapter, I set out the early history of pre-trial judicial and extra-judicial
questioning of the accused as understood by leading writers, and suggested that
this presented a picture of development and progress. 	 As a result of
"improvements" in criminal procedure, they observed in general terms that the
role played by the accused by the middle of the nineteenth century (1852) was no
longer dictated by authority; the accused was a citizen with all the rights and
freedoms that entailed. But liberal sentiment had taken protection of the individual
too far resulting in judges excluding statements of the accused "upon the slightest
pretext" t and wherever there was a breach of procedure. The case of Baidry in
1852 was deemed to represent the foundations of the modern system in which
rationality rather than voluntarist sentiment informed the underlying values of the
English criminal justice system.
The object of this chapter is to subject this interpretation of history to critical
scrutiny, and to assess the evidential and methodological foundations upon which
it has been based. It will be argued that these writers have been unsystematic,
which in turn has led to a number of inconsistencies and contradictions in the
picture presented. It will also be maintained that the conventional wisdom is
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further undermined by its approach to the evidence and the quality of the data
relied upon.
It will be apparent that as this critique unfolds various inconsistencies may arise;
but this is an unavoidable consequence of having to work within the analytical
framework that has been laid down. The search for an alternative analytical
framework is dealt with in chapter three.
2. Examining the consensus:
a) Methodology
All of the writers argue that certain values dominated particular eras or specified
time frames and that this was reflected in judicial attitudes towards questioning of
the accused. Judged by academic criteria, such general conclusions would require
a systematic framework for them to have any validity. Thus, we would expect the
leading writers to examine both judicial and extra-judicial questioning of the
accused within the same time frame. Yet, they chose to examine judicial and
extra-judicial questioning separately and within different time frames, or focused
on one aspect of questioning to the exclusion of the other. As a result, the
arguments advanced are riddled with inconsistencies and contradictions. For
instance, Stephen writes that by 1848 the accused was "absolutely protected
against judicial questioning;" but he also states that by 1852, the courts were not
as protective as they used to be when determining the admissibility of confessions.
'Wigmore, op. cit., p. 297.
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The former gives the impression of a system that by the 1850s is orientated around
the need to protect the accused; the latter of a system that has other interests it
thinks it should protect. If these rules had been analysed within a theoretical
framework, these two positions might not seem so inconsistent; but in their current
form it is difficult to avoid the contradiction.
This problem is even more apparent in Wigmore's analysis. Wigmore's general
proposition consists of two parts. The first claims that the law of confessions can
be explained through certain stages in history, each having its own defining
characteristics. Within this general theory, he argues that the 1800s were
characterised by "a general suspicion towards all confessions... .and an inclination
to repudiate them upon the slightest pretext." The second claims that judicial
decisions up to 1852 gave an "appearance of sentimental irrationality to the law"
as judges excluded statements of the accused due to the possible influence of
social class, the absence of a right of appeal and a set of rules of criminal
procedure that were regarded as unfair to the defence. After 1852 and Baidry, the
law is rationalised and the same factors no longer appear to operate. Thus, the first
part is presented as a general claim and covers the whole of the 1800s; while the
second states that the values behind judicial decision-making were different before
1852 from those values that were applied after 1852. Indeed, the latter seems to
suggest that there was no "general suspicion" throughout the 1800s. Contradictory
propositions are advanced, therefore, within the same time period.2
2Similar contradictions are apparent in Mirfield's work as he implies, in chapter two, that the courts
were less protective of the accused after Ba/dry in 1852; but then in chapter three, he states that he
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The absence of a consistent analytical framework also accounts for the occasional
incoherence of some of the arguments. This is particularly evident in Mirfield's
work. In his description of confession evidence up to 1852, for example, he sets
out two possible themes: first, judicial protection of the accused; and second,
judicial method in determining admissibility of evidence. In the account that I set
out in the last chapter, however, the role of the accused disappears as a theme
after 1852 and then suddenly resurfaces in the discussion of Rules on Police
Questioning. At no stage in his discussion of the case law after 1852, does
Mirfield provide a general assessment of the attitudes of the courts in relation to
the accused between 1852 and the decision in Ibrahim. Instead, he appears to
focus on the methods of judicial reasoning (even this is not clear because of his
discussion of police questioning). Having raised the first theme in his first section,
Mirfield ought to have examined it throughout the period which he was analysing.
As for his section on Rules on Police Questioning, it is not altogether clear why it
has been included in the chapter. Although he states that the courts began to
become concerned with police questioning of the accused after 1885, there is no
link with the earlier passages. It is treated as a separate development that emerged
"out of the blue" and which will be picked up later. Its relationship with his two
possible themes is not discussed.
The absence of any systematic method is evident also in the tendency to prefer
theories or explanations plucked from repositories of "common sense," rather than
from verifiable data. Hence Wigmore's explanations for the judicial "sentimental
agrees with Stephen that, by 1850, "the accused was absolutely protected against all judicial
questioning"(p. 67).
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irrationality" before 1852 are not based upon case analysis or upon any other data.
He argues that social conditions and class relations were behind this judicial
sentiment but this is not supported by any references to the case law nor to the
social situations in which many cases arose.
Even where he cites data, they are presented so as to fit his theories instead of
providing the foundation from which a theory could be constructed. His historical
analysis includes only those cases that appear to support his conclusions; the cases
that refute it are mentioned only in the substantive chapters where they are
confined to their particular facts and sub-category in the law of confessions.
Distorted evaluation of the data caused by adherence to pre-determined theories is
compounded by their interpretation in the light of original premises or
unacknowledged ideology. For instance, Wigmore constructs his propositions on
the basis of a legal philosophy which states that the object of the criminal trial is to
convict the guilty simpliciter. When a judge comes to determine the admissibility
of evidence, he presumes that his decision should be based on its reliability. Thus
if a confession is obtained illegally or involuntarily, it will be excluded only if, in
the circumstances, it is likely to be untrue. The consequence of Wigmore's
argument is that unless a judge decides in this way, his reasoning is "irrational."
The cases which he cites as examples of "sentimental irrationality" are decisions
in which the judge did not use his reliability principle.3
31t might be argued, for instance, that it is not "irrational" for a judge to be concerned with
protecting individual rights because it protects the legitimacy and integrity of the system.
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Mirfield is guilty of the same error. He determines the values of English law in the
nineteenth century by reading Wigmore, Stephen and Bentham. Case law is cited
to justify those opinions rather than to evaluate them, and any decisions that are
inconsistent with their analyses are rationalised or relegated to the footnotes.4
b) The wrong type of evidence
Not only is the approach of the leading writers unsystematic, but it is also highly
dependent upon data that are poor in quality and equivocal in nature. Three of the
writers (Stephen, Wigmore and Mirfield) rely either directly or indirectly on case
reports from the nineteenth century. Yet, the details of judicial reasoning for
decisions are rarely stated in the reports (particularly before 1850); cases such as
Cox v Coleridge provide the exception. Further, in a significant number of cases
the judgement is not even reported verbatim. The case reporter prefers to leave us
with a bare summary. 5
 Moreover, where the case report details the facts of the case
and cites the judgements verbatim, there is often more than one plausible
interpretation. 6
 The quality of these original data thus renders problematic any
explanation through case law alone of the values which the judiciary applied. The
case law is too ambiguous and, as a consequence, is open to different
interpretations.
The ambiguity of the evidence cited, and the degree to which it supports the
positions advanced by each writer will be explored in the next section.
4See p. 50, op. cit. The implication is that the cases mentioned in the footnotes are exceptional, but
Mirfield does not indicate why we should treat them as such.
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Assessing the Evidence
James Fitzjames Stephen:
Protecting the accused against "judicial questioning":
In his first section, he claims that by 1848, the year in which the Indictable
Offences Act 1848 was passed, the accused was "absolutely protected against all
judicial questioning before or at the trial." In short, he contends that English law
offered to the accused every conceivable protection against improper questioning
by judges at the trial and by magistrates during preliminary examinations.
The first evidence that Stephen uses to support his claim is the Indictable Offences
Act 1848, section 18. He states that the accused was "absolutely protected"
because the section required magistrates to warn the accused not to say anything
and that if they did, it would be taken down and used in evidence.
It seems that, at first glance, the section is very protective because the procedure
consists of warning the accused of the dangers not once, but twice of saying
anything. The procedure appears mandatory because the section states the
magistrate "shall" administer to the accused the first warning that "you are not
obliged to say anything," and "always.. .shall state to him and give him clearly to
5For example, see: Row, Thornton, Gilham and Wilde, op. cit.
6See, for instance, the discussions of Jarvis, Reeve and Hancock and Sleeman, infra.
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understand, that he has nothing to hope from any promise of favour." The content
of the first warning also implies that the magistrate has no power to force the
accused to make a statement because it states that he is "not obliged to say
anything."
While the section appears to limit the magistrate's powers of questioning, it is
doubtful it amounted to "absolute protection" from questioning because no
"rights" are conferred upon the accused in the event of any breach of those
powers. The first caution, for example, states "whatever you say will be taken
down in writing, and may be given against you upon your trial" (emphasis added).
The word "whatever" seems to suggest that even if the magistrate decided to
interrogate the accused, with or without a caution, the answers would be
admissible at the trial. The second caution admits statements of the accused
explicitly even if the magistrate himself, or his clerk, had threatened the accused
because it states "whatever he shall then say may be given in evidence against him
upon his trial, notwithstanding such promise or threat."
The final proviso precludes any evidentiary consequences if the accused is not
cautioned. It states, "nothing herein enacted or contained shall prevent the
prosecution in any case from giving in evidence any admission or confession or
other statement of the person accused or charged, made at any time, which by Law
would be admissible as evidence against such person" (emphases added). This
suggests that unless the confession had been preceded by a threat or a promise, any
statement made by accused persons, whether to a police officer or to a magistrate,
7See chapter one, p. 7.
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would be admissible in criminal proceedings. if this interpretation is correct, the
caution operates in order to facilitate the admission of evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible; it does not purport to protect the accused.
In fact, it seems that the statute is intended more as guidance for the magistrate
rather than as a set of legally binding procedures. if we examine the content of the
warnings, the Act does not specify the actual words to be used. The section
prefaces the caution with: "and shall say to him these words, or words to the like
effect" (emphasis added). Further, if we examine the Parliamentary debates that
took place during the passage of the Bill for the Indictable Offences Act 1848, the
draftsman did not use mandatory language that would place magistrates under a
legal obligation to caution. To have done so, would have encouraged civil actions
against magistrates which the Act was designed to prevent. Introducing the Bill to
the Commons, the Attorney General lamented:
"at present, the law upon the subject was to be found scattered among
many Acts of Parliament, and many recorded decisions of the courts; and it
was difficult, if not almost impossible, for magistrates to execute their
various functions without being subject to prosecutions or actions in the
honest performance of their duty."8
The object of the section was to lay down a mandatory procedure for magistrates
to follow so that they would be protected against actions for malicious
8Parl. Debates (HC: 1848) 3rd series, vol. 96 (3rd Feb. cot. 4).
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prosecution, etc.;9the object was not to provide a canopy of rights to protect the
accused against abuses of state power.
An examination of the case law
As section 18 does not offer protection to the accused against the questioning of a
magistrate unequivocally, it is important that we examine the case law. It should
be noted that Stephen does not provide any specific evidence from case law.
Nevertheless, he states, in general, that the courts were very protective of the
accused in the nineteenth century when it came to judicial questioning.'° This
would suggest that the accused was never prejudiced by the questioning of a
magistrate. As the 1848 Act was intended to codify the existing law,"I will
examine the case law before and after 1848.
(i) The position before 1848:
From the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was a line of judicial authority
protective of the accused. Judges prohibited magistrates from questioning the
accused in the same way as a witness;' 2
 they held that no power existed to compel
the accused to make a statement,' 3nor to trick him into making one. 14 They also
cautioned the accused, as a matter of practice, of the dangers of making any
9During the same debate, it was pointed out that some magistrates had even tended their resignation
because they were being harassed with actions (ibid., at cot. 6).
'°HCL, op. cit., pp. 43 8-439.
"See the speech of the Attorney Generat; Par!. Debates (1848 HC), op. cit.
12 See Wilson (1817) Hott 597.
' 3 See Green (1832)5 Car & P312.
' 4Arnold (1838) 8 Car & P621.
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statement, 15
 and refused to hold the caution was always curative of irregularities in
questioning of the accused.'6
This does not mean, however, that the courts always protected the accused from
being questioned, nor that they offered him every protection. Indeed, after 1826
the courts held that the statements of an accused made during a magistrate's
interrogation were admissible so long as the magistrate did not induce or threaten
the accused.' 7
 Although there are instances of the courts excluding statements of
the accused because of a failure to caution, this was only because of the presence
of an earlier inducement;' 8
 confessions obtained by an inducement were
inadmissible in any event.' 9
 There is not a single decision before 1848 that held a
confession should be excluded merely on the ground that a caution was not
administered to the accused. The caution was not used as a protective procedure
which accused persons could utilise in their defence. Moreover, in some cases
possible threats were construed as cautions to facilitate the admission of evidence.
In Wright's Case (1830),20 the accused was told by the magistrate during a
preliminary examination that his wife had already confessed, and that the case was
strong enough against him for a bill to be sent to the grand jury. Counsel for the
accused objected that this amounted to a menace and that the subsequent
confession made by the accused should be excluded. But Parke J. held that the
' 5 See: Gilham (1828) 1 Mood. 186; Clewes (1830)4 Car & P221 at 223; Webb (1831)4 Car & P
564at564; Green(1832)5Car&P312at312;Drew(1838)8Car&P140at141.
' 6See Best J in Sexton (1823), op. cit. at 103; Denman CJ in Howes (1834) 6 Car & P404; Rule
(1844) 8 J.P. 599.
' 7 See Ellis (1826) Ry & M 432.
8See Cooper v Wicks (1833) 5 Car & P 536.
19The rule in Warickshall, op. cit.
201 Lewin 47.
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statement of the accused was admissible because the magistrate's interjection
amounted only to a "caution".
Further, it is unlikely that accused persons, many of whom were illiterate, would
have understood the significance of the caution, as there was no guarantee of legal
representation before a magistrate. In Cox v Coleridge (1822),21 the defendants
were two justices of the peace who were carrying out a preliminary enquiry in
relation to a felony allegedly committed by the prisoner. During the course of
their proceedings, an attorney (the plaintiff) entered the room, stating he had been
retained by the prisoner. Whereupon the justices ordered that the attorney be
removed forcibly from the room. The plaintiff's action for trespass and common
assault depended on whether there was a general "right" for the accused to have
counsel during a preliminary enquiry. It was held by a majority of the court that
no right to counsel (or an attorney) existed at this stage of the proceedings,
although a discretion was vested in the court to allow representation in individual
cases.	 According to the majority opinion, the magistrate's preliminary
examination was, in many instances, an investigation into the circumstances of the
offence and that it was not appropriate to grant representation to the accused at
this stage. The attitude of the court is best summed up by Best J:
"Besides, if this right exists, there can never be any private examinations,
which are very frequent, and often very necessary for the purpose of
justice. They are useful, not merely to take down in writing such evidence
as is to be offered at trial, but to find where further evidence may be
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obtained, and to get at accomplices. These objects would be defeated if
any one had a right to be present who could convey intelligence of what
had passed.....It may be extremely hard that an innocent person should be
confined for an hour, when, if he were allowed professional assistance and
witnesses, he could demonstrate his innocence, and entitle himself to his
discharge. But there is no rule, however wise, that does not produce some
inconvenience or hardship, and the question always must be, does the good
outweigh the evil. Considering how many desperate offenders might
escape justice, and proceed uninterrupted in their guilty career, if this right
were allowed, I have no hesitation in saying that it ought not to be
admitted, and that we ought to give judgement for the defendants."22
Contrary to Stephen's assertions, the language of Best J indicates that the court
was more interested in convicting "desperate offenders" than protecting the
accused against magisterial questioning. This decision is particularly severe in the
light of the fact the prisoner was illiterate and not in the best position to defend
himself.23
Four years after Cox v Coleridge, however, it appears that the courts had changed
their stand. In Ellis (1826)24, the accused claimed "the right of his attorney's
attendance and assistance"25during his examination before the committing
211 Barn. & Cress. 37.
22Ibid., at 54-55. See also the judgment of Abbot CJ at 49 which is expressed in similar language.
23 See defence counsel's speech at p. 46.
24Ry & Mood. 432.
25Ibid.
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magistrate, but was refused by the magistrate. Littledale J subsequently acquitted
the accused because he had been denied professional assistance.
Yet, the significance of this change is not clear. Ellis was only authority for the
proposition that the accused had a right for counsel to be present at committal
proceedings where he requested it. The court was not under an obligation to
provide the accused with counsel nor to tell him that he had a right to be
represented. This had two consequences. First, an accused who was poor would
not have been able to afford legal representation and therefore, would not have
been protected. Second, if he was illiterate and ignorant, as many suspects at the
time appear to have been, he might not have realised the need for a lawyer at
committal proceedings.
It should also be mentioned that many of the investigative functions of magistrates
were being transferred gradually to police officers, whose legal powers of
questioning, although not set out by statute, 26had not been limited in a significant
way by the courts. By 1831, they mentioned the need for a caution, but only in
very limited situations. In Swatkins (183 l), 27Patteson J believed a confession was
unsafe if it was made to a constable after an interview with a different officer
(because of the dangers of collusion) without a caution. He held, however that the
caution was unnecessary on the facts because the accused had been "detained as an
26See the Metropolitan Police Act 1829, 10 Geo. IV, cap. 44. Section 7 confers powers to
"apprehend" and "secure" in custody those whom he has just cause to suspect, etc; it does not
confer any power to question the accused.
274Car&P548.
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unwilling witness" and was not under any charge at the time. 28 In Kerr
(1837), 29Park J made it clear that even in cases where the accused was detained
under a charge or as a suspect, a police constable was not legally obliged to
caution the accused before asking a question. He stated:
"there does not appear to have been anything improper in the conduct of
the policeman; though, treating it as a general question, I think that it is
better that it should not be done."
As with the magistrate's caution to the accused, it was up to the police officer to
decide whether, in the circumstances of the individual case, he should caution or
not (although a judge would caution the accused in similar circumstances).
Even in those cases where a police officer did caution an accused, it is unlikely
that he would have understood its significance. There was no right to legal advice
at this stage, so the caution would not have had, necessarily, any protective effect.
In the final analysis, up to 1848 it could not be said that the accused was
"absolutely protected" against judicial questioning. A special procedure, in the
form of a caution, was applied when the accused was questioned but this was not
for his/her benefit. The prime objective was to ensure the admissibility of
statements. Assistance of counsel was made available but only in limited
28Ibid., at 550. It should be stressed that Patteson J was not saying that a statement of an accused
under charge was inadmissible unless preceded by a caution. Rather, he was confirming that a
confession should not be admitted when there is a possibility that a person under a charge may
have been induced by a person in authority. Such a confession would be inadmissible unless the
accused repeated his statement after a caution.
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situations, and at a time when the real questioning powers were exercised by
police officers who could question an accused in the absence of lawyers and away
from the public gaze.
(ii) An examination of the case law after 1848
Questioning by Magistrates:
Stephen's claim of "absolute protection" is also difficult to accept after 1848 and
the passing of the Indictable Offences Act because of continuous disagreements
over the evidential effect of section 18. According to Stephen, section 18
prevented the magistrate from questioning the accused without a caution, which
had the effect of sealing his lips during the preliminary examination. Although
this assessment is supported by Kimber (1849),° Higson (1849)31 and Pettit
(1850),32where the prosecution was obliged to prove to the court that a caution had
been duly administered to the accused before admitting his statement, in Samsome
(1 85O) Campbell LCJ held that the proviso containing the caution was "merely a
direction to the magistrates how to proceed, and not a condition precedent." He
continued:
298 Car. & P. 177.
303 Cox CC 223.
'2 Car & P769.
324 Cox CC. 164.
334 Cox CC. 203. This decision was made "en bane."
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"If he neglects his duty, there is no clause of nullity in the statute, nothing
to exclude a confession which would be admissible at Common Law."34
In the eyes of this bench, therefore, the true import of section 18 lay in the
expression, "or words to the like effect," rather than the word "shall." 35 The Act
was intended only to guide magistrates in the execution of their functions; it was
not envisaged that "obligations" would be imposed upon them which the accused
could utilise in the presentation of his defence. This was confirmed by the proviso
which assumed statements of the accused were admissible in the absence of a
magistrate's caution.
As no power to exclude evidence attached to the giving of a caution, its purpose
and role could not have been to protect the accused, as Stephen claimed. In fact,
the purpose of the caution is made clear in the earlier part of Campbell LCJ's
judgement. He states:
"in this case there was no evidence of any promise or threat whatever, and
therefore there could be no necessity for showing that any caution had
been given; for I am of the opinion that the giving of such a caution
cannot be a condition precedent to the admissibility of every declaration
made by a prisoner to magistrate read over to him and signed by him."36
34Ibid., at 207. The rest of the judges state they "concur" with Campbell LCJ or are "entirely of the
same opinion."
35 See further, p. 6 supra.
36Ibid.
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If a caution was necessary only upon the discovery of a threat or promise, its
demonstrable function was to negative the effect of that threat or promise; it was
not to warn and protect the accused against making any further statement. In other
words, the caution operated to facilitate the admission of statements rather than to
prevent them from being made.
In Stripp (1856), 37the pre-Samsome position was reaffirmed indirectly by Jervis
CJ,38but there was a difference of opinion amongst the judiciary after 1848. In R v
Bate (187	 Montague Smith J took the same approach as the court in Samsome.
He stated section 18 of the 1848 Act "was framed for the very purpose of
dispelling (emphasis added) from the prisoner's mind any hope or fear excited by
a promise or threat." 40Consequently, written statements made before the
committing magistrate were admissible nothwithstanding the presence of an
earlier inducement by the police officer.
If the courts were still holding that the magistrate's caution could be curative of
improper questioning of the accused by a police officer, Stephen was wrong in
assuming that the courts consistently used the caution to protect the accused.
37Dears. 648
38By stating that "section 18 of 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, which requires that a prisoner shall be
cautioned, in order to render what he says admissible in evidence against him...", Jervis CJ
assumed that the caution was a condition precedent to admissibility. No reference was made to
Sainsoine in the judgment because it was not relevant to the determination of the case.
i I Cox CC. 686.
40Ibid., p. 688.
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As for the provision of legal assistance during preliminary proceedings, there is no
additional case law up to the time Stephen was writing, that provided any more
guidance on the issue. It appears that the issue had been settled.41
Questioning by police officers:
In the case analysis of judicial questioning before 1848, it was mentioned that the
protections afforded to the accused were insignificant because the police had taken
over the responsibility of investigative questioning. It was also observed that the
protection afforded to the accused during such questioning was minimal. An
analysis of the case law between 1848 and 1883 shows no agreement among the
judges as to the circumstances in which a police officer was able to question an
accused, if at all, nor as to the evidential consequences that followed if he
exceeded his powers.
In Berriman (1854)42
 the accused was questioned by a police officer on the basis
of a local rumour that she had given birth to and killed a child. The accused made
a statement to the police officer who then charged her with murder. During the
course of his testimony, the police officer was about to refer to her statement when
Erle J interjected:
41 1t should be pointed out that the Indictable Offences Act 1848, s 17 implied the right to have legal
counsel present during the committal if the accused wanted, as depositions of witnesses could not
be admitted at the trial unless "he or his counsel or attorney had a full opportunity of cross-
examining the witness." This does not mean, however, that the accused had the right to be provided
with counsel at this stage.
420p. cit.
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"By the law of this country, no person ought to be made to criminate
himself, and no police officer has any right, until there is clear proof of a
crime having been committed, to put searching questions to a person for
the purpose of eliciting from him whether an offence has been perpetrated
or not, if there is evidence of an offence, a police officer is justified, after a
proper caution, in putting to a suspected person interrogatories with a view
to ascertaining whether or not there are fair and reasonable grounds for
apprehending him. Even this course should be very sparingly resorted
to... .1 wish it to go forth amongst those who are inferior officers in the
administration of justice, that such a practice is entirely opposed to the
spirit of our law."
In Erie J's formulation of English law, a police officer was not allowed to question
an accused without "clear proof of a crime having been committed." He fails to
elaborate upon what constitutes "clear proof," but it is evident from the facts that
this did not include mere rumour. if "clear proof" existed, a police officer had the
right to question a "suspected person" in order to determine whether he should
make an arrest, but only after administering a caution. Yet he stressed even that
course of action should be resorted to "very sparingly."
The evidential consequences of a police officer breaching these powers is not set
out clearly by Erie J and left a lot to judicial interpretation. First, it is not apparent
whether there was a new "exclusionary rule" of evidence, a discretion to exclude
on the facts, or a combination of these. Second, if there was a new exclusionary
rule, there was uncertainty as to its scope. The operative factor(s) were not stated;
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they could have been questioning in the absence of independent proof of an
offence, questioning without a caution, or a combination of these. Third, if this
was a new exclusionary rule coupled with a discretionary power to exclude where
questioning with a caution had been resorted to frequently rather than "sparingly,"
he does not state in what circumstances a police officer would be allowed to
question without judicial interference.
In general, the case appears protective of the accused, but it would be overstating
the case to argue that Erie J had ensured the accused was "a'ôsoute
	 protected,
as Stephen implied. The evidential consequences were not set out clearly and a
judge could have interpreted them very narrowly. The only absolute prohibition
appears to be questioning an accused without proof of an offence having been
committed. The number of situations in which that would occur, however, would
be few. In all other instances, he seemed to suggest the police officer had a "right"
to ask questions because he stated "no police officer has any right, until (emphasis
added) there is clear proof of a crime having been committed." No evidence was
required to show that the suspect had any connection with the crime other than
mere suspicion. The only protection afforded to the accused was the caution, the
legal significance of which is unstated.
The cases between 1854 and 1883 reveal different opinions in respect of police
questioning, and thus different degrees of protection extended to the accused. The
full range of views is best illustrated by court decisions in Ireland during the 1 850s
and 1860s, and which were cited frequently in English courts. At one end of the
spectrum, judges took a protective approach and excluded statements of the
54
accused on grounds of the unconstitutionality of police questioning, with or
without a caution, before or after the charge. 43 They also excluded statements
because custodial police questioning of the accused, even in the absence of
specific threats or inducements, breached the rule that confessions must be
voluntary. 44
 There were Judges also at the opposite end of the spectrum, who did
not view police questioning of the accused as constitutionally improper nor as a
necessary violation of the voluntariness rule. Statements of the accused could be
excluded only if there had been held out threats or inducements. The legality of
police questioning of the accused was thus irrelevant to the issue of
admissibility.45
 There were also judges who sought the middle ground; that there
was nothing improper in police questioning of the accused per se, but the
circumstances of that questioning, along with the absence of any caution could be
factors that a judge could take into account in the exercise of his discretion.46
In some of the English cases of that period, another judicial compromise was
found: to condemn custodial police interrogations of accused persons conducted
without a caution in the summing up to the jury, rather than to exclude altogether
statements so obtained. In some instances, this approach did not prejudice the
accused. In R v Cheverton (l862), for example, a police superintendent had gone
to see the accused with regard to the alleged murder of her illegitimate child. He
asked her certain questions, without cautioning or explaining to her the object of
43See: Bodkin (1863) 9 Cox CC 403; Toole (1856) 7 Cox CC 244, per Pigot CB, at 245; Gillis
(1866)11 Cox CC 69, per O'Hagan J at pp 72-73.
44See: Toole (1856), ibid, especially Baron Richards at p.245; Hassett (1861) 8 Cox CC 511.
45See Johnstone (1864) 15 ICLR 60, especially the majority judgments of Deasy B, Ball J and
Monahan CJ. Note also, however, the vigorous dissents of O'Brien J, Lefroy CJ and Pigot CB.
46Ibid, per Hayes J at pp 84-85.
472F&F833.
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his inquiries. The now Chief Justice Erie, did not consider the failure to caution as
a ground for excluding her replies. Instead, in his summing up to the jury he
commented:
"It has been suggested, on behalf of the prisoner, that the child supposed to
be murdered was sent away by her, and is, or may be, alive. That is not for
her to prove, but for the prosecution to disprove. To disprove it, her
answers to the questions of the police superintendent on the second
occasion are relied upon. To put such questions without any caution was
most improper, especially since the prisoner does not seem to have been
aware of their drift or object. And an unmarried woman might naturally be
reluctant to answer fully as to her illegitimate children."48
In the event, the accused was not prejudiced. The tenor of Erie CJ's summing up
and its intimation to the jury of the evidential value of her statements did enough
to secure an acquittal.
In other cases, the accused was not so fortunate. In R v Mick (1863),49 the accused
was charged with feloniously wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm.
On being taken into the police station, the accused was interrogated by the
superintendent without a caution. The caution was administered only after the
police officer knew that the accused was willing to make a statement. In
considering the admissibility of the statement, Mellor J stated:
48Ibid., p. 835.
490p. cit.
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"I think the course you pursued in questioning the prisoner was
exceedingly improper. I have considered the matter very much: many
judges would not receive such evidence. The law does not intend you, as a
policeman, to investigate cases in that way. I entirely disapprove of the
system of police officers examining prisoners. The law has surrounded
prisoners with great precautions to prevent confessions being extorted
from them, and the magistrates are not allowed to question prisoners, or to
ask them what they have to say; and it is not for policeman to do these
things. It is assuming the functions of a magistrate without those
precautions which the magistrates are required by law to use.....The
evidence is admissible, but I entirely disapprove of this way of obtaining
it."
The accused was found guilty subsequently and sentenced to 12 months'
imprisonment. In the other cases that followed this compromise, there is no
indication in the reports of the sentence given to the accused.5°
Although these cases do not attach any evidential significance to the legality of
police questioning of the accused, in 1863 Mellor J admitted that "many judges
would not receive such evidence." Arguably, this indicates that English judges
were as split over the issue as judges had been in Ireland.
50See further: R v Regan (1867) 17 LT 325; R v Reason (1872) 12 Cox CC. 228.
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In the 1870s, it is unclear which one of the approaches to police questioning of the
accused prevailed in judicial thinking because of ambiguity in the case reports. In
The Yeovil Murder Case (1877),51 for example, the accused were tried for
breaking into a dwelling house and stealing.
	 During his testimony, the
superintendent reported his conversation with one of the prisoners and stated that
he had asked the accused if he could account for himself on the night in question
(there is no mention of a caution). Interrupting his testimony, the Lord Chief
Justice stated:
"the law did not allow a man under suspicion and about to be apprehended
to be interrogated at all. A judge, magistrate, or jury could not do it, and it
was a very great mistake to do so in this instance."
Although the potential protection this afforded to accused persons was much
wider than that offered in Berriman, as a police officer was prevented even from
questioning a person suspected of committing a reported offence, the case report
does not state whether the statement was excluded. The possibility exists,
therefore, that judges preferred to leave the matter of interrogation of the accused
to the jury.
By 1883, at the time Stephen was writing, the law relating to police questioning
had become very complex and uncertain, containing a variety of sentiments and
approaches. In general, the courts expressed a rhetoric that was very protective of
the accused, but it did not confer any necessary benefit because the evidence was
5141 JP 187.
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still admitted in a significant number of cases. In the other cases, words were
more than rhetoric; statements were excluded merely on account of police
questioning, or because a caution had not been administered in the appropriate
manner. Whether or not an accused would have been "protected" against such
questioning, therefore, would have depended upon the values of the individual
judge.
Protecting the accused using the law on confessions
In his second section, Stephen commented on the law of confessions and the rule
that confessions must be voluntary. He stated that a very protective approach was
evident up to 1852, where the courts were prepared to take "almost anything as an
inducement to confess." Stephen does not cite any direct evidence to support this
assertion, but cites pages from Taylor, On Evidence, as the authority.
Yet, it is evident from the case law that the courts were not always so protective of
the accused and did not take "almost anything as an inducement to confess." As
early as 1809, there were judges who restricted the operation of the rule in a
number of respects. First, it was held that a confession could only be excluded if
threats or inducements were made by "persons interested" 52 in the prosecution of
the accused. In Row, 53 the court refused to exclude a confession obtained as a
consequence of threats from friends and neighbours. In Gilha.'n (1 828) and
521n later case law, the terminology is changed to "person in authority". See further the judgments
of Park J in: R v Gibbons (1823) 1 Car. & P96 at 98; R v Kingston (1830)4 Car. & P 387.
53Russ. & Ry. 153.
i Mood. 186.
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Wilde (1835), the rule was further refined to ignore threats or inducements that
were "spiritual" in nature. Nor did the rule operate to exclude confessions that
had been obtained in oppressive circumstances. In Thornton (1824),56 the court
admitted a confession of a fourteen year old boy notwithstanding the fact of illegal
detention for nearly a whole day, food deprivation and deliberate intimidation by
the police officer having charge of him. 57 In Gilham (1828), a confession was
admitted notwithstanding persistent questioning in the course of five or six
different examinations of the accused. The courts also admitted confessions
where the accused was not physically in the condition to make voluntary
decisions. In Spilsbury (1835),58for example, the court admitted a confession in
spite of evidence from the case report itself that the accused had been "drunk at
the time."59
In the period after 1852, Stephen argued the judicial mood swung against the
accused, a trend that was exemplified initially by Baldry6° which he stated
"considerably modified" the law. Yet, he does not explain from the text of Baidry
how it modified the existing law. On the facts, the accused was charged with
administering poison with intent to murder his wife. A dispute arose over the
admissibility of a confession made after a constable had cautioned the accused that
"he need not say anything to incriminate himself, what he did say would be taken
down and used as evidence against him." The defence objected to the admissibility
1 Mood. 452.
1 Mood. 27.
57The courts consistently held before 1852 that the fact of custody did not vitiate a confession.
See: Green &Allen (1834)6 Car. &P. 655; Wilde (1835) op. cit..
587 Car. & P. 187.
59For a contrary earlier example, see the much maligned decision of Best J in Sexton (1823), op.
cit.
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of the accused's subsequent statement on the ground the caution given differed in
a material respect from the statutory caution given by magistrates and amounted to
an inducement. The case was argued before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.
In dismissing the objection, it was held by Pollock CB, Campbell LCJ, Parke B,
Erie J and Williams J that the caution given was not the type of statement that
should exclude a confession.
Stephen probably regarded the decision as a considerable departure from the
existing law on the subject because some of the judges expressed attitudes that
were not protective of the accused. Baron Parke stated:
"I think there has been too much tenderness towards prisoners in this
matter. I confess that I cannot look at the decisions without some shame
when I consider what objections have prevailed to prevent the reception of
confessions in evidence; and I agree.. .that the rule has been extended quite
too far, and that justice and common sense have, too frequently, been
sacrificed at the shrine of mercy;"6'
Erle J agreed, confirming that,
600p. cit.
61 Ibid., at 445.
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"in many cases where confessions have been excluded, justice and
common sense have been sacrificed, not at the shrine of mercy, but at the
shrine of guilt ,,62
If we read the other judgements closely and the whole of the case report, however,
it is apparent that protection of the accused against questioning by the police or the
magistracy was still an important concern. Indeed, during arguments of counsel,
Campbell LCJ stated categorically:
"Prisoners are not to be interrogated. By the law of Scotland they may be;
but by the law of England they cannot."63
He made no distinction between interrogation by police and interrogation by
magistrates; both forms of interrogation were regarded as illegal. Similarly, if we
examine the interruptions of Pollock C.B during counsel's arguments and his
actual judgement, it could not be stated that he was hostile towards accused
persons, nor even that he expressed the same values as Baron Parke and Erle J.
During their discussion over the actual wording of the caution that was given to
the accused by the police officer, the following exchange occurred:
"Parke B. - What do you contend? - Do the words amount to a promise of
advantage, or to a threat?
Mills. That the words import an advantage.
'2Ibid., at 446.
63Ibid.,at 441.
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Parke B. - What is the advantage?
Mills. "Whatever you say will be given in evidence."
Pollock C.B. - No: not "whatever you say"; - but "what you do say." If the
word "whatever" had been employed it might have been different.
Mills. I was under the impression that the constable had used the word
"whatever'; but it is not so."64
It is apparent from this exchange that although Pollock C.B. was not prepared to
countenance exclusion on the basis of the words actually used by the police
officer, he would have excluded the confession if the police officer had stated:
"whatever you say may be taken down and used in evidence." This opinion of
Pollock C.B. is in pan materia with the judgements of Maule J in Furley65 and
Harris66 which were two of the decisions that had been regarded as too protective
of the accused.67
If we read the judgement of Pollock C.B., it is the protection of innocence as
opposed to the conviction of the guilty that is more evident. He stated:
"It is very important for the protection of innocence that any man charged
with a crime should be told at the time of his apprehension what that
Ibid., at 437.
65 Op. cit.
66Op. cit.
67See the comments of Campbell LCJ who states that this decision had been referred to them in
consequence of decisions reached by Coleridge J (Drew and Morton) and Maule J (Furley and
Harris); at 440. It should also be added that Pollock C.B. is not consistent; in his judgment, he
later criticises the decisions of Maule J, stating: "I cannot agree with his view on the subject, and I
have myself decided the other way, offering to reserve a case for the consideration of the judges"
(at 443). It is possible, however, that he misinterpreted Maule J's decisions.
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charge is. Attention should be paid to any communication made by him at
that time, because, generally a prisoner has no means of paying for
witnesses. The accused may frequently be in a situation at once to say that
he was in a place and could prove an alibi, and may be able to make some
statement of extreme importance, in order to shew that he did not commit
the crime, or was not the person intended to be charged. In criminal trials I
make a point of inquiring whether the prisoner made a statement on being
first taken into custody, and I have known repeatedly an acquittal occur
chiefly on the grounds of what the prisoner stated at the time of his
apprehension. It is proper that a prisoner should be cautioned not to
criminate himself; but I think that what he says ought to be adduced either
as evidence of his guilt, or as evidence in his favour."68
Although Pollock C.B. held there was no inducement on the facts, it is submitted
that he did so because he was afraid that a decision to exclude the evidence would
prevent a police officer from administering a caution. He regarded this as
important to the protection of innocence because it was one of the few
opportunities the accused had to put forward his side of the story.
Stephen's assertion that Baidry had "considerably modified the law" seems to
suggest that judges had taken a more hostile attitude towards accused persons
uniformly; that they were no longer prepared to give them the benefit of the doubt
and were more concerned with convicting the guilty. Yet I suggest the values that
judges exhibited were different. While Baron Parke and Erle J both took a "tough
68Ibid.,at 443-444.
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line," the decisions of Campbell LCJ and Pollock C.B., ostensibly, were as
protective of the accused as several of the decisions that had been decided before
Baldry.
Stephen also argued that after 1852 the courts were much less protective of the
accused and were not predisposed to exclude confession evidence. But the
evidence he presented is inadequate to base such an observation. He cited only
Jarvis (1867)69 and Reeve and Hancock (1872)70and we are not told why these two
cases are peculiarly representative of the period after 1852.
Moreover, if we examine the facts and the judgements of these cases it is clear that
the courts were not enunciating a new general approach to confession evidence
that was any less protective of the accused. On the facts of Jarvis, the accused
was charged with stealing some articles from his master. He was taken into the
master's office, whereupon he was told: "Jarvis, I think it is right that I should tell
you that, besides being in the presence of my brother and myself, you are in the
presence of two officers of the police; and I should advise you that to any question
that may be put to you will answer truthfully, so that, if you have committed a
fault, you may not add to it by stating what is untrue." The prosecutor then added:
"Take care, Jarvis; we know more than you think we know." The accused
subsequently made a confession and was convicted. The admissibility of the
confession was then reserved for the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. Holding
that the confession was rightly admitted, Kelly C.B. commented:
690p. cit.
700p. cit.
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"While it is our duty to watch with a jealous caution the rules of law as to
inducements to confess, for the sake of public justice we must not allow
consideration for prisoners to interfere with the rules or decisions of
courts of law."71
The possibility that the words "you will answer truthfully" and, "Take care, Jarvis,
we know more than you think we know," could have been seen as a threat by the
accused were dismissed by the Chief Baron. He deemed the statements "advice on
moral grounds ,,72
In this particular decision, both sentiment and result ostensibly went against the
accused. It should be noted, however, that even here the need to protect the
accused was considered by the courts. Kelly C.B. also stated that it was the court's
"duty to watch with a jealous caution the rules of law as to inducements to
confess," and accepted that if the accused had been told "you had better tell the
truth" this would have excluded the confession. 73
 It could also be argued that the
statement of the accused was voluntary even from a liberal perspective, as the
master's statement to his servant seemed to amount to no more than a caution. It
forewarned him specifically of the presence of two police officers and the possible
consequences of making a statement. In so doing, entrapment was avoided and
the case for an involuntary statement all the more difficult to sustain.
71 Ibid.,at 98.
72Ibid.,at 99.
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We might explain the less protective approach on the facts of the case. Although
the police officers were in attendance, they were not the ones who spoke with the
accused; it was his master. Masters often regarded themselves as the moral
guardians of their servants and it is possible, therefore, that the accused may have
perceived the statements as "moral guidance" from someone who knew his best
interests (particularly as the word "advice" was used), rather than as a threat.
One can make a similar observation of Reeve v Hancock. In that case, the accused
were told by their mother, in the presence of a police officer, that they "had better,
as good boys, tell the truth," after which they confessed. Expressing similar
sentiment to his earlier judgement, Kelly C.B. refused to exclude the confession,
and stated:
"The cases had no doubt at one time gone a great deal too far in the
exclusion of such evidence as that now in question. But the case cited
[Jarvis] is binding upon us; and it is a much stronger case than the
present."74
Willes J agreed with him adding: "It seems to have been supposed at one time,
that saying "Tell the truth" meant, in effect, "Tell a lie."75
Yet it should be noted the judges were not overruling previous decisions that had
stated "You had better tell the truth" amounted to a threat. Nor were they
73Willes J explicitly states that the decision would have been different if the accused had been told
"It is better for you to tell the truth" (see p. 99).
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exhibiting a more hostile attitude towards the accused than evinced in those cases;
rather they were reacting to the particular facts of this case and to the type of
person making the statement. In the previous case, it was argued that the master
acted as the "moral guardian" of the accused and thus could be expected to give
"moral guidance." In this case, it was a mother giving "parental guidance" to her
young children. 76
 Although possible, it is highly unlikely that a mother would
threaten her children to confess or that her children would think that she is telling
them that they must confess to the crime.
It is submitted, then, that neither of the cases which Stephen cites provides
unequivocal evidence that the courts had shifted their focus, in any considerable
extent, from a desire to protect the accused. Rather, their concern was not to
extend the exclusionary rule any further. 77 To do so could have had bad
consequences for the protection of innocence, 78 as well as for the conviction of the
guilty.
If Stephen's conclusions have little foundation when examined in the light of case
law, his rationale that the courts were still influenced by the "extreme severity of
the old criminal law" also might be difficult to support. In fact, there is case law
74Ibid., at 363.
75Ibid.
76According to the report, one was eight, the other was a little older.
771t should be noted that there were Irish authorities which sought to extend the voluntariness rule
by applying it to police questioning of the accused without any specific threats or inducements; see
Too/c, Hassett, Bodkin and Gil/is, and the minority judgments in Johnstone, op. cit..
78See the judgment of Pollock C.B. in Ba/dry mentioned above.
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to suggest that the courts were prepared to make the finest of distinctions to admit
statements where the accused stood charged with a capital offence.79
Henry Wigmore
In relation to the first part of his proposition, that the 1800s were characterised by
a "general suspicion towards all confessions," the evidence he presented is
inadequate. The cases are not representative of the century as a whole. The latest
case in his historical analysis is 1853.80
The second part of his proposition, that the courts were guilty of "sentimental
irrationality" before Baidry, is also inadequately supported. The only proofs
offered in his historical analysis are: (1)"sample" statements taken from cases
neither the names nor the facts of which he cited; and (2) sociological and
psychological insights into a class-based society and the motivations of judges
gleaned from sources he failed to mention.
If we take the sample statements he cited, they appear only as examples of
"sentimental irrationality" because of the way that Wigmore has presented them.
If the statements were identified properly by the case name, analysed in their
795ee Swatkins, op. cit., in which the prisoners Lloyd and Swatkins were both executed on a
technicality. See also the discussion of Williams, p. 31, infra.
80Blackburn (1853) 6 Cox CC 333.
69
factual context and in the light of the actual judgement, the decisions to exclude
would not be as irrational nor as illegitimate as Wigmore claimed.
The first example of "sentimental irrationality" was taken from Sexton
(1823), 81 which he condemned as an "absurd" decision because a statement was
excluded merely on account of "a promise to give a glass of gin." Yet, if we read
the case report, it is evident the facts have been misrepresented and the judgement
inadequately analysed. According to the report, the prisoner was in custody of a
police officer on suspicion of burglary. While he was in the police officer's
custody, the prisoner had told him: "If you will give me a glass of gin, I will tell
you all about it." The report then states: "Two glasses of gin were given to him,
and he made a confession of his guilt." In excluding the confession, Best J stated:
"The confession was very improperly obtained by the officer. Police
officers must not be permitted to tamper with prisoners to induce them to
make confessions; no kind of tampering is so dangerous as the giving them
spiritous liquors. Had the magistrate known that the officer had given the
prisoner gin, he would, no doubt, have told the prisoner that what he had
already said could not be given in evidence against him, and that it was for
him to consider whether he would make a second confession. If the
prisoner had been told this, what he afterwards said would be evidence
against him, but for want of this information, he might think that he could
not make his case worse than he had already made it, and under this
impression might sign the confession before the magistrate. If a
70
confession, so obtained, were allowed to be proved at the trial of a
prisoner, however careful a magistrate might be that a prisoner should not
be entrapped into a confession, an over zealous constable might defeat the
humane provisions of the law, by so practising on the hopes and fears of a
prisoner just before he came into the magistrate's presence, as to make
him, when before the magistrate, appear to make an uninfluenced and
voluntary confession, when every sort of trick had been made use of."82
It should be noted that it was not the promise of gin that resulted in the confession
being made and in Best i's decision to exclude the confession; but the fact of
giving the accused two glasses of gin. He held the confession involuntary, and
therefore inadmissible, because the accused's statement was made under the
influence of gin; not because of a promise to give a glass of gin. Moreover, it
could not have escaped Best J's attention that the accused was possibly a drunk
who was addicted to gin, which would explain why it was the prisoner who made
the offer. Under such circumstances, the confession would be unreliable as well
as involuntary. When analysed in the context of its facts and the case report,
Wigmore's claim that the decision in Sexton was "absurd" appears extreme.
Wigmore's second example, "If the prisoner would only give him his money, he
might go to the devil if he pleased," was taken from Jones (1809).83 As with his
description of Sexton, the words of the offending statement have been carefully
managed to make the case appear "irrational" and "soft" on the accused. If we read
81 0p. cit.
820p. cit., at 103.
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the report, however, the potential for a false confession clearly existed. The
prosecutor, after a prolonged pursuit, was alleged to have told the accused, who
was in the custody of a constable at the time, that "he only wanted his money, and
that if the prisoner gave him that, he might go to the devil if he pleased." The
accused subsequently gave him some money, saying "that's all he had left of it."
The trial judge left the evidence before the jury who found him guilty. The
conviction was overturned by a majority of the judges on the ground that the
statement was inadmissible. Although the judgements were not given in the
report, we can see why the judges might have so decided. First, the accused was
in the custody of a police officer and was not free to go. Second, he had been told
by the prosecutor (who was a private in the Somerset militia), to the effect that so
long as he gave him the money he demanded, he would be released. In the
absence of any proof that the money he gave the prosecutor was actually the
prosecutor's money, he could have handed any money over merely to set himself
free.
Wigmore's third example was taken from the case of Blackburn (1853).84 Far
from supporting Wigmore's argument, however, the case contradicts it because
Blackburn was decided in 1853, after the decision in Baidry.
In his fourth example of sentimental irrationality, he stated that a confession was
excluded because the prisoner was told "what he said would be used against him."
83Russ & Ry 152.
840p. cit.
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The example may have come from Furley (1843), 85 which is one of the cases
criticised by Wigmore later in the chapter. 86 In that case, Maule J excluded a
statement of the accused because a police officer had told her: "whatever
(emphasis added) she told him would be used against her on her trial." If this is
the same case referred to by Wigmore, he has misrepresented the decision by
omitting the words "whatever" and stressing the word "against." According to the
judge, the statement was inadmissible because "if you promise what he states will
be, at all events (emphasis added), used at the trial, you may thereby be inducing
him to confess." 87By using the words "at all events", Maule J indicated that it was
the word "whatever" that might have given the accused the impression that
anything she said would be held against her whether true or false. In her eyes,
therefore, the best course of action would have been tell the police officer what he
wanted to know. Analysed in this way, the decision to exclude the statement of the
accused was not as irrational as Wigmore's version of the facts would have us
believe.88
Even when we move to Wigmore's sociological arguments as to why the courts
were guilty of "sentimental irrationality," Wigmore proves unconvincing. In
respect of his first argument, that the courts were excluding confessions because of
attitudes of subordination of the "working classes" to those who had authority
over them, we would have expected to see unanimity amongst the judges for an
inducement to have proceeded from "a person in authority." Yet, in the early case
850p. cit.
86See p. 474 of his chapter.
87Ibid., at 77.
88 Indeed, this was the view of Pollock C.B. expressed in Baidry, supra.
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law, there is no reference to "persons in authority". In Row (1809),89the court held
the inducement had to come from a "person interested" in the prosecution, by
which they meant the prosecutor, a constable and the like. Unless the prosecutor
was a master or an employer of the accused, there is no reason to suppose that the
prosecutor was necessarily an authority figure. Furthermore, by the time the courts
had started to use the terminology of "person in authority" in the 1820s, 9° there
was no agreement whether or not it was a pre-condition for exclusion of any
confession. In Dunn (183 l), 91 Bosanquet J stated explicitly:
"Any person telling a prisoner that it will be better for him to confess, will
always exclude any confession made to that person."
Not only would we have expected the courts to look for persons in authority
before excluding a confession, but also we would have expected to see
confessions excluded "upon the slightest pretext" where they were obtained by "a
person in authority." Yet it is apparent that the courts condoned such confessions
even when obtained in oppressive circumstances.92
In regard to Wigmore's second observation, that the absence of a right of appeal
combined with the practice of judges deciding "without consultation" had
provided an excuse for excessive judicial tenderness, appears to be a direct lift
89Russ & Ry 153.
90For examples, see: R v Gibbons (1823) 1 Car & P97; R v Tyler and Finch (1823) 1 Car & P 128.
914 Car & P 543. See also Kingston (1830) 4 Car & P 387, where the court excluded the accused's
confession made to a surgeon after he had told her, "You are under suspicion of this, and you had
better tell all you know." Although it could be argued that the surgeon was an "authority figure" as
he was empowered by the state to pronounce death, the importance of a person in authority was not
expressed by the court when determining the admissibility of the statement.
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from Baron Parke's judgement in Baidry (1852). 93Baron Parke, commenting on
the cases before 1852, said:
"..justice and common sense have, too frequently, been sacrificed at the
shrine of mercy. We all know how it occurred. Every judge decided by
himself upon the admissibility of the confession, and he did not like to
press against the prisoner, and took the merciful view of it."
But this observation of Baron Parke is not supported by the texts. First and
foremost, judges did consult. In Kingston (1830),95the case report states that "Mr
Justice J. Parke, having conferred with Mr Justice Littledale, held...". In Enoch
and Pulley (1833), 96the confession is excluded by "Mr Justice J. Parke (having
conferred with Mr. Justice Taunton)." 97 In Croydon (1846),98the presiding judge,
Mr Rogers, made a specific point of telling the court that he had consulted before
excluding the confession. He stated: "I have consulted with Mr Baron Platt upon
the points raised, and he entirely agrees with me that there was a sufficient
inducement, and that the statements of the prisoner are inadmissible."991n Kimber
(1849) , b00 "Coleridge J., after consulting with Cresswell J" held that a statement of
an accused made before a magistrate should not be received in the absence of any
proof that the statutory caution had been read to the accused before hand. In
92See the earlier discussion of Thornton (1824), op. cit.
Op. cit.
940p. cit., at 445.95 Op.cit.
% Car & P 539.
97 Ibid., at 540.
982 Cox CC. 67.
99Ibid., at 68.
'°°3 Cox CC. 223.
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Higson (1849),b01 "Alderson, B. (after consulting with Coleridge J)" also
entertained a Very strong opinion that independent proof of a statutory caution
having been given was a condition precedent to admissibility of a statement of the
accused made before a committing magistrate. In all of these cases, the courts
appear to have approached the admissibility of statements in a way that was
favourable to the accused. In none of them, however, did they decide without
consultation.
Second, even in those cases where judges decided without consultation, their
decisions were not always favourable to the accused. In Richards (1832),'°2the
accused was told by her mistress that if she did not tell her everything that night, a
constable would be sent for the next morning to take her before a magistrate. The
girl made a statement but the next morning the constable was sent for and she
repeated her statement before the constable on the way to the magistrates.
According to Bosanquet J, who decided without consultation, although the first
statement was inadmissible because of the threat that was made by the mistress,
the repeated statement made to the constable was admissible because
"she must have known, when she made the statement, that the constable
was then taking her to the magistrates. The inducement, therefore, was at
an end."
1012 Car. & K 769.
1025 Car. & P.318.
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He rejected categorically the argument that the second statement was made under
the influence of the earlier inducement and should have been excluded. He did not
consider the possibility, that had been opened by Swatkins (1831),'° 3that a
statement of a person held in custody as a suspect should not be received in
evidence unless there was evidence of a prior caution. Nor did he consider, in the
exercise of his discretion, the propriety of the police officer asking the accused
questions while she was in custody.'°4
If judges acting on independent responsibility were guilty of excessive tenderness
towards accused persons, it is puzzling to discover that confessions obtained in
such circumstances were nevertheless admitted. It also reveals the misleading
nature of Wigmore's statement as to the extent to which the accused benefited
from "generous" Nisi Prius rulings. Although it may be true that there were
twenty Nisi Prius rulings on confessions to every full-bench decision, Wigmore
did not indicate the percentage of Nisi Prius rulings against the accused. If, as
may be the case, a sufficient proportion of rulings on confessions at Nisi Prius
decided against the accused, the proportion of Nisi Prius rulings to full bench
decisions was irrelevant. Moreover, it is ironic that one of his examples of
"sentimental irrationality," taken from R v Jones (1809),'°5was decided in the
Easter term before nine judges: Macdonald C.B., Chambre J., Lawrence J., Le
Blanc J., Heath J., Wood B., Grose J., Mansfield C.J., and Lord Ellenborough. If
' °30p. cit. It is not being argued that this was the necessary ratio of Swatkins but rather a possible
interpretation of it.
'°'There are a number of decisions where judges have made decisions against the interests of the
accused, without consultation. See further: Long (1833)6 Car &. P. 179; Spilsbury (1835)7 Car.
& P. 187; Court (1836)7 Car. & P.487; Thomas (1836)7 Car. & P. 345; Kerr (1837) 8 Car. & P.
177; Holmes (1843) 1 C & K. 248.
'°5Russ. & Ry. 152.
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full bench decisions were not always against an accused, and Nisi Prius rulings
were not always in favour of the accused, Wigmore's argument is hardly
convincing.
Wigmore's third argument that exclusion of evidence was an attempt by judges to
mitigate the unfairness of criminal procedure that denied the accused the right to
counsel or to testify on his own behalf, is also unconvincing as a general
statement. As regards the right to counsel, the argument would have weight only
if we could identify a protective approach taken by the courts when the accused
did not have the benefit of counsel. Yet, this is contradicted by the case law. In
Long (1833),'°6for example, the accused was charged with setting fire to some
ricks. A constable, armed with a warrant, went to arrest the accused and upon
arrest told her that a very serious oath had been laid against her by a witness. The
accused made a confession subsequently which the prosecution sought to be
admitted at trial. Baron Gurney admitted the confession without objection. There
is no evidence from the case report that the accused was represented by counsel.
If Wigmore had been right, the court would have required a caution at the time of
arrest before admitting the statement,'° 7but this was never raised.'°8
Although the accused was incompetent to testify until the Criminal Evidence Act
1898, he was able to make unsworn statements. Sometimes, the ability to make an
unsworn statement was of little avail to the accused because of the limitations
'°Ô Car. & P. 179.
107 See Swatkins (1831), op. cit.
'°5For another good example where the courts were not protective of the accused, even in the
absence of legal counsel, see Thornton (1824), op. cit.
78
imposed by the court.'° 9Nevertheless , the accused was not always prevented from
contradicting the statements of witnesses who had given evidence against him. In
Dyer (1844),"°Alderson B., interrupted defence counsel's closing speech to the
jury when an appeal was made to sympathise with the accused for not being able
to respond. In an impassioned reply to counsel, he stated:
"I would never prevent a prisoner from making a statement, though he has
counsel. He may make any statement he pleases before his counsel
addresses the jury, and then his counsel may comment upon that statement
as a part of the case. If it were otherwise, the most monstrous injustice
might result to prisoners. If the statement of the prisoner fits in with the
evidence, it would be very material, and we should have no right to shut it
out."
If, as a matter of practice, the courts were prepared to allow the accused to
challenge witness statements, and his objections could be included in the defence
counsel's closing speech to the jury, the handicap imposed upon the accused was
not as great as Wigmore made out. As judicial practice had minimised the
detrimental effects of not being able to testify, it is submitted that there was little
reason for judges to exclude confessions upon every available pretext.
'°9 See Reg v. Malings, 8 Car & P. 242 in which Patteson J held that the prisoner was only
permitted to make a statement under special circumstances.
1101 CoxCC. 113.
'Ibid., at 114.
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His assessments of the decisions in Drew(1838)," 2Morton(1843)'' 3and Harris
(1844)," 4as "absurd" are also inappropriate if we examine the texts of the
judgements in the light of their facts. Indeed, reliability, which according to
Wigmore was the rationale behind the exclusionary rule, appears to have been a
prominent consideration in judicial minds. In Drew, Coleridge J excluded the
confession because he could not "conceive a more direct inducement to a man to
make a confession, than telling him what he says may be used in his favour at the
trial." 115The confession was inadmissible because he believed that the police
officer's statement could have generated a false hope in the mind of the accused;
that if he co-operated with the police, it would be to his advantage at the trial.
Coleridge J explained his judgement further in Morton. He stated:
"In Drew's case the prisoner was told that what he said would be used for
him. Is not that creating a hope, that if he told his story whether true or
false (emphasis added), it might benefit him?"6
The implication from this judgement is that Coleridge J believed the confession
was unreliable and that the confession was possibly false.
In Morton, it will be remembered that the accused had been told by a police
constable that "anything he did say in his defence would be listened to, or
" 20p. cit.
1130p. cit.
1140p cit.
" 5 0p. cit., at 141.
1160p. cit., at 515.
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assistance would be summoned." In considering whether to admit the subsequent
confession, Coleridge J laid out his reasoning in the following manner:
"The true principle of the cases is a very simple one, that nothing shall be
said to make an impression on the prisoner's mind, tending to make him
state a falsehood.. .1 think this case comes altogether within the principle of
it. The word 'defence' necessarily conveyed to the prisoner's mind that
what he said would be for his benefit, - the hope is created and
remains."1 17
This suggests that Coleridge J believed that the rationale behind the exclusionary
rule was reliability and that, as a result of the police constable's statement, he
thought the accused's confession was unreliable because it was made under the
impression that he would benefit.
Similar reasoning is evident in the judgement of Maule J in Harris. It has been
noted that the accused was told that "whatever" s/he said would be taken down
and used against her/him. Maule J rejected the confession in Harris, stating: "I
cannot say that did not induce him to say something which he thought might be
favourable to him." 8 Also in Furley, he concluded: "If you promise a person that
what he states will be at all events used at the trial, you may thereby be inducing
him to confess" 9(emphasis added). It is submitted that this shows that Maule J
excluded the confessions, due to the impact the statement may have had on the
lI7Qp. cit., at 515.
ll8Qp cit., at 106.
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mind of the accused. In the circumstances, he doubted the reliability of the
confession.
Wigmore was too selective also in the evidence he presented to support his
arguments. There are several cases that were not cited in his historical analysis
where the courts did not exclude confessions "upon the slightest pretext."2°
Wigmore admitted in a later section' 21 that, with the exception of
Wilson, ' 22confessions were not excluded for the mere fact the accused had been
questioned by a committing magistrate. He accepted also that confessions were
not excluded where they were made to a police officer while the accused was in
his custody. If the courts were as protective of the accused as he claimed in his
section on the history of confessions, it begs the question why there were so many
exceptions.
Post 1852:
As far as the period after 1852 is concerned, he appeared to imply that Baidry
ushered in a new era of "rationality." Yet, there is no evidence presented to
support that opinion. Moreover, the elements of "sentimental irrationality" that so
appalled Wigmore were present also in Baidry. As far as confession evidence after
' 90p. cit., at 77. See also the discussion of Furley, op. cit., supra.
' 20See the earlier discussion of Stephen.
21 See pp. 502-5 14.
' 220p. cit.
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Baidry is concerned, it was mentioned in the discussion of Stephen that the courts
exhibited primarily the same tendencies before and after 1852.123
Glanville Williams
Williams stated that there was no power to interrogate the accused without his
consent whether before or during the trial. He did not qualify his statement by time
nor did he confine it to interrogation by judges and magistrates; it was a general
statement and description of the law as it existed in the nineteenth century, which
by implication included all those who question the accused. Yet, the evidence he
presented related only to questioning by magistrates; there was no reference to
police questioning of the accused until a later chapter, and that referred only to
twentieth century practices.
Questioning by magistrates:
It is submitted that the amount of evidence presented by Williams to support his
argument is inadequate. There is no discussion with the texts of primary sources.
The only evidence provided is an observation made allegedly by Bentham that
during his day magistrates were "nullifying the enquiry so far as the accused
himself was concerned," and a reference to the Indictable Offences Act 1848. It
will be submitted that even this evidence fails to provide a sufficient foundation
for his views.
' 23 See Bate (1871), Fennel! (1881) and the police questioning cases cited during the discussion on
Mirfield; supra.
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It should be apparent immediately that Bentham's observation is only capable of
supporting Williams up to 1825, the date A Treatise on Judicial Evidence'24was
published. Williams's comments in respect of the position after 1825, therefore,
remain unsupported entirely. It is also submitted that Bentham's observations fail
to support Williams even up to 1825. Bentham did not state that magistrates
"were making a habit of nullifying the enquiry" by cautioning the accused that he
was not bound to answer any of their questions. In the passage from which
Williams based his remark, Bentham pointec out that the a' 'cac enab1ec1
magistrates to "exercise despotic power." 251f the magistrate wanted to be strict, he
would examine the accused under the Marian statutes and his answers would be
used at trial to secure a conviction. If, on the other hand, the magistrate wanted to
"make a parade of clemency"or show favour to the accused, he would apply the
Common Law and tell the accused to "say nothing which may turn to his
disadvantage." Bentham seemed to indicate that magistrates examined under both
the statutes and the Common Law, but only "nullified" enquiries where they
proceeded under the Common Law.
It should also be mentioned that even if Bentham had stated that magistrates were
"nullifying" preliminary enquires, Bentham's account would be insufficient as a
source of evidence. Bentham did not cite a single case to support his opinions.
Although he was one of the most notable thinkers of his age, Bentham's
unsubstantiated opinion is no substitute for case law.
' 240p. cit.
' 25 0p. cit., p. 242.
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The second piece of evidence that Williams used was section 18 of the Indictable
Offences Act 1848. According to Williams, section 18 made it compulsory to
caution the accused which had the effect of sealing his lips unless he wanted to
make a statement of his own volition.
Although he relied substantially upon this Act for his conclusions, Williams did
not make any references to the text of the Act itself. If he had, he would have
observed that section 18 was in fact ambiguous; that although the section used
mandatory language, it did not state expressly that statements of the accused
would be excluded if a caution was not administered, nor even if the magistrate
had pressurised the accused into answering his questions. In fact, the case law
indicated a section 18 caution was not regarded uniformly as "compulsory" nor
was its effect always to protect the accused.'26
Questioning by police:
As Williams claimed that there was no power at all to interrogate the accused
before the trial unless s/he volunteered to speak, it suggests the same rules applied
to police officers and other inferior law enforcement officers as applied to
magistrates. Yet, until the 1850s, few limitations were placed on a police officer's
[et all powers of questioning; nor was he obliged to caution as a matter of
' 26See further, the earlier discussion of Stephen and the different interpretations of section 18
discussed in my analysis of the case law.
85
routine.' 27After 1854 police powers received more attention in the courts, but it
has been argued already that judicial approaches to these powers were inconsistent
and vague. Although the I 880s appeared to spark in England the (re)emergence of
a more protective approach towards the accused when in police custody, both in
terms of questioning and the use of a caution, the subsequent cases fell far short of
establishing a consensus. Indeed, by the time of the establishment of the new
Court of Appeal in 1907, the case law was in a state of disarray.'28
Rationale:
Williams argued that this excessive zeal to protect the accused had its roots in
prior judicial involvement in torture. Although Williams does not make this
explicit,' 29the way in which this could have been done by the courts was to require
that all statements of the accused should be entirely voluntary. "Voluntariness" in
this sense would mean that it should be left to the accused completely whether or
not to make a statement. The person who obtained the statement would not be
allowed to use force, threats, intimidation, promises, nor even to question the
accused unless the latter had expressly consented to questioning in full knowledge
of the consequences.
' 27 See the discussion of Stephen, supra.
28 Sce Gavin (1885) Cox CC 656; Brackenbury (1893) Cox CC 628; Male and Cooper(1893) Cox
CC 689; Miller (1895) Cox CC 54; Rogers v Hawken (1898) QBD 192; Histed (1898) Cox CC 16;
Knight v Thayre (1905).
' 29He nevertheless implies this when he states that there was no power under English Law to
interrogate the accused "unless he volunteers to speak."
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Yet, only certain aspects of this principle of voluntariness were accepted
universally by the courts. It is true that after Warickshall,' 3° there was no
disagreement in principle among the judges that a confession should be excluded
when obtained as a result of a threat or a promise. There were disagreements,
however, on how a threat or a promise should be defined, if the fear of torture
dominated judicial minds as much as Williams claimed, one would have expected
a unanimous application of a broad definition of a threat or promise to give the
accused the benefit of the doubt. But I have indicated already that some courts
applied a narrow definition.'3'
If Williams was right, the fear of torture and the need to distance the courts from
similar practices would have been stressed in examinations before magistrates.
During the times of the Tudors and Stuarts, magistrates as well as judges, had
been involved in torture. Not only would the courts have been sensitive to any
statement that hinted a threat or a promise, they also would have been sensitive to
any interrogation of the accused where s/he did not expressly consent. Yet, the
evidence suggests that the courts were not uniformly as sensitive as Williams
claimed.'32
1300p. cit.
' 31 See Gilha,n op. cit; Wilde op. cit.; Sleeman op. cit.; Court, op. cit.; Hol,nes, op. cit. It should be
noted that Pollock C.B. in Ba/dry argued that the judges in Court and Holmes made a distinction
between the statement "be sure to tell the truth" and "you had better tell the truth." It is submitted,
however, that Baron Rolfe in Holmes does not make any such distinction, On the authority of
Court, he ruled that the confession was admissible in spite of "previous cases the other way,
where it was held, that it was an inducement to tell the prisoner that it would be better to tell the
truth. I think this statement admissible." The fact that there were cases decided the other way in
respect of the statement that it would be "better" to tell the truth, indicates that the distinction later
made in Baidry, op. cit., by Pollock C.B., is not entirely accurate. See also: Gibbons (1823) 1 Car
& P 97;.Tyler and Finch (1823) 1 Car & P 128; Thornton (1824), op. cit; Taylor (1839)8 Car & P
733; Moore (1852) 2 Den 522.
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In respect of the second rationale given by Williams, it is presented as if there is a
correlation between the rules of questioning and the prevalence of the death
penalty. This has been assumed as a result of the numbers of felonies that carried
the death penalty at the time and the alleged desire of the courts to avoid using the
accused as a source of evidence against himself. A number of points can be made
in respect of this assertion: first, neither Williams nor Bentham conducted any
study to compare the decision-making process of judges in death-penalty cases
with non-death penalty cases. They make the assertion as if it is self-evident. It is
difficult to see, however, how any assertion could be made when the decision-
making process in both may have been the same. Second, both Williams and
Bentham ignored the complexity of the decision-making process. Even if a
comparison had been made, it is possible that a multitude of factors could have
influenced the judge in his determination to exclude the evidence; from the colour
of the accused's socks to the facts of the individual case. In order to discover the
significance of each factor in judges' decisions, it would have required drawing up
a comprehensive list of variables and a close textual analysis of reported
judgements. Third, as Williams claimed that there was no right to question an
accused before as well as during the trial, he should have presented evidence also
on the influence of the death penalty on pre-trial questioning in addition to
questioning at trial. In the event, he provided evidence of neither. As far as
Bentham is concerned, the only case he referred to was Mansfield's anecdote of
the priest charged with celebrating mass. But this fails to take Williams's
argument any further because it concerned testimony at trial. Even then, we are
not given any reported judgement, nor a detailed account of the statute under
132See the discussion of Stephen, supra.
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which the accused was charged. In that context, Bentham's evaluation of the case
that the accused would have been found guilty had he been forced to testify, is
questionable because alternative defences may have been available. Fourth, the
assertion looks even more questionable in the light of case law.'33
Peter Mirfield
(1) 1800-1852 - The Period of Sentimental frrationality:
We have encountered this expression before during our analysis of Wigmore. It
was noted that it described an approach of the courts that placed the accused at the
centre of judicial thinking and which was prepared to set the guilty free in order to
avoid a false conviction. But the meaning which Mirfield gives to this phrase is
different. For him, it means that there was a particular method of reasoning which
the courts applied, that did not take the reliability of the confession into account,
nor the need to discipline police officers, nor the need to protect suspects,
although in general it tended to favour them during this period. The courts, in a
mechanical fashion, looked merely for the existence of a threat or a promise. If
absent, they would look for something improper in the questioning of the suspect.
Mirfield cited seven cases to support this position. Mirfield dubbed Enoch and
Pulley (1833)' 34an "irrational" decision because it was too protective of the
accused. He could not see how the statement: "it would be better to tell the truth or
' 33 See the earlier discussion of Swatkins, op. cit.
' 340p. cit.
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it would lie upon her and the man would go free," could have cast doubts on the
reliability of the subsequent confession. Yet there were good grounds to doubt the
reliability of this confession. First, it is clear from the report that the accused was
emotionally distraught when she made her confession. The report states that,
Abigail Commander, the witness who had made the inducement, had been asked
by the attending constable to stay with the accused in order "to prevent her from
laying violent hands on herself." 35 This suicidal impulse was understandable
because the victim was the newly-born child of the accused and she may have felt
responsible for its death. In such circumstances, a false confession could have
been expected.
Second, the evidence was equivocal that a murder had even occurred. Indeed, this
appears from the remarks of Park J in response to a question whether the child had
breathed. He stated: "The child might breathe before it was born; but its having
breathed is not sufficiently life to make the killing of the child murder." Park J's
scepticism seems justified if we look at the imprecision of the charges. The report
states that there were four counts of murder: the first charged both of the prisoners
with the wilful murder of the child by stabbing her in the head with a fork; the
second charged them with killing the baby with their hands; the third charge stated
that the child had been stabbed with a fork before it had been completely born and
had then later died of the stab wound; the fourth charge was similar to the third,
except that it charged the prisoners with killing the child with their hands. The
imprecision of the charges is understandable also if we return to the circumstances
of the child's death as mentioned in the case report. It states: "A puncture was
' 351b1d., at 539.
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found in the child's skull; but, when the injury that had caused it was inflicted did
not appear." The point in time when the injuries were inflicted was crucial to the
issue of murder, but this had not been established on the facts.
It is suggested that the prosecution already had a weak case and a confession made
in the circumstances outlined above would not have made it any more convincing.
In the circumstances, it would be difficult to accuse Park J of "sentimental
irrationality."
Mirfield condemned Croydon (1846)' 36as "ridiculous" because the court had not
considered "how the particular accused would have been likely to interpret the
statement" and that the court had applied "a simple, formulaic approach." 37
 If this
were true, it is difficult to explain why the presiding judge, Mr Rogers, excluded
the confession on the ground that there was a "sufficient inducement." 38 If the
inducement was "sufficient" that implies necessarily that the court was not looking
for a threat or inducement per Se, and that it had considered the possible impact
the statement had had on the mind of the accused. Furthermore, on the facts it is
extreme to argue that the decision of Mr Rogers was "ridiculous." Although the
person who made the statement to the accused was a lawyer, and not a police
officer, the report states that he was "endeavouring to discover the criminals for
the purpose of prosecution." 39 In such circumstances, it would not be
unreasonable to believe that an unreliable confession would result. A statement to
the accused which says, in effect, that he was known to be guilty and that he had
' 360p. cit.
' 370p. cit.
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better tell the lawyer what he wants to know, might have conveyed a message that
there was no point in denying the crime as that would serve only to increase his
sentence.
Mirfield used Sexton (1823)' 40to suggest that the courts were so keen to exclude
confessions, that factors other than reliability, such as the behaviour of the person
investigating the offence, could affect the decision to admit statements of the
accused. Yet, the words of Best J suggested that he excluded the confession
because it was involuntary and unreliable, not because of the propriety of police
behaviour per Se. Best J remarked that to admit a statement of the accused in such
circumstances, however a careful a magistrate might be, would make it "appear"
that the accused had made "an uninfluenced and voluntary confession when every
sort of trick had been made use of." 4 ' If giving the accused two glasses of gin
makes the latter's confession "appear" uninfluenced and voluntary, the necessary
implication is that Best J regarded the confession as involuntary. Moreover, this
necessary inference is supported by his reference to the Warickshall criteria of
"hopes and fears" and that the police officer had given the accused the gin in order
to "induce" him to make a confession.
His judgement also points to the danger of a false confession as he stated that the
accused may have repeated his confession before the magistrate out of fear,
' 380p. cit., at 68.
' 39Ibid., at 67.
' 400p. cit.
' 41 0p. cit.
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because to do otherwise could have made his case worse.142 ft is clear, therefore,
that Best J regarded this confession as unreliable.
The final pieces of evidence cited by Mirfield are the cases of Furley, Harris,
Drew and Morton.' 43 He argues that the judges were guilty of "sentimental
irrationality" because confessions had been excluded merely on the ground that
the infant police caution had been administered to the accused in a garbled
144
manner.	 Mirfield is suggesting that the judges did not consider whether the
resulting confessions were involuntary and unreliable when determining
admissibility. It has been submitted already during the discussion of Wigmore that
although there were concerns regarding the manner in which the police caution
was administered, statements of the accused were excluded because they were
involuntary and unreliable.'45
So far, it has been argued that the cases Mirfield cites do not support his
proposition that judges were "sentimentally irrational" in the sense that they
decided cases mechanically. I argue also that the case law fails to support his
argument that the courts were generally protective of the accused. Rather, the case
law suggests the judiciary had different values and different approaches. Hence
the reason for Sexton sitting side by side with cases such as: Thornton (1824),
' 42As the accused had not been told by the magistrate that his first confession could not be evidence
against him, Best J added that the accused "might think that he could not make his case worse than
he had already made it, and under this impression might sign the confession before the magistrate."
' 43 0p. cit. It should be noted, however, that these cases are cited during his analysis of Ba/dry and
he does not offer any analysis that is independent of the judgments laid down in that seminal case.
' 440p. cit., pp. 54-55.
' 45The only other evidence that Mirfield provides to accuse the courts of "sentimental irrationality"
are the sociological "insights" mentioned by Wigmore; supra.
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Gilham (1828), Wild (1835), Spilsbury (1835), Court (1836), Thomas (1836) and
Holmes (1843), none of which exhibited sentiments in favour of the accused)46
(2) Post 1852- 'The "Progeny of Baidry" and all that':
It should be mentioned at this stage that Mirfield does not specify what he means
by "progeny." Moreover, it is not self-evident from his account. He begins by
citing the dicta from Baldry' 47which condemned the extent to which earlier courts
had protected the accused, and then proceeds to discuss cases such as
Sleeman' 48and Jarvis' 49which took a similar approach to confession evidence and
the need to protect the accused as the judgements in Baidry. As we read
Mirfield's account, however, they are cited not as examples of a new, less
protective approach towards the accused but as instances of "irrationality." This
explains why Fennell' 50is also cited in the same breath (which decided in favour
of the accused). Mirfield regarded this decision as another example of the
inflexible approach to confession evidence that he had observed in the period
before 1852. The actual position of the accused after 1852 is hardly dealt with
except in relation to the sub-section he entitles Rules About Police Questioning.
Here, he states that the courts "began" 51 to be concerned with police questioning
of the accused and cites cases such as Gavin (1885), Histed (1898) and Knight and
' 46See further, the earlier discussions of Stephen and Wigmore.
' 470p. cit.
' 480p. cit.
' 490p. cit.
' 500p. cit.
' 51 This is a curious assertion because it has already been established that the courts were concerned
with police questioning as early as Sexton in 1824 (police officers prohibited from tricking the
accused into making confessions).
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Thayre (1905),' 52which he regarded as generally protective of the accused. This
sub-section, however, is presented as an isolated topic; there are no cross-
references to his earlier discussion on confessions. We are left wondering,
therefore, whether he has any opinion regarding the position of the accused after
1852.
As it is not clear what proposition Mirfield is advancing, it is problematical
assessing his evidence, if by "progeny" he means that the courts were no longer
prepared to protect the accused to the same extent as they had prior to Baidry, the
only cases he cites in support are: Sleeman (1853),' 53farvis and Reeve and
Hancock. In Sleeman, the accused was the servant of the prosecutor and had been
indicted for setting fire to one of his farm buildings. The case against her was
based on a confession that she had made, while in the custody of a police officer,
to the married daughter of her master, Mrs Allen. Before receiving the confession,
Mrs Allen had told the accused: "Jane, I am very sorry for you, you ought to have
known better; tell me the truth, whether you did or no.. .don't run your soul into
more sin, but tell the truth." Baron Martin postponed the judgement in order to
ask the opinion of the judges whether the confession was admissible in evidence.
It was held unanimously (Baron Parke giving the judgement of the court) that the
confession was admissible on the ground that "there was really no threat or
inducement at all; and.. that Mrs Allen was not a person in such authority that an
inducement or threat held out by her would render the confession inadmissible."154
' 520p. cit.
' 53Cox CC 245.
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It is submitted that this case does not indicate a general approach that was new and
less protective of the accused. It is entirely consistent with earlier decisions, such
as Gilham (1828) and Wilde (1835), which held that spiritual inducements did not
vitiate statements obtained from the accused. It can also be explained on the facts.
Arguably, as the daughter of accused's master, Mrs Allen was merely tendering a
"guardian's advice" and not making a threat.' 55 The courts were refusing to extend
the rule any further; they were not embarking on a new campaign against accused
persons.
(3) The interrogation powers of magistrates in the nineteenth century:
It has been noted that Mirfield takes the same position as Stephen and Williams,
that by 1850 the accused was "absolutely protected against judicial questioning"
and also cites section 18 of the 1848 Act.' 56 Mirfield cites the case of Berriman'57
as additional evidence, but the case was decided in 1854 and not in 1850. It
cannot substantiate his argument, therefore, that by 1850 the accused was
"absolutely protected against judicial questioning."
Even if we examine the judgement and facts of Berriman it does not support the
general argument that the accused was "absolutely protected" against questioning
by a magistrate. During her appearance before the magistrate, the report states that
"after the prisoner had been cautioned in the usual manner, and had stated that she
had nothing to say (emphasis added) the presiding magistrate, before committing
' 54Ibid., at 246.
155 See the discussion of Stephen, op.cit.
96
her, asked her where she had put the body of the child." 58 Erie J rejected this
statement saying:
"I shall certainly refuse to allow such evidence to be given. The question
ought never to have been put, and it would be very unfair towards the
prisoner to receive in evidence an answer so irregularly elicited."59
I suggest that Erie J excluded the evidence, not because the Act absolutely
prohibited questioning, but because the accused had already stated that she had
nothing to say. Any questioning after that point was judicial "badgering" and aa'
answer she gave subsequently involuntary. Mirfield states that the judge had
concluded that the magistrate was prohibited from questioning the accused other
than in the terms specifically allowed for by the Act itself. Yet this reasoning
appears only in the argument of defence counsel;' 60it is not referred to by the
judge. His decision to exclude the evidence was based on the exclusionary rule,
not the Act.
3. Conclusion:
It has been argued in this chapter that the conceptualisation of the English criminal
justice process as one in which the needs of the accused took centre stage in the
first half of the nineteenth century but which then tapered off in the second half,
' 56The criticisms levelled earlier at Stephen and Williams apply equally, therefore, to Mirfield.
"Op. cit.
580p .
 cit., at 389.
'"Ibid.
IGOSce p. 389.
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was ill-conceived and unsystematic. Moreover, when examined in the light of
statute and case law, this version of history was found to be inaccurate and at
variance with judicial thought.
I mentioned in chapter one that the consensus of leading writers was indicative of
a wider historical perspective which characterised the era up to 1852 as one in
which the ideology of liberal laissez-faire dominated. Imbued with the values of
individualism and with the notion that all citizens should be able to conduct their
lives without state interference, it was presumed that laissez-faire, through the
agency of judicial sentiment, provided the accused with an armoury of rights to
protect him/herself from violations by the state. Hence, why it was claimed that
judges sought to exclude statements of the accused upon every available pretext.
The argument presumed the judiciary spoke with one, uniform voice that
constructed the accused as a citizen before 1852, but which had reconfigured that
definition in the light of new crime control imperatives after 1852. Yet, if we are
to follow the case law concerning pre-trial judicial and extra-judicial questioning
of the accused during the period, the judiciary spoke with a variety of voices both
before and after 1852. In fact, the case law as a whole is illustrative of the absence
of a judicial consensus that was presumed to exist within each time frame.
I suggest that the door is now open for a fresh analysis and explanation of the
orientating values of the English criminal justice system and of the role that the
accused has played within it. An analysis which, in contrast to those set out
earlier, seeks to explore the accused's role within a tight conceptual framework
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and in the context of driving historical forces; that builds conclusions on the basis
of the data, instead of preconceived notions. This will be the task for our next
chapter.
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Questioning of the Accused and the Construction of the Individual
Chapter three
1. Introduction:
In this chapter, we will attempt to account for the different approaches that judges
took during the nineteenth century and to explore the role that the accused has
played in the English Criminal Justice System more systematically.
Since the 1960s, one of the methods most frequently used to explain the values
lying behind legal rules has been Herbert Packer's two models of the criminal
process: "crime control" and "due process." These models are useful analytic
tools, and clearly set out the essential tensions that exist within the criminal justice
system, but are inappropriate for this study because of the type of data available.2
'See Herbert L. Packer (1969) The Limits of the Criminal Sanction, Stanford, California, Stanford
University Press, pp 149-173. Packer's work has been discussed widely and applied both here and
in the United States; see further: Griffiths, J. (1970) Ideology in Criminal Procedure, Yale Law
Journal 79, 1; Bottoms, A. and McLean, J. (1976) Defendants in the Criminal Process, London,
Routledge and Kegan Paul; McBarnett, D. (1981) Conviction, London, Macmillan; McConville,
M. et al (1991) The Case for the Prosecution, London, Routledge; Sanders, A. and Young, R.
(1994) Criminal Justice, London, Butterworths; Ashworth, A. (1994) The Cri,ninal Process: an
Evaluative Study, Oxford, Clarendon; Uglow, S. (1995) Criminal Justice, London, Sweet &
Maxwell; Choongh, S. (1997) Policing as Social Discipline, Oxford, Clarendon.
2A significant number of cases during the nineteenth century were poorly reported, and it was only
in rare cases (see Sexton, Cox v Coleridge and Baidry, op. cit) that judges gave fully reasoned
explanations for their decisions. Moreover, most of the cases and statutes of that period were
ambiguous. Any attempts to assign a particular case, judgment or statute to one of Packer's
models, therefore, would be to indulge in speculation.
100
Instead of models, it will be suggested that an approach that locates the values of
the English Criminal Justice System within an historical framework, that sees the
role played by the accused as reflective of historical forces, ideological currents
and new organizational structures yields more analytical insight. As a result of this
analysis, it will be advanced that the values of liberal constitutionalism, and the
notion of universal citizenship that it implies, were never fully realised in the role
played by the accused. Initially, this was because there was no consensus as to
what values should guide the relationship between the individual and the state,
which is illustrated by the variety of judicial opinion throughout the nineteenth
century, and the absence of any judicial mechanism that would have been able to
implement an official party line.
However, systemic concerns for crime and social control, legitimacy and
efficiency, which were evident in judicial thinking from the start of the nineteenth
century, became increasingly important as the influence and scope of the state
expanded. As the state expanded, and as respect for it grew among the propertied
classes, the role of accused persons concomitantly diminished to the point they
became "suspects," and their status as individuals divested of the rights, freedoms
and protections which were accorded to "law-abiding citizens".
It will be suggested that this construction of the individual was made possible only
after a series of structural changes culminating in the formation of the Court of
Appeal in 1907, which was then given practical expression through the publication
of the Judges' Rules in 1912. The judicial compromises and consensus which the
101
Rules represented, however, took time to permeate through all the levels of the
judiciary, as the values of liberal constitutionalism and laissez-faire were still
present after 1912. After 1933 and the collapse of the Gold Standard, a political,
legal and moral consensus emerged in which Welfarism and the needs of the
community, as expressed by the institutions of the state, took precedence over the
protection of the individual. The casualty in this construction was the accused
who remained disempowered and vulnerable to state power.
In this chapter, the historical analysis will begin by setting out the ideological
currents which influenced the structure of the English criminal process at various
points during the nineteenth century. After which, I will set out the structure of the
ancien regime as it existed before 1829 and the values that it purported to hold and
actually expressed through the case law. The chapter will proceed to explain the
historical events that led to the reform of the old regime and the establishment of
the "New Police," and will discuss their role within the restructured system. The
reaction to this restructuring, through the nineteenth and early twentieth century
case law and the Judges' Rules will then be examined.
The final part of this chapter focuses on the post-war developments up to 1984,
and will show how these structural changes were consolidated, as exemplified
through greater willingness, on the part of the judges and the legislature, to equip
the police with ever increasing powers to question the accused in the manner they
saw fit.
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2. The role of the accused an historical and structural analysis
a)The ideological setting:
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries witnessed the culmination of a
school of thought that had asserted itself following the "Glorious Revolution" in
1688. Ideological notions of the state which viewed the individual as "subjects" of
the Crown, and as the emanations of the arbitrary power of the ruling monarch,
justified on the basis of unquestionable divine decree, had lost popular appeal as a
result of the political turmoil in the seventeenth century. Indeed, the state was
increasingly viewed with suspicion, and as a threatening entity. This necessitated
the establishment of the Rule of Law under which the lives of "citizens" would be
protected from abuses of power and interference by the state. Thus, Blackstone
wrote:
"the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate those
absolute rights of individuals. Such rights as are social and relative result
from, and are posterior to, the formation of states and societies: so that to
maintain and regulate these, is clearly a subsequent consideration.....
Political therefore, or civil liberty, which is that of a member of society, is
no other than natural liberty so far restricted by human laws (and no
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further) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the
public."3
Notions of a centralised state, equipped with arbitrary powers and supported by
standing armies, or a "police force" on the lines of the French system, was
anathema to Blackstone's, and others' 4 , vision of a liberal state, and a painful
reminder of the tyrannies carried out during the reigns of the Stuarts and Tudors.
While such methods of administration were efficient and effective, they ran
counter to the Englishman's sense of liberty. Adherence to libertarian values
might occasion inconvenience in the administration of justice, but it was "the price
that all free nations must pay" 5 lest they follow the examples of despotic regimes
and arbitrary governments found elsewhere. 6 If deterrence and prevention were
aims of the criminal justice system, they could be achieved by condign penal laws,
such as capital punishment. Any extension of the spheres of government through
a centralised "police force", on the pretext of crime prevention and detection,
would unjustifiably interfere with the freedom of the individual.7
This sentiment was not reserved purely for matters in relation to criminal justice,
but covered all areas of human activity over which the state could exercise some
3See, 1 Comm. 124-125.
4 See, for instance, the writing of William Paley, and The Principles of Moral and Political
Philosophy (17th ed., 1809), in particular.
54 Comm. 350.
63 Comm. 325-327. This seems to reflect a long tradition of national chauvinism in English juristic
writings; see further, Shapiro, B. (1991), Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Probable Cause;
Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, Berkeley, University of
California Press, pp. 121-124.
7The best example of this approach is the work of William Paley, cited above.
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influence. Hence, matters of business, industry and commerce, even religion8,
were best left to the individual. As Locke wrote, and Adam Smith affirmed:
"government has no other end but the preservation of property." 91n short, this was
the ideology of "laissez-faire"; the exaltation of the individual above the
collective, the triumph of the "citizen" over the forces of state; that the best form
of government was minimal government.
While this conception of the state was the ruling orthodoxy at the turn of the
nineteenth century, it was not left unchallenged. It came under increasing attack
from the Utilitarians, such as Bentham, who sought thth rspimtion from
continental models. It was his and their concern that institutions and laws should
make the "greatest happiness" principle a living reality. Bentham, therefore, was
not for "leaving things alone, but for continually interfering with them."° In stark
contrast to the predominant laissez-faire approach, he advocated whole-scale
reform of the establishment by calling for the abolition of its laws rooted purely in
custom and received wisdom, and for replacing them with new laws based upon
rationality and his "felicific calculus." These new laws would prevent and deter
anti-social action by forcibly restraining it, and would encourage virtuous actions
by providing certain and substantial rewards.
8This is exemplified by the increasing secularisation of the State that took place in the late 18th and
early 19th centuries, witnessed by the repeal of both the Test and Corporation Acts and other
legislation that had been passed against Catholics; see Langford, P. (1993) State, Law and
Prosecution: the Emergence of the Modern Criminal Process 1780-1910, Doctoral thesis,
University of Warwick, p. 265.
"Of Civil Government," in Works (11 ed., 1812), Vol. V, p. 393. See also Adam Smith, Wealth
of Nations (ed. of 1904), Vol. 2, Book V, p. 207.
'°Benn, A.W. (1906), The History of English Rationalism in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. 1, p.
291.
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Within Bentham's scheme of things, reform would include developing a
centralised system of policing, the object of which was to "prevent evils and
provide benefits," chief among which was the control of crime. In combination
with other reforms, this would be secured by granting the police sufficient powers.
Hence, the police would be empowered to intervene as soon as an offence would
"announce itself in various manners," whether it was in the course of being carried
out or immediately afterwards, and to spread information whenever a crime had
been perpetrated, thereby facilitating the detection and identification of offenders
and by making it more difficult for offenders to escape. Moreover, for "the
preservation of public tranquillity and the execution of good laws," the police
would be able to use spies and paid informers.
The establishment of a body of police, preventing the commission of offences and
securing the detection of offenders, would be accompanied by complementary
reforms in procedural and substantive law. First, the discretion handed to judges to
develop the Common Law in accordance with custom and their subjective
preference, would be replaced by a code that was far less amenable to
manipulation. In relation to criminal evidence, this would mean that hitherto
subjective and elastic principles would be substituted with strict rules of evidence
that would ensure the guilty would not escape justice. Secondly, and as a
consequence, penal law would be modified in the certainty that punishment would
take place. Penal laws that had made the death penalty almost the norm rather than
the exception, would be replaced by punishments that matched them with the
severity of the offence.
"See, Principles of Penal Law, Vol. 1, pp. 573-574.
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In many respects, Bentham was ahead of his time. As A. W. Benn commented:
"Benthamism seemed to promise an immense extension rather than a restriction of
the functions of government," 2and thus flew in the face of popular opinion. The
individual, as a single entity, was not the orientating unit of his conception of the
state. What mattered was "aggregate" happiness, and the interests of the many
over the few, which would be enforced by a centralised and powerful, yet
beneficent state. However, this did not mean that he did not have his supporters.
Indeed, he later worked in close collaboration with Patrick Colquhoun, who along
with Robert Peel and Edwin Chadwick, played an influential role in the setting up
of the Metropolitan Police Force in 1829,' 3and as we shall see, in the consequent
restructuring of the criminal process.
b) The structure of the English Criminal Justice System up to 1829 and the
role of the accused:
In many ways, it could be argued that the system that entered the nineteenth
century was a reflection of the dominant laissez-faire attitudes towards
government. Criminal justice was largely a localized and individualistic affair, as
there was no central or state direction, and operated through the individual
initiatives of parish constables, Prosecution Associations, night watches and
magistrates.
'2lbid.
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The parish constables had little or no collective identity, and often operated out of
their own houses and within the community which they had to police. They were
also unpaid by virtue of the office itself, and relied to a large part on the person
who sought their assistance for their income.14
Prosecution Associations, which existed in both rural and urban areas, owed their
establishment and proliferation to the activism of magistrates and property owners,
who were prompted by their dissatisfaction over the ineffectiveness of the parish
constable and an increasing concern regarding the "crises" that had beset the
country between 1740 and 1780.' Their functions comprised detecting and
apprehending suspected offenders by printing hand bills and placing adverts in the
local press; paying persons to search for stolen goods as well as the offender, and
ensuring that a solicitor would get the suspect committed for trial before a
magistrate. These Prosecution Associations, however, never became a centralised
or state agency. Their operation was localised and the result of private
16initiatives.
The introduction of night and paid watchmen in the boroughs and larger towns
was a response to the perceived inadequacies of the parish constable in the context
of the changing nature of the social order caused by the Industrial Revolution. In
one sense, it might be thought that this was the beginning of a paid police force;
' 3 See Radzinowicz, L. A History of the English Criminal Law,Vol. 2, Steven & Sons, London, p.
385.
' 4Langford, P., (1993), op. cit., p. 13
' 5 See D. Phillips, "Good Men to Associate and Bad Men to Conspire: Associations for the
Prosecution of Felons in England 1760-1860," in Hay, D. and Snyder, F. (1989) Policing and
Prosecution in Britain 1750 - 1850, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
' 6lbid., p. 134.
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an attempt by the state to show to the people the benefits of a more activist
government through a system of regular and visible patrols to counter ever
increasing social disturbance.' 7
 But the image of the paid and night watches was
very different from an efficient outfit that would command the respect of the
people. "Many were old and ailing. Some were employed out of charity; some as
an alternative to making them a charge on the poor rate. They carried lanterns and
rattles and called out the passing hours - if they kept awake." 8 Whether this
absence of professionalism was a true representation across the country is perhaps
doubtful.' 9Nevertheless, it expressed the complacency and lack of interest in
active government that appeared to dominate the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth century.
Although these aspects of law enforcement, focusing on private, individual
initiatives and the absence of state control, seem to epitomise the laissez-faire
state, the spirit of individualism was not universally expressed nor did it accord
with the respective roles played by the magistrate and the accused within the legal
and social order.
The magistrate formed the link between the localities and the institutions of the
state in the maintenance of order and the provision of information. Formally, this
link was carried out by processing defendants charged with indictable offences,
and conducting summary trials, but it found more concrete expression in the
' 7See Langford, op. cit., p. 17.
' 8Critchley, op. cit., p. 26.
' 9See pg. 11 post and the notes attached thereto.
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nature of the prosecution process over which he presided and his societal role.
Langford writes:
"The magistrate embodied a personalised, demonstrative authority in the
'old society' in which social position and judicial role overlapped. Law
and society had a vital and indissoluble link in the figure of the magistrate
who symbolised the natural origin and truth of law and society."2°
Due to the position he occupied within the social order, and the reality of private
prosecution that depended upon a series of individual decisions, 2 ' the magistrate
was able to exercise considerable discretion and power over who and how he
prosecuted, and whether to take an active or a passive role.
Similarly, during pre-trial examinations of the accused, the magistrate wielded
considerable power. This was facilitated by the juxtaposition of powers conferred
by the Marian statutes to take the examination of the accused, 22with those powers
conferred by the Common Law. Hence, Bentham complained:
"The magistrates exercise despotic power, and can show favour or rigour
as they choose. It places in their hands a disguised but arbitrary power of
pardon. If the magistrate intends to do justice, he conducts the examination
according to the will of the legislator; if he wishes to make a parade of
clemency, or show partial favour to the accused, he follows the rule of the
200p. cit., p. 43.
21Ibid.
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common law, and even tells the prisoner to be on his guard, and to say
nothing which may turn to his disadvantage."23
Although magistrates occasionally suffered censure in the courts for interrogating
the accused like a witness24 , this hardly amounted to a uniform judicial crackdown
on their de facto powers to prosecute and to conduct examinations in the manner
they saw fit. Indeed, some decisions appeared to facilitate this process. 25 When
examined from this perspective, then, it places the role of the accused during the
early 1800s within a different constitutional paradigm than that projected by the
liberal, laissez-faire ideology. Instead of being a holder of "rights", the accused
was viewed as an object of magisterial power within a wider patriarchal social
order.
It is submitted that this insight helps to throw light on controversial decisions such
as Sexton (1823), previously cited and roundly condemned as an example of the
liberal, "sentimental irrationality" that was said to pervade judicial opinion at that
time. 26 In that case, it was not the technical violation of the voluntariness rule
with which Best J was primarily concerned; but rather its impact upon proceedings
22For a detailed discussion on the effects of the Marian statutes, see chapter one.
23A Treatise on Judicial Evidence, Vol 2, p. 242. For Glanville Williams's misinterpretation of this
section, see chapter two.
24See Wilson (1817), op. cit.
25 See Ellis (1826) and Cox v Coleridge (1822), op. cit., discussed in the last chapter. There is also
some evidence to suggest that Wilson (1817) did not reflect any judicial consensus regarding the
examination, as Littledale J in Ellis noted that Holroyd J had admitted an examination of the
accused to which there was this objection. Wigmore even suggests that Wilson is an isolated
opinion in the face of a line of authorities which authorised such an examination; see "On
Evidence", op. cit., s. 848, pp. 510-512. It could be argued that, as such, it would be mistaken to
use Wilson as reflecting part of a general trend that led to the "judicialisation" of the preliminary
enquiry by 1848 as claimed by Choongh; see Policing As Social Discipline, op. cit, pp. 6-7.
26For the facts and various interpretations of the case given by other authors, see chapters one and
two.
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before the magistrate. The report states that the magistrate, before receiving the
confession of the accused, had not been informed by the constable that he had
given the accused two glasses of gin. As such, it amounted to a deceit practised
upon the magistrate. Best J comments:
"Had the magistrate known that the officer had given the prisoner gin, he
would, no doubt, have told the prisoner that what he had already said
could not be given in evidence against him, and that it was for him to
consider whether he would make a second confession. If the prisoner had
been told this, what he said afterwards would have been evidence against
him."27
If the judge had been concerned with the voluntariness per se of the questioning of
the accused, he would have prevented his interrogation by the constable while in
custody, but this occurs without judicial censure. What appears more important is
the behaviour of the constable which effectively prevented the magistrate from
carrying out his patriarchal role of advising the accused of what he should or
should not say.
We see this elevation and negation of the respective roles of magistrate and
accused more clearly in Cox v Coleridge (1822). 28According to the majority
opinion, whether an accused should have an attorney or counsel present during a
magistrate's preliminary examination, rested solely with the presiding magistrate.
270p. cit., p. 103.
28Best J was also a presiding judge in this case. For the facts, see chapter two.
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It was a question of his individual discretion and not in the nature of an
enforceable right vested in the accused. Hence Hoiroyd J commented:
"... the right claimed cannot legally be supported. A magistrate, in cases
like the present, does not act as a Court of Justice; he is only an officer
deputed by the law to enter into a preliminary enquiry, and the law which
casts upon him that jurisdiction, presumes that he will do his duty in
enquiring whether the party ought to be committed or not."29
If the magistrate needed the services of counsel, then he could call upon one, but it
was not something which an accused could foist upon him. While the position
might be different in judicial proceedings before a "Court of Justice," the law did
not accord the same protection to the accused in preliminary enquiries before a
magistrate. In effect, this meant that the magistrate, when investigating the
circumstances of an offence, was the master of his own bench and the sole source
of authority.30
As we observed in the last chapter, the relative unimportance of the role of the
accused did not apply only to magisterial questioning, but was expressed more
generally in rules of questioning. From the beginning of the nineteenth century,
for example, we can observe a gradual narrowing of the potentially expansive
290p. cit., at 51 and 52.
30The reluctance to impose any form of judicial control is indicated by the court's presumption that
the magistrate "will do his duty in enquiring whether the party ought to be committed or not." This
judicial attitude is further illustrated by their approach to the magistrate's caution, which was
generally left to the discretion of the magistrate. There is no case law up to 1829 which required
him to administer a caution, though Sexton (1823), op .cit., seems to suggest that a magistrate
would do this as a matter of practice, particularly if there was an earlier inducement.
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voluntariness rule first enunciated in Warwickshall. 31 It was held in that case that
if a confession had been "forced from the mind by flattery of hope or the torture of
fear" it should be rejected as evidence; but it did not require that "flattery of hope"
or "torture of fear" should come from any person connected with the prosecution
nor that he should hold a position of authority. Yet, it was held by nine judges, as
early as 1809, that the exclusionary rule would not operate unless the inducement
proceeded from a person who had "a concern in the business" and not from one
who merely "officiously interfered". 321n Gibbons (1 823), Park J further
narrowed the operation of the rule to persons having "authority", by which he
meant, "the prosecutor, constable, &c' 34
 It did not apply to inducements made by
surgeons whilst administering treatment to the accused. The narrow operation of
the rule before 1829 is further exemplified by judges condoning custodial
interrogation of the accused by constables, even where that interrogation was
illegal and oppressive in the circumstances.35
It is suggested that if the individualistic, liberal, laissez-faire state ever existed in
reality, it certainly had not been fully realised by 1829. Although in terms of
structure and organisation, the system appeared to conform to the laissez-faire
model, the broad powers conferred on state officials and the lack of concern for
the "rights" of the individual as expressed through the case law on questioning,36
31 0p. cit. For a discussion of this case, see chapter one.
32Row (1809) Russ. & Ry 154.
33j Car. & P97.
34Ibid, at 98.
35See Thornton (1824), op. cit., discussed in chapter two.
36This is also reflected in actions for malicious prosecution or false imprisonment. As of the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the rights that existed to bring such actions were purely
formal. The absence of financial assistance for the poor (who were the majority of criminal
defendants) and the restrictive approach adopted by the courts when prosecutions were challenged,
militated against successful challenges to their legality. See further: Hay, D. (1989), "Prosecution
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indicated that the individual was not the orientating unit of analysis. Rather,
instead of a criminal justice system dominated by liberal values, the evidence
pointed to a continuation and perpetuation of the eighteenth century decentralised
social order dominated by patriarchy and paternalism. A legal system in which the
treatment afforded to an accused was solely dependent upon the discretion of
officials, who, because of their social standing and local connections, were
presumed to know best.
c) 1829-1912 - Reconfiguring the System in a Climate of Crisis:
Between 1780 and 1848, much of Europe, including England, was in the throes of
a social revolution. The ideas of "the Enlightenment," the industrial revolution
and massive growth in urban populations were effecting social transformation at a
number of levels in society, placing considerable strain on existing social
structures and hierarchies. Inevitably, the strains and social tensions led to
breakdowns in law and order, violence and social upheaval. The "Gordon Riots"
of 1780, the French Revolution of 1789 and its aftermath, the emergence of
British Jacobins in the 1790s, the Burdette and Luddite riots of the early 1800s,
the Ratcliffe murders of 1811, increasing crime rates and a perceived decline in
moral standards, 38
 all played their part in generating a "climate of crisis" 39and in
and Power, Malicious Prosecution in the English Courts, 1750-1850" in Hay and Snyder, Policing
and Prosecution in Britain 1750-1850, Oxford, Clarendon Press, pp. 350-352.
37According to Clive Emsley, the event still preyed on the minds of magistrates and politicians as
late as 1815; see Policing and Its Context 1750-1870, (1983) Macmillan Press, London, p. 46. See
also by the same author: "The Military and Popular Disorder in England 1790-1801", Journal of
the Society forArniy Historical Research (1983).
38See Pant. Debates HC (1812), Vol. 21, 195-204; Park Debates HC (1828), Vol. 18, 784-804, in
which Robert Peel referred extensively to increases in crime rates and the threat to security for
property to justify his call for a "New Police."
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sowing fears of revolution in the minds of the established order. 40
 Even in 1829,
during the passage of the Metropolitan Police Bill, and when London was
enjoying a period of relative calm, rioting was still taking place elsewhere.4'
Although its efficacy has been underestimated by most historical accounts, 42 the
old localised system of parish constables and watchmen acting under the direction
and supervision of magistrates, was perceived as being incapable of managing
these crises and of imposing social order. Moreover, the fail-safe mechanism of
calling in the army to quell social unrest, 43was generating fears of a standing
army,44 and criticized for its unconstitutionality.
The ongoing process of rationalising the criminal law and punishment, and the
institutional reforms that took place after 1829 which accompanied it, namely the
establishment of the "new police" and the judicialisation of the magistracy, were
attempts to manage these crises at the structural level. The restructuring was not
at any stage an expression of the values of individualism nor of the need to protect
the accused as portrayed by the consensus in the previous chapter. 45The form that
restructuring took, however, and the rhetoric which promoted it, had to bow to
39Emsley, (1983), op. cit., pp. 5 1-52; Reiner, R. (1985), The Politics of the Police, Brighton,
Wheatsheaf, p. 12.
40This was particularly true in the big towns and cities which faced the full brunt of social rebellion
in the late eighteenth century up to the 1 840s. But an "ideology of order" also later manifested
itself in rural areas; see Storch, R. "Policing Rural Southern England before the Police" in Hay and
Snyder (1989), op. cit., pp. 211-264.
41 Hay and Synder (1989), op. cit., p. 10.
42See: Phillips, D. (1977), Crime and Authority in Victorian England: The Black Country 1835-
1860, London, Croom and Helm, chapter three.
431n some parts of the country, especially in rural areas, the desire of magistrates to call out the
army to quell riots and other serious forms of disorder remained well into the Chartist period of
1830-1843. See: Radzinowicz, L. (1968), A History of English Criminal Law and its History fromn
1750, Vol. 4, Steven & Sons, London, pp. 14 1-157; Langford, op. cit., p. 22.
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dominant values and interests for it to succeed. The systemic need for social
control necessitated a particular type of model of law enforcement which was
unpalatable to "traditional" English sensitivities. It required a professionally
trained, disciplined and centrally organised form of policing, instructed by the
Home Office, with expansive powers to suppress and control all of the social
elements that had exposed the existing legal infrastructure. But such a reform
itself would represent a fundamental assault on traditional libertarian values, the
social structure, its hierarchies and on vested interests. It would entail transferring
power and reorienting the system of criminal justice from local bodies and justices
to the organs and representatives of a new centralised state. Such a controversial
and radical measure could generate intense opposition from many quarters, in
particular from the local justices who were pivotal figures in the ancien regime.
In its pure form, as expressed in the writings of Bentham and Chadwick, there was
little chance of such radical reform plans becoming a reality. Indeed, the
centralised police force eventually established by Robert Peel in 1829 46in the
Metropolitan districts of London, although intended as a prototype for the rest of
the country,47 was not adopted nation-wide because of vested interests and
persistent resistance from the counties and boroughs. 48 The solution lay in a
compromise in which the "new system" would incorporate the "old". While
44EmsIey notes that by 1801 there were 71 permanent and 21 temporary barracks set up in different
parts of the country; op. cit., p. 46.
45See chapter two.
465ee the Metropolitan Police Act 1829 (10 Geo. IV c. 44).
47See Emsley, C, op. cit., p. 67; Radzinowicz, L. (l968),op. cit., p. 159; Pan. Debates (1828), n.s.,
vol. 18, cots 784-798.
48See: Langford, op. cit., p. 27; Storch, R., "Policing in Southern England before the Police", op.
cit. Chadwick's centralizing ambitions specifically failed in 1839 because of the political strength
of the magistracy which was heavily represented in Parliament; see Hay and Snyder, op. cit., p. 11.
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institutional change was necessary and inevitable (because of the social turbulence
in the 1830s and early 1840s caused by Chartism), control of the police,
ostensibly, had to remain with the localities themselves rather than with the
institutions of the central state. Control by magistrates at quarter sessions thus
remained intact by virtue of the Municipal Corporations Act l835, the County
and Borough Police Act 1856 50and the Local Government Act l888,' with
additional supervision of the Borough forces provided by the Watch Committees.
It would be misleading to suggest, however, that the new system had effectively
established the new police as "agents" of local government. The County Police
forces, now led by County Chief Constables, exhibited a high degree of
independence from magistrates in particular. The high social status of these Chief
Constables, 52 in conjunction with the indirect links between them and the Home
Office established by the 1856 legislation, 53 had the effect of granting them de
facto autonomy and undermined the amount of local control given to magistrates.
Although the supervisory regime imposed upon borough police forces was much
tighter,54even Borough Chief Constables were able to exercise increasing
independence from the Watch Committees by the 1860s. 55 As the nineteenth
century came to a close, the ties between local government and the police became
even looser as the responsibilities of Watch Committees in other local government
495 & 6 Gulielmi IV, C. 76, s. lxxvi.
°19 & 20 Vict. C. 69, s. vii.
'51 & 52 Vict. C. 41, s. 9(3).
52See Langford, op. cit., p. 50.
53me County and Borough Police Act 1856 imposed a duty upon all Chief Constables to provide
the Home Office with information.
54According to Critchley, the control of the Watch Committees was "absolute"; see A History of
Police in England and Wales, op. cit., p. 124. But, as Langford notes, this was only true of the
early period, after which the ties were gradually loosened by the activities of borough police Chief
Constables, who by the 1860s were increasingly autonomous; op. cit., pp. 5 1-53.
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business began to increase, and as central government upped its financial
contribution towards the running of the New Police. 56 The combined effect was
increased centralization.
The replacement of parish constables and night watches by an organised police
force, also enabled a new system of prosecution to gradually assert itself. The old
system of private prosecution and individually initiated investigations, with the
active support of magistrates and prosecution associations, was taken over by the
new police with the financial support of the State. 57 According to Hay and Snyder,
the reason for this development was because the "police had become convenient
substitutes for private prosecutors who would not, or could not, go to the trouble
or expense of proceeding." 58While the pace with which this occurred and the form
that it took was not uniform across the country, by mid-century the police were
either conducting in person the majority of prosecutions or nominating able
solicitors to act on their behalf.59
55See Langford, ibid.
56See the Police Expenses Act 1874; Critchley, op. cit., p. 127; Langford, op. cit., p. 53. The
operational independence of the police is neatly illustrated by Maitland. Commenting on the usual
procedure of applying for a warrant from a magistrate to search places for stolen goods, he states
that by 1885 there were cases in which an authority in writing from the chief police officer of the
district would serve as a sufficient substitute; op. cit., p. 115.
57Up to 1836, the costs of all prosecutions were a local burden. But since 1836 one half of those
costs, and from 1846 the whole, were repaid to the counties by the central state; see F.W.
Maitland,(1885) Justice and Police, London, Macmillan, pp. 141-142.58Op. cit., p. 37.
59Ibid, pp. 39-40. According to Jennifer Davis, of the 83, 582 offences that were proceeded against
in London in 1869, only 11, 631 charges were the result of private summonses. See "Prosecutions
and Their Context," in Hay and Snyder, op. cit., p. 419.
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Although there were attempts in the 1850s 6° and the 1870s 6 ' to introduce a system
of public prosecutors to avoid too much power being concentrated in the hands of
the police, 62by the time of the introduction of the office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions in 1879, the police was already accepted as a legitimate institution in
the eyes of many, especially the new middle classes. 63
 There was insufficient
motivation, therefore, to remove those powers of prosecution which they had
arrogated for themselves. 64
 Hence, the new office of the DPP was not established
as the separate body of public prosecutors which Bentham and his supporters had
demanded and which had been advocated in the 1850s, but as a "supervisory"
body which would intervene only in "exceptional cases." The existing system of
prosecution, was perceived as working well, 65
 with the DPP needed only "to give
advice in cases of importance and difficulty to justices of the peace, and to Chief
Officers of Police, who may apply for his advice in such cases.. .subject to any
special instructions which he may receive from the Attorney-General."66
The increasingly "state-like" system of prosecution, however, was still projected
as "private" and individually-initiated. The incumbent DPP, during the first
inquiry into the office, justified his infrequent intervention on the ground that the
60See The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, Pan. Papers 1856 Vol. VII, cited
in Langford, op. cit., pp. 110-116.
61 See The Fifth Report of the Judicature Commission, Par!. Papers 1874, Vol. XXVI, cited in
Langford, op. cit., pp 124-134.
62There were also fears of police bias because of their dual role of prosecutor and witness, and the
possibility that this would be exploited by defence counsel. See Langford, op. cit., p. 127.
63 See Emsley, Policing and Its Context, op. cit., ch. 9. Police involvement in prosecution was
increasingly viewed as unproblematic; see The Fifth Report of the Judicature Commission, op. cit.,
and the discussion by Langford, op. cit., pp 125-127.
See the Correspondence of E.H. Leycester Penryhn, Chairman of Surrey Quarter Sessions, Pail.
Papers 1875 Vol. LXI, p. 541, cited in Langford, op. cit., and the latter's discussion, p. 133.
65See Langford, op. cit., p. 131.
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Prosecution of Offences 1879 had enshrined the right of private prosecution.
Maule stated:
"The seventh section of the 'Prosecution of Offences Act 1879', contains
this material restriction with regard to my interference: 'Nothing in the Act
shall interfere with the right of any person to institute, undertake, or carry
on any criminal proceeding.' Therefore, as long as people elect to carry on
their own prosecutions, I have no legal right to intervene or interpose, and
it is only when they apply to me, and I learn in that way that they wish for
my interposition, that that interposition is wefl-founded or warrantable'
[my emphasis].
The fact that, in the 1880s, "private prosecution" had become a rarity and by then
a police domain, was not expressed in official rhetoric. The police officer was
conceptualised not as an agent of state, but as an individual citizen providing a
service to complainants who, by reason of their financial difficulties, would be
otherwise unable to get redress. As with the reform of policing itself, the new
system of prosecution was not presented as a radical departure from the old. In so
doing, historical continuity was preserved and the legitimacy of the new system
established. Thus by the time of the Royal Commission on Police Powers and
Procedure in 1929, lawmakers were still prepared to state:
6 Evidence of John Blosset Maule Q.C., incumbent DPP, in the Report of the Committee Appointed
to Inquire into the Office of the Public Prosecutor, Part. Papers 1884 Vol. XXII, p. 317, cited in
Langford, op. cit., p. 138.
67Ibid, cited in Langford, op. cit., p. 139.
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"Despite the imposition of many extraneous duties on the police by
legislation and administrative action, the principle remains that a
policeman, in the view of the common law, is only 'a person paid to
perform, as a matter of duty, acts which if he were so minded he might
have done voluntarily" 68
The establishment of the police as law enforcers, investigators and de facto
prosecutors also enabled reform of the magistracy to take place. Utilitarian-led
rationalisation of the criminal law that had begun in the 1820s, and which
continued for much of the nineteenth century, led to a massive growth in the
number of summary offences.69
 This had the effect of transferring the majority of
criminal cases from Quarter Sessions and Assizes to the new, and specially
constructed, Magistrates Courts thereby establishing the Magistrates Court as the
principal site of guilt determination. 70 Although the magistrate had always acted
in some judicial capacity, this shift in case orientation served to highlight the
judicial role over the administrative one. In terms of legitimacy, therefore, and for
presentational purposes, it was increasingly important for the magistrate to act
"judicially."7'
68London, HMSO Cmnd 3297, para 15.
69By 1856, the expansion of summary jurisdiction was already halving the number of indictable
offences that reached Quarter Sessions; see the comments of Thomas Puckle, Chairman of Quarter
Sessions at Newington, in The Report of the Select Committee on Public Prosecutors, Parl. Papers
1856 Vol. VII, p. 373, cited in Langford, op. cit., p. 120.
70F. W. Maitland notes that by 1883, only 14000 persons were tried for an indictable offence while
the number of summary convictions for larceny alone had risen to 27000; see Justice and Police
(1885), London, Macmillan & Co, p. 128.
7t This was one of the objects of the 1848 Act; see Freestone D. and Richardson J.C. "The Making
of English Criminal Law Sir John Jervis and his Acts," Crim.L.R. [1980], pp 5-16, at p. 10.
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It is in this context that we can view in part the greater frequency of cautioning
amongst magistrates before 1848 that we observed in the last chapter, and the
desire of judges to impose a form of discipline upon wayward magistrates.72
Although Jervis's Act of 1848 was concerned with setting up a series of
procedures that would protect magistrates from legal challenge, 73 it is also clear
that it was intended to consolidate the existing law which by that time favoured
strict procedural control of magistrates. Furthermore, later nineteenth century case
law also indicates that it was not expected that magistrates would question
accused persons outside the framework of the 1848 Act. Hence the case reporter
for the The Justice of the Peace in 1877, commended "to the attention of all
justices of the peace and police officers" (emphasis added) the comments of the
Lord Chief Justice that the law did not allow a judge, magistrate, jury or police
officer to question an accused. 74
 The office of magistrate was no longer
characterised by its wide discretionary powers in symbolic recognition of his
status within the local community. Rather, he was now a state functionary
equipped with specific and limited powers, and expected to perform a specific
function at a specific place in a specified manner.
This increased supervision of the magistrate through cautioning and the removal
of questioning powers, however, did little to benefit accused persons. Its purpose
was not to endow the accused with an armoury of enforceable rights should the
72See the discussion of Arnold, op. cit., in chapter two.
73See chapter two, pp 6-7. According to Langford, as a result of the last bill during the passage of
the Indictable Offences Act 1848, it was also assured that magistrates would be protected against
legal suits challenging the validity of their decisions unless malice was proved; op. cit., p. 42.
74See The Yeovil Murder Case (1877)41 JP 187. See also the earlier decision of Berriman (1854),
op.cit., in which it was held that the magistrate had no right to question the accused (though no
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magistrate overstep his powers, 75 but to enable the new system to work more
harmoniously. By off-loading questioning powers onto the police, questioning of
the accused could take place outside the court, in private and hidden from public
scrutiny. Thus confessions could be obtained using oppressive tactics with little
danger of the legitimacy of the system being threatened. if oppression came to
light in subsequent proceedings, the "voluntariness" of the confession could be
assured by the appearance of the accused before the magistrate who would read
the second caution as stated in the 1848 Act, a procedure that was likely to
facilitate the admission of a confession no matter how oppressive or illegal police
questioning may have been.76
In terms of the whole restructuring process, the judicial role was not excluded
from this process of reform. Under the old system, watchmen and constables had
acted individually under the auspices of Justices of the Peace. The new system,
however, had enabled an increasingly autonomous police force to emerge with
only loose external supervision. 77 In the context of the late nineteenth century,
with ever increasing powers conferred directly or indirectly on the police by
statute, 78 this led some commentators to doubt the legitimacy of the extent of these
reference was made to the 1848 Act itself). For a detailed discussion of this decision, see chapter
two.
75See the discussion of Samsome in the previous chapter.
76Although there appear to have been some differences in opinion amongst the judiciary as to the
role of the caution after 1848 (see the discussions of Samsome, Stripp, Bate in chapter two), the
dominant position was that the role of the caution was to facilitate the admission of confessions,
and not to provide a means by which they would be excluded.
77The "looseness" of this supervision is illustrated by the extent of the autonomy granted to chief
police officers in the early I 880s. According to Maitland, where there was a need to search for
stolen goods, there were cases in which an authority in writing from the chief police officer in the
relevant district was deemed as good as a magistrate's warrant; op. cit., p. 115.
78This included powers conferred by the Licensing Acts [see, for example: the Licensing Acts of
1872, c. 94, s. 35 (concerning inspection of houses providing intoxicating liquor); of 1878, c. 12
(concerning powers of entry onto premises to inspect threshing machines) land by virtue of their
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powers without any corresponding supervision. Hence, Maitland remarked: "In
truth, the very large inspectorial powers given by this statute and by that are
becoming consolidated in the hands of the police."79
It was important, in terms of police legitimacy, for a new form of supervision to be
established. A form of supervision that was independent of government. This was
to be achieved by subjecting police officers to "the Rule of Law;" namely, to
control by the judiciary. In order for this form of control to be effective and for the
system to work efficiently, it was necessary to generate a sufficient consensus
amongst the judiciary as to the extent of that control. But this was necessarily
problematic because of the individualised nature of the judiciary and the lack of a
formal and hierarchical decision-making structure in the nineteenth century.
Although consultation amongst them was common, the responsibility for the
majority of decisions resided with individual judges which gave them the ability to
interpret the common law or statute in accordance with their own sets of values
rather than in compliance with the values of a corporatised judiciary. When faced
with a politically and constitutionally controversial subject, such as the control of
the police, it was inevitable that different values would be expressed from the
Bench and different rules would be set out concerning the proper scope of police
questioning.
appointment as inspectors by local authorities of such matters as food and drugs, weights and
measures, explosives, etc. See further, F. W. Maitland, op. cit., p. 116.
79Ibid., p. 117. It should be noted that I am not arguing that the police were regarded as
uncontroversial before this point, nor that there were no calls for strict supervision of the police.
Indeed, the opposite has been argued in the foregoing section.
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Control of police officers by the judiciary did not suddenly emerge in the early
1880s, as Mirfield suggested. 8° It had been an ongoing process since the early
I 830s and the increased nation-wide presence of the police. Moreover, differences
of opinion were present even then. In Swatkins (183 l),81 Patteson J was prepared
to impose some form of legal control upon the questioning of an accused (albeit
very limited in scope) by requiring a police officer to first caution him when he
was formally detained as a suspect under charge. 82While in Kerr (1837),83 Park J
left the need to caution the accused entirely with the police officer himself.
As it became apparent that a police force was being established nation-wide, that
was responsible for collecting evidence and prosecuting cases against an accused,
the need for clear and authoritative guidance from the courts became increasingly
important. The clarity of that guidance, however, was obscured by the differing
opinions of the Bench as to the extent and nature of police powers of questioning.
In the early 1850s, it seemed that some of the senior judiciary realised the
importance of a judicial consensus on such matters in the wake of a series of
decisions from Maule J and Coleridge J in the 1840s. 84 These had left the police
officer in a quandary whether to question the accused at all, and if so, how he
should administer a caution without it being regarded by the courts as an
inducement in contravention of rule in Warickshall. The newly established Court
of Criminal Appeal in 1848,85 provided the structural means by which the
800p. cit.
81 0p. cit.
82For a discussion of this case, see chapter two, p. 9
830p. cit.
84See the cases of Drew, Morton, Furley and Harris referred to in the last two chapters.
1 I & 12 Vict. C. 78.
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differences amongst the judiciary could be minirnised and thus better guidance to
the police provided.
It is submitted that the case of Baidry (1852) was a formal recognition by some of
the senior judiciary for a new consensus to emerge. Three of the five judges refer
to the "wayward" decisions of judges Maule and Coleridge and the need for clarity
on the issue. 86
 A sentiment, perhaps, best expressed by Baron Parke who states:
"I have the most unfeigned respect for Coleridge J and Maule J; and in
deference to their decisions, I offered to reserve a case at Aylesbury, but I
cannot concur in their judgement. I have reflected on Reg. v Drew, and
Reg v Morton, and I have never been able to make out that any benefit
was held out to the prisoner by the caution employed in those cases. We
ought therefore to be extremely obliged to Lord Campbell for having
reserved the point in order that it might be settled" 87(emphasis added).
It is clear from Campbell LCJ's concluding remarks that this sentiment (the need
for a formal consensus) was shared by all of the Court:
"With regard to the decisions of my brother Coleridge and by Brother
Maule, with the greatest of respect for them, I disagree with their
conclusions. It was in deference to their ruling that I reserved this point,
not that I entertained any doubt upon the question myself. I am very glad
86See the judgments of Chief Baron Pollock at 442-3, Baron Parke at 445, Campbell LCJ at 447. It
is also apparent from their earlier interjections with counsel at 440.
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to find that all this Court concur in the view which I took at the trial, that
the evidence was admissible."88
But is it not apparent that this formal recognition of the need for a consensus
extended to their substantive opinions and values. Hence, it was noted in the last
chapter that while Erie J and Baron Parke exhibited similar values and opinions,
these were different from the opinions of Chief Baron Poliock and Campbell LCJ.
Campbell LCJ's concluding remarks should be read, therefore, as an attempt to
present a consensus more than an actual consensus on the extent of police powers
and the manner in which they were exercised. 89
This lack of substantive consensus is evident throughout the rest of the nineteenth
century, as judicial opinion reacted to the controversial changes that were taking
place in the structure of the criminal process. The re-emergence of an activist
administration in the 1870s and 1880s, and renewed interest in police reform,9°
culminating in the Local Government Act l888,' aroused the iiberalisl and
87Ibid.
88Ibid, at 447.
89This is also apparent from the first decision of the Criminal Court of Appeal in Garner (1848) 1
Den. 329, in which Maule J and Erie J clearly had different perspectives as to the application of the
voluntariness rule. For Erie J, its application was discretionary: "I think, in every case, it is for the
Judge to decide whether the words were used in such a manner, and under such circumstances, as
to induce a prisoner to make a confession of guilt." Whereas, for Maule J, it was simply a question
of applying a verbal formula. Hence in response to counsel's question whether the statement, 'you
had better tell the truth', rendered a statement involuntary, he replied: "They have been held to do
so over and over again." The need for a presentational consensus to conceal differences, however,
is clear from Chief Baron Pollock's statement: "We are all of opinion that the conviction cannot be
sustained." (emphasis added).
901n 1874, it was decided to increase the Exchequer grant towards the cost of all police forces from
one-quarter to one-half of the cost of pay and clothing. This was part of a policy to increase the
supervisory powers of the Home Secretary over the county police forces; see Critchley, op. cit., p.
127.
91 Chap. 41, p. 257. The motivation for the Act was to improve police efficiency and to increase the
supervisory powers of 'democratic' organs of government over the police (see Critchley, op. cit.,
pp. 132-139). This was sought by abolishing police forces in towns with a population of less than
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decentralist tendencies of some members of the judiciary. This was reflected
subsequently in the case law on police powers of questioning in the 1880s and
1890s, with some judges roundly criticising the police questioning of accused
persons when in custody and excluding any statement obtained thereby. 92 But
these opinions were not universally shared. 93 Some judges remarked they knew of
"no such rule of evidence" and saw nothing wrong in police questioning of the
accused whether in custody or not. A caution would be preferable, but it was not
essential to admissibility. They also echoed the sentiments behind the Criminal
Evidence Act 1898, that a rule which prevented the accused from making a
statement to the police when first arrested or charged would cause "mischief' and
would be against the interests of those accused who were factually innocent.94
Other judges made a compromise; that while there was no rule of evidence which
prohibited police officers from questioning the accused in custody, there was a
discretion which could be exercised depending on the facts of the individual
case.95
10,000 people and by vesting supervisory powers in a joint standing committee of the county
council and quarter sessions (section 9)
92See the judgment of Smith J in Gavin (1885)5 Cox CC 656 at 657, and the judgments of Cave J
in Thompson (1893) 2 QB 12, Male and Cooper (1893) 17 Cox CC 689 at 690 and Morgan (1895)
59 JP 827. In the latter case, the report states that Cave J ruled "that the prisoners, having been
taken into custody at the house, what they said in answer to the charge at the police station could
not be given in evidence against them, as it was not right, when once a prisoner was in custody, to
charge him again at the police-station in the hope of getting something out of him. A detective had
no earthly business to examine a prisoner."
93 5ee Brackenbury (1893) 17 Cox CC 628 in which Day J expressly dissented from the decision of
Smith J in Gavin, op. cit.
94See the judgments of Russell LCJ and Mathew J in Rogers v Hawkin (1898) 19 Cox 122.
95 See the judgment of Hawkins J in Histed (1898) 19 Cox CC 16 at 17n where he states: "I entirely
agree with the ruling of Smith J in Gavin . Cross-examination of a prisoner by a policeman should
not be permitted, and in my discretion I should exclude evidence obtained in that way" (emphasis
added). See further Miller (1895) 18 Cox CC in which the same judge decided not to exercise his
discretion. See also the judgment of Channell J in Knight v Thayre (1905) 20 Cox CC 711.
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The confusion that this must have engendered in the police force with regard to
their powers of questioning over the accused was all too apparent. In the Preface
to Vincent's Police Code in 1882, Justice Hawkins, had given a clearer impression
to police officers as to the path they should take. He wrote:
"When a crime has been committed, and you are engaged in endeavouring
to discover the author of it, there is no objection to you making enquiries
of, or putting questions to, any person from whom you think you can
obtain useful information. It is your duty to discover the criminal if you
can, and to do this you must make such enquiries; and if in the course of
them you should chance to interrogate and to receive answers from a man
who turns out to be the criminal himself, and who inculpates himself by
these answers, they are nevertheless admissible in evidence, and may be
used against him.. .When, however, a constable has a warrant to arrest, or is
about to arrest a person on his own authority, or has a person in custody for
a crime, it is wrong to question such person touching the crime of which he
is accused. Neither judge, magistrate, nor juryman, can interrogate an
accused person - unless he tenders himself as a witness - or require him to
answer questions tending to incriminate himself. Much less, then, ought a
constable to do so, whose duty as regards that person is simply to arrest
and detain him in safe custody. On arresting a man a constable ought
simply to read his warrant, or tell the accused the nature of the charge upon
which he is arrested, leaving it to the person so arrested to say anything or
nothing as he pleases. For a constable to press any accused to say anything
with reference to the crime of which he is accused is very wrong.....There
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is, however, no objection to a constable listening to any mere voluntary
statement which a prisoner desires to make, and repeating such statement
in evidence; nor is there any objection to his repeating in evidence any
conversation he may have heard between the prisoner and any other
person. But he ought not, by anything he says or does, to invite or
encourage an accused person to make any statement without first
cautioning him that he is not bound to say anything tending to incriminate
himself, and that anything he says may be used against him. Perhaps the
best maxim for a constable to bear in mind with respect to an accused
person is, 'Keep youi eyes open, nd yo mot st'....
unfairly to a prisoner by coaxing him word by word or conduct to
divulge anything. if you do, you will assuredly be severely handled at the
trial, and it is not unlikely that your evidence will be disbelieved.
"In detailing any conversation with an accused person, be sure to
state the whole conversation from the commencement to the end in the
very words used; and, in narrating facts, state every fact whether you
think it material or not, for you are not the judge of its materiality.....I
cannot too strongly recommend every constable, however good he may
fancy his memory to be, to write down word for word every syllable of
every conversation in which an accused has taken part, and of every
statement made to him by an accused person, and to have that written
memorandum with him at the trial."96
96Cited in Abrahams, G, 1964, Police Questioning and the Judges' Rules, Oyez Publications,
London, pp 13-14.
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According to Justice Hawkins, therefore, it was the duty of a police officer to
question persons in order to discover the author of a crime, if that person later
turned out to be the criminal himself, the answers he gave could be evidence
against him at the trial. But once that person had become an "accused", that is a
warrant of an arrest had been issued against him, or he had been arrested on the
authority of the police officer, or he was in custody for a crime, he was not
allowed to be questioned in relation to that crime. The officer could ask him if he
had anything to say, but only after a proper caution had been administered to the
accused reminding him that he was not obliged to say anything and t(at what (e
said would be used in evidence. Should a police officer stray from these
guidelines, the statement of an accused would not be inadmissible at the trial.
Nevertheless, he might receive a rebuke from the trial judge which could
adversely influence the jury in their determination of guilt.
This would have given the police the impression that they had wide questioning
powers, especially if they managed to avoid instigating formal legal proceedings
by questioning their suspect without arresting him. if they wanted to detain the
suspect for questioning, detention would have to be justified on grounds other than
their suspicion the person committed the crime, such as: flight,97 the investigation
of other crimes, or of other persons involved in the crime. If they needed to
question the accused after they had arrested him, there was less room for
manoeuvre but so long as they cautioned him before doing so, any statement given
97This possible justification for custodial questioning had been opened up as early as 1831 by the
case of Swatkins, op. cit. For discussion of this case, see chapter two.
132
would still be admissible. Technically, they ought only to enquire whether the
accused wanted to make a voluntary statement, but more detailed questioning
could be justified on grounds of "clarification" without any judicial reprimand
because of the emphasis laid on a verbatim record and the likelihood that most
accused persons would be illiterate and unable to write their own statements.
It is submitted, therefore, that the "progeny of Gavin" must have caused confusion
in police ranks because there is no indication of an extension to the rule in
Warickshall in these guidelines, nor of a discretion vested in the judge to exclude
statements obtained in breach of them according to the facts of particular cases.
The discretion mentioned in the text refers only to how a judge refers to the
evidence in his summing up to the jury.
Moreover, it is from this context that we understand better the communications
between the Chief Constable of Birmingham and Alverstone LCJ in 1906, the
formation of the Court of Appeal in 1907 and the publication of the Judges' Rules
in 1912. The Chief Constable of Birmingham had written to Alverstone LCJ
seeking advice in respect of the police caution. The request appeared to be for
some rules that would clearly guide police practice because one judge on his
circuit had disapproved of a caution in one set of circumstances, another judge
referring to a different set of circumstances had disapproved of the omission of a
caution. In response to this request, Alverstone LCJ referred to the following as a
guideline. He said:
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"There is, as I far as I know, no difference of opinion whatever among any
of the judges of the King's Bench Division upon the matter. The practice
which has been definitely followed, and approved for many years, is that
whenever a constable determines to make a charge against a man he should
caution him before taking any statement from him. Whether there is any
necessity for a caution before a formal charge is preferred must depend
upon the particular circumstances of the case: no definite rule can be laid
down.
"In many cases a person may wish to give an explanation which would
have exonerated him from any suspicion, and he ought not to be prevented
from making it. On the other hand, there are cases in which it would be
the duty of the constable to caution the person before accepting any further
statement from him, even though no charge has actually been
formulated"98 (emphases added).
The need to present a judicial consensus to the Chief Constable is clear from his
statement that there is "no difference of opinion whatever among any of the judges
of the King's Bench" and that the practice of requiring a caution to be
administered at the time of the formal charge had been "definitely followed." But
it is not clear from Alverstone LCJ's statement that a consensus had been reached
in respect of either the caution before charge or in relation to any evidential
consequences. Nor is it clear whether interrogation of a suspect should stop upon
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his arrest or when in custody. Unlike Justice Hawkins in 1882, the emphasis in
Alvestone LCJ's statement is on the formal charge and not on the arrest. It could
be argued that he was silent about these matters and refused to lay down any
definite rules because he was aware of the variety of judicial opinion on the
matter.
The formation of the Court of Appeal in 1907 provided the mechanism by which
compromises could be effected and judicial consensus achieved. Ostensibly, the
reason for the establishment of the Court of Appeal lay in two notorious
miscarriages of justice, the cases of Beck and Edaiji. The reports of the two
committees which had looked into these cases had focused on remediable errors
found in the trial. In order to restore confidence in the system, and thus its
legitimacy, the structure of the criminal justice system was changed with a new
Court of Appeal that would check for defects in the original trial by giving an
accused a right to appeal against his conviction. However, as Langford has
noted,99the real motive for the change lay less in the need to give an accused the
right to protect himself from a false conviction, and more in the systemic need to
renew and maintain the criminal process. He writes:
"This 'project' of renewal of the criminal process.. .was specifically
orientated towards the maintenance and reproduction of the efficiency and
98Cited in Abrahams, 0, op. cit., p. 16.
99State, Law and Prosecution: The Emergence of the Modern Criminal Process 1780-1910, op.
cit., pp 240-260.
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organisational coherence of the criminal process. This was the conceptual
environment in which the Court of Appeal was shaped."°°
What had formally been an application of mercy to the Home Office became a
"right" of appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Home Office had been inundated
with more than 6000 applications each year and did not have the resources nor the
expertise to deal with such numbers. This in turn, had focused attention on the role
of central government in matters of criminal justice and reawaken the fears of
liberal constitutionalists. 10 ' It was necessary, therefore, to off-load these cases onto
an independent, non-governmental body to promote both the efficiency and
legitimacy of the system. In the new set-up, the Home Office retained its
prerogative of mercy, but with the Court of Appeal acting as a filter to
substantially reduce the numbers applying, thereby relieving the pressure and
strain on the Home Office. Flooding of the new court was also avoided by
limiting the right of appeal to indictable offences only (the majority of offences by
this time were summary), by the application of maximum time limits for appeal
and through internal guidelines given to prison officers. In so doing, the efficiency
of the system was maintained.
The new Court of Appeal promoted efficiency in another important respect. The
unreformed court structure had facilitated individualism and differences of
opinion among judges. Although they frequently consulted in the Inns of Court
and in their determination of certain difficult cases, the structure was insufficiently
°°Ibid, p. 259.
101 1bid., pp 242-243.
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corporatised and harmonised to promote unanimity of opinion. The notion of
"binding precedent", in particular, had yet to be fully articulated as there was no
hierarchical court structure that could enforce it. The new court provided a forum
in which the most senior judges could agree, and for that consensus to be set down
in specially formulated case reports, the Criminal Appeal Reports, and for it to be
communicated to all circuit judges.
That a consensus was reached by senior judges'° 2is evident from both the content
and form of the case reports on police questioning of the accused between 1907
and 1912. As for the latter, the individualised judgements that we witnessed in
Baldry (1852), for example, are replaced by a single judgement read on behalf of
all the appellate judges. Thus, in Alice James (1909) b03
 the agreed judgement is
given by Darling J; in James Unsworth (1910)b04 by Bucknill J; in Booth and
Jones (1910)'°5by Darling J, and in Godinho (191 l)'°6by Hamilton J. In terms of
content, all of the judgements refuse to both extend the application of the
voluntariness rule to statements made during defacto custodial questioning, and
to exercise their discretion to exclude statements of the accused made in response
to questions after cautioning.
The new "corporate spirit" of the Court of Appeal is perhaps best illustrated by
107Booth and Jones.
	
The appellants had been convicted of demanding money on a
' °2This "spirit", however, was not shared by all trial judges; see Winkel (1912) JP 191 and the
judgment of Avory J as an example.
1034 Cr App Rep 319.
1045 Cr App Rep 1.
1055 Cr App Rep 177.
1066 Cr App Rep 12
107Op . cit.
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forged document and claimed that a statement "forced" from them by a series of
questions put by a Post Office investigating official at the appellant's house, with
a police detective present, should have been excluded at the trial. It was submitted
by the appellants' counsel that as the investigating official knew a fraud had been
committed, that he had gone to question the accused in relation to that offence,
and that he would not have let them go (according to the police detective), they
were in custody at the time and so should not have been questioned. Two of the
appeal judges interjected at this point:
"Lawrance J: A policeman's eye is not custody.
Darling J: If this sort of investigation were not allowed very few crimes
would ever be discovered."08
Then without requiring any assistance from counsel for the Crown, Darling J
delivered the judgement holding that the voluntary rule had not been breached and
that "custody" was a factual question for the trial judge to determine on the basis
of the interrogator's state of mind. He stated:
"The evidence before the learned judge was that the person putting the
questions had not determined to take the prisoner into custody, and he had
to make up his mind whether that was so or not. The learned judge came
to the conclusion that there was no evidence to justify him in holding that
1081bid., p. 179.
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the interrogator had already determined to take Booth into custody or that
he was practically in custody."°9
By leaving in part the question of custody to the individual interrogator, the Court
of Appeal facilitated police interrogation of suspects and enabled them to collect
sufficient evidence from an accused before having to charge. Any hint of
involuntariness was removed by the interrogator "giving the appellant a definite
option either to speak or not to
	
added). The presence of the
caution precluded the operation of the voluntariness rule.
The collective desire to equip the police with sufficient powers to investigate
crime by allowing questioning of suspects in de facto custody is more evident in
this consensus than any need to protect the individual accused. Where some judges
had once sought to protect an accused by restricting questioning and demanding
that their very words be recorded to prevent police officers from fabricating any
statements," senior judges at the beginning of the twentieth century no longer
thought it necessary." 2 Suspects were already protected by the voluntariness rule
and the police had to be trusted to carry out their duties of detecting and
investigating crime. The state, through the agency of the police, was now a
servant of the people; the suspect was the enemy.
'°9lbid., p. 180.
°Ibid.
See Sexton (1822), op. cit. and Justice Hawkins's guidelines to the police in 1882.
2See Godinho (1911) op. cit. "The other point raised, that the confession must be excluded
unless the ipsissima verba are given, does not actually arise, because the uncontradicted evidence
is that the words in question were the actual words. Moreover, the case relied upon, Sexton, has
been much, and probably justly, doubted," per Hamilton J at p. 14. The implication is that if the
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These notions of the state and of the suspect we also see present in the Judges'
Rules in 1912. The original rules, which did not have the force of Iaw,"3were
drawn up by the judges at the request of the Home Secretary and were intended as
guidance for the police, who were still in considerable doubt as to the procedure
they ought follow' 14in their questioning of suspects. The rules stated as follows:
"1. When a police officer is endeavouring to discover the author of a
crime, there is no objection to his putting questions in respect thereof to
any person or persons, whether suspected or not, from whom he thinks that
useful information can be obtained.
2. Whenever a police officer has made up his mind to charge a person
with a crime, he should first caution such person before asking any
questions or any further questions as the case may be.
3. Persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution
being first administered.
4. If the person wishes to volunteer any statement, the usual caution
should be administered. It is desirable that the last two words of such
caution should be omitted, and that the caution should end with the words
"be given in evidence."5
The spirit they express is that of the new Court of Appeal, and not the old
liberalism, nor even the sentiments of Justice Hawkins in 1882. Under rule 1, the
words had been contradicted, it would not have affected the decision because Sexton was a bad
decision in any event.
3 Voisin (1918) 13 Cr App Rep 89.
" 4See the comments of Darling J in Cook (1918) TLR 515 at 516.
" 5L.R. [1918] 1 KB 539.
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judges clearly sanction questioning of suspects without a caution - that is, persons
who were already suspected before police questioning. The person questioned is
not merely a witness who "turns out to be the criminal himself, and who
inculpates himself by these answers." 1 ' 6Under rule 2, the questioning is allowed to
continue without a caution until the police officer feels that he has enough
incriminating evidence to charge the suspect (see Booth and Jones ). Under rule
3, questioning of the suspect can continue even if the accused is in custody so long
as a caution is given (ibid.; though what amounts to 'custody' is not defined).
Under rule 4, any defects apparent in the foregoing questioning are removed by the
administration of a proper caution (ibid.).
It is relevant that the rules do not state the evidential consequences for their
breach. It is suggested that this was done for two reasons: first, to maintain the
consensus among senior judges and to promote a wider consensus among circuit
judges. If the rules had stated that they were rules of law, and that any breach
would lead to exclusion of statements of the accused, some judges would have
argued such a position was "against the balance of decided authority" (see Sumner
U in Ibrahim below) and unnecessarily restrictive of the police, if, on the other
hand, the rules had stated they were only rules of guidance to the police with no
evidential consequences arising from their breach, it would have removed the
discretionary power to exclude evidence which some judges had arrogated to
themselves to exercise in appropriate circumstances." 7By focusing on police
questioning powers per se rather than on the consequences for breaching the rules,
6per Justice Hawkins, op. cit.
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controversy would be avoided among senior judges and they would thus be in a
better position to enforce a consensus wholescale and provide better guidance to
the police. Secondly, by reserving a discretion to exclude, the rules provided
another device through which the legitimacy of the system would be maintained.
In extreme cases of police malpractice, but which did not technically come under
the voluntariness rule, judges would have the power to exclude evidence where
the moral integrity of the system was threatened.
This consensus of senior judges and the desire to make it more widespread in the
judiciary is further illustrated by the Privy Council in Ibrahim [1914]."81n
refusing to exclude a confession that had been obtained from the accused while he
was in custody and without the proper caution, Sumner U (on behalf of the Whole
court) stated:
"The English law is still unsettled, strange as it may seem, since the point
is one that constantly occurs in criminal trials. Many judges, in their
discretion, exclude such evidence, for they fear that nothing less than the
exclusion of all such statements can prevent improper questioning of
prisoners by removing the inducement to resort to it. This consideration
does not arise in the present case. Others, less tender to the prisoner or
more mindful of the balance of decided authority, would admit such
statements, nor would the Court of Criminal Appeal quash the conviction
thereafter obtained, if no substantial miscarriage of justice had
7For a good example of how this discretion would be exercised, see the judgment of Channell J in
Knight v Thayre [1905], op. cit.
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occurred.....Having regard to the particular position in which their
Iordships stand to criminal proceedings, they do not propose to intimate
what they think the rule of English law ought to be, much as it is desired
that the point should be settled by authority, so far as a general rule can be
laid down when circumstances must so greatly vary. That must be left to a
Court which exercises, as their lordships do not, the revising functions of a
general Court of Criminal
Although Sumner U (on behalf of all the judges) admits that "the English law is
still unsettled", the disagreement is only in relation to the consequences of
"improper questioning of prisoners" (emphasis added); that is, those persons who
were in official legal custody for the commission of a crime. Some would
exercise a discretion to exclude the evidence, whereas others (the implication is
the majority) would admit such statements. Even in this matter, there is an
expressed desire for the issue to be "settled by authority" in the new Court of
Appeal. There is no expressed disagreement, however, over the questioning
powers of the police in relation to suspects. Those persons who had fallen under
police suspicion for the commission of a crime ("suspect"), but were not legally in
custody or arrested (i.e. not a "prisoner"), or had not been formally charged (i.e.
not an "accused") would not be granted any protection from police questioning
other than the formal application of the voluntariness rule. 120 That was stated by
Rule 1 and then confirmed by Ibrahim.
" 8AC 599.
H9Ibid, p. 614.
' 20This was not a hypothetical situation as by the middle of the nineteenth century, the police had
become the initiators of investigations, and could determine when to arrest, detain, and charge
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It is submitted, therefore, that by the time of the Judges' Rules in 1912, a
consensus had been achieved. The category of "prisoner" had been sub-divided
into sub-categories of "accused" and "suspect". Although the degree of legal
protection afforded to "prisoners" and "accused persons" had yet to be fully
worked out, there was a judicial consensus that those who fell into the category
"suspect" would have the least protection in order to maximise police efficiency
and their ability to investigate crime.
d) The rise and fall of Welfarism and the ascendance of the suspect
Welfarism, that is the notion that the state accepts responsibility for and actively
promotes the interests of the community through state intervention in the lives of
its citizens, did not suddenly emerge post-1945 when the new Labour
administration established the Welfare State (though, perhaps, that was when it
was at its peak). The Utilitarians, through the figure of Jeremy Bentham, had as
early as the 1820s, advocated an activist and centralised state that would promote
the collective welfare of its citizens. We have seen how, as the nineteenth century
progressed, although the Benthamite project was never completed, the state
became increasingly interventionist, powerful and representative. Reform of the
police, the judicialisation of the magistracy and the corporatisation of the
judiciary, reflected a much broader programme of reforms in parliamentary
democracy, local government and central government that had been begun in the
'suspects'; see Bryan, I. (1997), Interrogation and Confession - A Study of Progress, Process and
Practice, Dartmouth & Ashgate, Aldershot, p. 133.
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1820s to ensure the system's survival through periods of crisis. As the state
became more representative through the gradual extension of the franchise, the
notions of liberal constitutionalists that the state was an evil to be avoided and that
all-embracing laissez-faire should be promoted, became less popular. The state
was increasingly perceived as acting on behalf of the whole community as
opposed to sectional interests. Even opposing political parties by the end of the
nineteenth century and into the Edwardian period had accepted as legitimate state
intervention in citizens' lives, as evidenced by the number of bi-partisan state
programmes,' 21 and the commitment of governments to redistributive policies. 1 221f
it ever had been, individualism, by the beginning of the twentieth century, was no
longer the orientating ethos of English government or of society.
We see this communitarianism reflected in the case law on the Judges' Rules and
in judicial rhetoric in particular. The emphasis on rising crime and the need to
facilitate police investigations for the benefit of the community as a whole is
apparent from the early cases. Thus, in Voisin (1918), in refusing to regard
breaches of the Rules per se as a reason for excluding statements of the accused,
the Court of Appeal commented:
"It is desirable in the interests of the community that investigations into
crime should not be cramped."123
' 21 See Pugh.'M. (1994) State and Society - British Political and Social History 1870-1992,
Edward Arnold, London, pp 109-121.
' 22Such as Lloyd George's "People's Budget" in 1909; see Smith, M. (1990), British Politics,
Society and the State Since the Late Nineteenth Century, Macmillan, London, pp 49-50.
' 23per Lawrence J at p. 95.
145
Similarly, in Cook (1918) Darling J opined on behalf of the Court:
"It would be a lamentable thing if the police were not allowed to make
enquiries, and if statements were excluded because of a shadowy notion
that if prisoners were left to themselves they would not have made
them."24
That is not to say, however, that the values of individualism and of laissez-faire
were dead. After the First World War, they were seen to dominate temporarily in
economic policy as Britain sought to regain its position in world trade through its
advocacy of a return to the Gold Standard.' 25 Respect for individual rights was
also present in the case law on questioning, and evident in the language of the
newly constituted Court of Appeal. Hence, the liberal judge Avory LCJ, threw out
statements of the accused that had been obtained by questioning in custody on the
ground that "an informal preliminary trial in private by the police is not fair to
prisoners." 26Moreover, even in those cases where concern for the rights of
accused persons was not paramount, there was still a recognition of the need to
protect the individual as expressed through the continued usage of words such as
"prisoner". Such words evoked violation of the freedom of the individual, and
stressed the importance for judicial regulation and protection. Hence in Voisin
(1918), Lawrance J commented:
' 24at p. 516.
' 25 Pugh, M, op. cit., pp 165-166.
126Grayson (1921), at p. 8. See also: Taylor (1923); Brown and Bruce (1931). Differences of
opinion were still prevalent in the late l920s and early 30s, focusing on the wording of Rule 3 of
146
"statements obtained from prisoners contrary to the spirit of the rules may
be rejected" (emphasis added).127
But following the debacle of Stanley Baldwin and his government in 1929, the
massive rise in unemployment, and then the collapse of the Gold Standard,
disenchantment with the free market and with private enterprise became more
entrenched, and belief in the virtues of active government grew.' 28 The formation
of a National Government and then the inexorable march to war rang the death
knell for laissez-faire and the pre-eminence of individual rights. In the case law
on police questioning, the term "prisoner" disappeared from judicial vocabulary
and was replaced by the more manipulable and less evocative language of the
Judges' Rules, as the "prisoner" became a "person in custody".'29
It is submitted that this symbolized a turning point in police powers and the role of
the accused. A welfarist consensus had been reached in that the needs of the
individual were perceived as inextricably linked to the strength and capacity of the
state to intervene. This is well illustrated by the substantive decisions and rhetoric
of the Court of Appeal after the Second World War. First, there is the image of
the police officer, as an impeccable representative of the state, fighting the ever
rising tide of criminality with his hands tied behind his back. In the words of Winn
U:
the 1912 Rules; see Woichover D. and Heaton-Armstrong A. (1996), Wolchover and Heaton-
Arnistrong On Confession Evidence, London, Sweet & Maxwell, p. 113.
' 270p. cit., at p. 96. See also Cook (1918), op. cit., where Darling J uses the same terminology.
' 28See Pugh, M., op. cit., pp 169-174.
' 29See Abrahams, 0., op. cit., pp 32-33, and Home Office Circular (1930), 536053/23.
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"In these days the criminal classes are only too well aware of their position
of virtual immunity in the hands of the police. It does seem that some of
the present doctrines and principles have come down in our law from an
earlier time when the police of this country were not to be trusted, as they
are now to be trusted in almost every single case to behave with complete
fairness towards those who come into their hands or from whom they are
seeking information."30
Second, there is a "demonisation" of suspects as they become associated with
"ever-increasing wickedness." 3 ' This lays the groundwork for equipping the
police with greater powers of questioning, and removing the remaining rights from
suspects. Police interrogation and cross-examination of a suspect when in custody
or under arrest, which had been prohibited by Justice Hawkins at the end of the
nineteenth century and by Avory J in the 1920s and early 1930s, is now positively
endorsed through a number of devices. First, the police are allowed to take a
suspect to the police station to "help them with their enquiries" and to thereby
place him in de facto custody. They are not placed under a duty to tell the accused
that he is not under arrest nor free to go.' 32 Second, even if the suspect is in legal
custody and the statement is obtained in breach of the rules, the court has a
discretion to admit the evidence.'Third, where a caution is normally required,
such as before the making of a voluntary statement, it is no longer necessary if
130Northa,n (1967) , at p. 102.
' 31 Chic Fashions (1968), per Denning MR at p. 313. See also the judgments of Diplock U at
p.3 16 and Salmon U at p. 319. See also the extra-judicial pronouncements given in Choongh, S.
(1997), Policing as Social Discipline , Clarendon, Oxford, pp. 18-19.
I32Wattani (1952).
' 3 See: May (1952) 36Cr App Rep 1; Smith (1961); Massey (1964).
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"impractical." 134 Judicial devices for circumvention of the rules culminate in
reformulation of the Rules in 1964 which gives the police official licence to
question suspects between arrest and charge.'35
By the 1970s, although the post-war consensus on the role of the state in economic
affairs, at least, had begun to break down and with it the consensus on the virtues
of an all-embracing Welfare State, the virtues of strong government and the need
for expansive police powers to check the advance of the criminogenic classes,
remained a constant. The Court of Appeal had become so disenchanted with the
"tenderness" of the rules, that it dispensed with the need for a caution at all in the
interrogation of suspects until the "beginnings of evidence" (i.e. a prima facie
case) had been established.' 36
 It castigated those who exercised their 'right to
silence' as "probably guilty," 37and coached the police to circumvent rights that
had been given to suspects. In Lemsatef (1976), Lawton U reproached the police
officer for refusing to give the suspect access to a solicitor on the ground that he
could not just state the wording of the Judges' Rules verbatim. He went on to say:
"The answer should have been that solicitors could not reasonably be
expected to turn up until ordinary business hours and that delaying
interrogation until then might have caused unreasonable delay."38
' 34See Sargeant (1963) in which the court allowed a police officer to delay giving a caution to a
suspect until after the latter had made a statement 100 words long.
' 35Wolchover and Heaton, op. cit., p. 114.
' 36Osbourne and Virtue (1972), P
.
 307.
137 See Gilbert (1977), per Viscount Dilhorne at p. 253.
'38p. 246.
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The Court of Appeal also rendered the rights meaningless in any event by not
imposing any duty upon the police to inform the suspect of his rights.'39
By the early 1980s, laissez-faire economics was back in full swing and the
massacre of Welfarism became a prime objective of the New Right, through the
guise of individualism. The whole premise upon which Thatcher had built her
election victory was the necessity of rolling back the state to free the individual. It
seems, however, that criminal justice had developed a logic all of its own. In spite
of a series of miscarriages of justice that occurred in the late 1970s and early 80s,
the wheels of English criminal justice appeared impervious to the need to protect
suspects from abuses of police power. The courts continued to validate custodial
interrogation of suspects, and, on the eve of PACE, finally subverted the Rules by
endorsing arrest and detention for questioning. 140 The distinction between
"persons in custody" and "suspect" that was present in the Judges' Rules, no
longer had substantive meaning. All persons who fell under police suspicion,
whether in custody or under arrest, were now "suspects."
' 39See Stephen King (1978).
' 40See Mohammed Holgate v Duke [1983].
150
Chapter Four
In Search of God's Law: Exploring Approaches to the Study of Islam and the
Islamic Criminal Justice System
1. Introduction:
Over the past three chapters, I have attempted to set out and explain the role of the
accused in the English criminal justice system through an historical and contextual
analysis of English case law and statute. This has entailed setting out the
conventional wisdom, subjecting it to scrutiny and suggesting a re-evaluation in
the light of historical trends, contemporary ideologies and enforcement structures.
Attempting to explain the role of the accused in the Islamic legal system in the
same manner and through the same types of sources, however, would be fraught
with difficulty.
For those who are schooled in the Anglo-American legal tradition, the "law"
which counts consists of those rules which are formulated by the state: statutes,
regulations, guidelines and judicial decisions. Yet, for the Muslim, what appears
in a country's posited laws has no necessary correlation with the Islamic tradition.
The real "law" is found in holy texts: the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and in juristic
interpretation of those texts. If the study emphasized the traditional texts and
ignored developments in Muslim states, this could prove frustrating for those who
are ignorant of the Islamic tradition. It would provide no answers to important
issues such as the inter-action between "text" and "context."
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My analysis of the role of the accused in Islamic criminal justice purports to
bridge this gap. Chapter five sets out rules of confessions and questioning in
Islamic Law, as has been expounded by the four main schools of Sunni
jurisprudence. Chapter six examines the extent to which these positions have
been reflected in the posited laws of a Muslim (or Muslim-dominated) state. This
will enable readers to draw conclusions on the relationship between Islamic law in
theory, and the "law" that is applied in practice.
Examination of appropriate sources, however, is not the only difficulty in this
comparative exercise. One must also recognise the potential for bias and the need
to use methodological tools that reduce such potential. This is true particularly
when one remembers the secular context of Anglo-American legal writing. A
"secular" re-interpretation or analysis of Islamic criminal justice might obscure
one's understanding of what is a "religious" system. As John Esposito has
observed:
"Modern, post-Enlightenment secular language and categories of thought
distort understanding and judgement. The modern notion of religion as a
system of personal belief makes an Islam that is comprehensive in scope,
with religion integral to politics and society, 'abnormal' insofar as it
departs from an accepted 'modern' norm, and nonsensical."
'The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, (1992), New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.
198.
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An analysis dominated by secular values and interests would contribute more to
distortion than real understanding of the Islamic tradition. if we are to avoid
stereotyping Muslims as "throwbacks to medieval civilizations," 2
 it is necessary to
explain the role played by the accused as the Muslim sees it. This does not mean
that one ignores concerns for "critical reflexivity" 3
 and for "distance"; rather, it
stresses the importance of cultural self-analysis when embarking on comparative
study. For I suggest that it is only when communities speak for themselves, rather
than through the filter of "foreign experts," that we can achieve more accurate
understanding.
The entry point into Islamic juristic culture which follows is "traditional" and with
a Sunnite bias. I am a "traditional" Sunni who does not regard his thinking as
"free" but as limited to the parameters that have been laid down in the Qur'n,
Sunnah, and in the opinions of the scholars from the principal schools of Islamic
Jurisprudence. As a corollary, I reject thinking which goes beyond those
parameters.
The substantive analysis of confessions and rules of questioning which appears in
chapter five, therefore, should not be seen as a comprehensive analysis of all those
communities who give themselves Islamic labels. 4
 It is merely an exposition of the
values of Sunnite legal culture through traditionalist methods.5
2Bobby S.Sayyid (1997), A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentricism and the Emergence of islamism,
London and New York, Zed Books, p. 1.
3 For a useful account of the need to be critically reflexive, see: Said, E. Orientalism (1995),
London, Penguin, pp. 25-28.
4The ShiAa and the Qadiyanis (Ahmadis) provide but two examples of the groups who operate
outside Ahlus-Sunnah wa-I Jam"ah (the People of the Sunnah and the Majority; ie. the Sunnis).
5Even here, I do not pretend to be exhaustive; see chapter five.
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Analysis of the implementation of this juristic tradition in chapter six takes place
within a set of typologies. These typologies have been formulated by a writer
working within the Sunnite tradition and also within the particular culture that
forms the subject-matter of my case study in that chapter.
Before I proceed to lay out these typologies, it is important to explain why existing
methodological overviews, including Orientalist perspectives, are inadequate or
inappropriate for my current purposes. The chapter will begin, therefore, with an
examination of some existing approaches.
2. Existing methodological frameworks
i)Orientalism:
According to Edward Said, 'Orientalism' can be defined as "a way of coming to
terms with the Orient that is based on the Orient's special place in European
Western experience." 6 Yet, the European's experience of the Orient is complex.
How they come to terms with the Orient, and Islam depends on their background,
their subjective experiences and interaction with Muslims and their works, on the
institutions they are tied to, as well as on their particular system of beliefs.
60p. cit, p. 1.
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For the older generation of writers, "Islam" has been an object of critique and, on
occasions, of ridicule. They have sought legitimacy for this denigration by
clinging to notions of objectivity and to a claimed intellectual superiority over
their Muslim counterparts. Even so-called "enlightened" Orientalists such as
Bernard Lewis have argued:
"Though often marred by prejudice and interest, it (orientalism) has
nevertheless produced an understanding which is far deeper, knowledge far
more extensive and more accurate than the corresponding and
simultaneous observation of Christendom from Islam."7
This "greater understanding" interprets Muslim texts from a secular viewpoint
which seeks to distinguish the West from Islam. The West is politically
democratic, the guardian of libertarian values of individualism, free speech,
freedom of thought, equality and progress. Islam, on the other hand, is
characterised as authoritarian, illiberal, oppressive, fanatical 8 , backward9and
threatening. The work of Bernard Lewis provides a good example. He breaks
Islam into atomistic units for ease of reference. Many of these units, however, are
selected because of the relevance and importance they represent to thought in the
West rather than to the Islamic East. Hence, in his book, Islam - from the Prophet
Muhammed to the capture of Constantinople' 0, which is meant to be general in
7Islam in History: Ideas, People and Events in the Middle East, 1993, 2nd Ed, Open Court,
Chicago, p. 8.
8Lewis mentions at one point that "men are still willing to kill and be killed" for the sake of Islam,
ibid., p. 6.
9The traditional Muslims are castigated for being "out of touch with the modern world", ibid., p. 4101974, Macmillan Press, London and Basingstoke.
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coverage, emphasis is on race, ethnicity", servitude' 2 , religious minorities13,
heresy and revolt' 4 , and the economy' 5 . These are all matters in which the West
has undergone a distressing and turbulent history. The central aspects of Islam, its
system of belief and the Shar"iah, occupy less than fifty pages of a book which is
two hundred and eighty six pages long.
The attempt to present Islam as hostile and racially exclusive, is evident from the
chapter entitled Race, Creed and Conditions of Servitude. Lewis wants to present
Islm as an Arab religion which was imposed on non-Arabs by violent conquest.
His object is also to show that the Arab Muslim regarded the non-Arab Muslim as
a legal and moral inferior. Thus, introducing the chapter, he comments:
"In principle, the Islamic Caliphate was a theocracy, a single universal
state of which God was the ultimate sovereign and in which all Muslims
were brothers. In fact, of course, it was an empire created by conquest, in
which before long the inevitable inequalities between conquerors and
conquered appeared. The conquerors were Muslims; they were also -and
primarily- Arabs and showed a normal human unwillingness to concede
equality to aliens and inferiors, even when these adopted the dominant faith
and thus claimed membership of the ruling community."6
"See part II, ch. 7; part VI, chs 8, 9 and 10.
' 2Part VI, ch. 12.
' 3Part VI, ch. 11.
' 4See part II.
' 5 See part IV.
' 60p. cit., p. 193.
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He then isolates and translates (his own translation) some sayings that he ascribes
to the Prophet which he thinks supports his case, such as:
Love the Arabs and desire their survival, for their survival is a light in
Islam, and their passing is a darkness in Islam
Those who revile the Arabs are polytheists
Love the Arabs for three reasons: because I am an Arab, because the
Qur'an is in Arabic, and because the inhabitants of Paradise speak Arabic
If the Arabs are humbled, Islam is humbled
There are seventy parts of wickedness. The Berbers have sixty-nine, and
mankind and the Jinns have one
May God curse both lots of foreigners, the Persians and the Byzantines'7
The context of these statements is not given in his text, nor are any explanations
provided (from Muslim or non-Muslim authors). We are intended to take the
necessary inferences having already read his introduction. Importantly, we have
no idea of the accuracy of these statements - are they mutawatir 18 , mashhur' 9 or
'7lbid., p. 196.
18 This term refers to a hadith of the Prophet that was witnessed and related (from the beginning to
the end of its chain of narration) by a large number of Muslims to another large group of Muslims.
Hadith mutawatir have the highest rank and are deemed the most authentic.
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ahad20? If the latter, are they aheeh21 , hasan22 or a"jf23 ? Lewis cannot provide us
with any of these answers because his operative concern is not with accuracy
(contrary to his earlier protestations), but with presentation. Thus, he relies on one
source only, Kanz al-"Ummal by al-Muttaqj, for these particular sayings. The
result is a narrow, unrepresentative and distorted account. It is also inaccurate as
the Prophet exhorted his community to respect one another and not to differentiate
on grounds of colour or ethnicity. He is reported to have said by mutawtir in his
last sermon:
"0 people, all of you are children of Adam, and Adam was created from
dust. There is no superiority for an Arab above a non-Arab, nor for a
non-Arab above an Arab, or for a white above a non-white. All of you are
equal. The men honoured in the sight of God are those who fear God
most."24
Bernard Lewis is not alone in following this methodology. Similar treatment of
Muslim texts can also be observed in the works of N. J. Coulson 25 and J.
' 9This refers to Prophetic hadith which have at least three different narrations the contents of which
are substantially the same.
20 Hadith ahad refer to solitary narrations from the Prophet the reliability of which may vary.
2t Literally, this means correct. In reference to hadith of the Prophet, it means that there is no defect
in the chain of narration.
22Litcrally, this means "good." Hadith which are aijeeij or hasan can be used for religious
judgments.
23Literally, this means "weak". There is a defect in the chain of narration (eg one or more of the
narrators is untrustworthy) which prohibits its use for religious judgments.
24This translation of the meaning of the Prophet's statement is by Dr Muhammed Ibraheem El-
Geyoushi: Teachings of/slam, n.d., Islamic Cultural Centre, London.
25See A History of Islanzic Law, 1964, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh; Conflicts and
Tensions in Islamic Jurisprudence, 1969, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
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Schacht26 . What also unites them is a deep scepticism of oral accounts, no matter
how careful the muhaddithun were in authenticating statements of the Prophet.
Commenting on the Sunnah, Professor Coulson states:
"Later generations falsely ascribed to Muhammed a great corpus of legal
decisions, and the extent of his extra-Qur'anic law-making is the subject of
the greatest single controversy in early Islamic legal history."27
This means that when they look at ahadith, there is no attention paid to the
strength of the reports, because they reject them out of hand, a priori. It is
presumed that oral accounts must be fabricated and that only posited texts, which
have been ratified by Western historians, are authentic. 28
 Thus all statements
ascribed to the Prophet (falsely or otherwise) are deemed relevant for the purpose
of revealing Islam's alleged worldview and its social relations. Which statements
will be selected will depend on the orientalist project.
As for the younger generation of Orientalists, they do not share many of the
preconceptions and prejudices of their older colleagues. Their presentation is fair
and humanistic, though inevitably reflecting western values. Matthew Lippman,
26See An Introduction to Islamic Law, 1964 (rept 1979), Clarendon Press, Oxford; "Law and
Justice" in The Cambridge History of/slam, 1970, vol. 2B, p. 539.
27History, op. cit., p. 22. It is important to note that Coulson does not give any evidence for this
view.
2 It should be remembered that the vast majority of the Arabs at the time of the Prophet, and in
later history were illiterate and were accustomed to learn by oral narration. Moreover, it would not
be unreasonable to assume that they would remember the exact words, especially when their
salvation depended on it. In particular, there can be no doubt in the authenticity of the ahadith
mutawatir (which number about 40), as it is highly unlikely that so many witnesses who say the
same thing would all have been wrong.
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Sean McConville and Mordechai Yerushalmi, 29for instance, are not openly hostile
to Islamic law. They refer to Muslim authors, such as Muhammad Iqbal Siddiqi,
Ma'moun M. Salama, Osman Abd-el-Malek al-Saleh, Awad M. Awad,
Mohammad Salim al-'Awwa and M. CherifBassiouni, who promote human rights
perspectives in Islam. Their selective citation of Muslim commentators, however,
is important because these are writers who accept the underlying value premises of
human rights discourse: freedom of the individual, equality before and under the
law, political and social democracy. In many respects, the whole notion of
"universal rights" is a secular framework which springs from concepts of
"progress" and an alternative tradition rooted in late eighteenth century France.3°
A similar critique can be directed at John Esposito. He has his own liberal agenda
which is not content to see Islam presented as the majority of Muslims would
prefer. He demands "a reinterpretation of the classical Islamic legal doctrine" 3 'so
that Islam can become more pluralist and accommodating.
Even the arch-critic of Orientalism, Edward Said, falls on his own secular sword.
In his wish to free interpretation from the orthodoxy of "dogma," he views
traditional Islam as an intellectual and civilizational threat. He states:
"underlying every interpretation of other cultures - especially of Islam - is
the choice facing the individual scholar or intellectual: whether to put
intellect at the service of power or at the service of criticism, community,
29lslamic Criminal Law and Procedure, (1988), Praeger, London and New York.
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dialogue, and moral sense.. .About this one cannot be too emphatic. For
otherwise we will not only face protracted tension and perhaps even war,
but we will offer the Muslim world, its various societies and states, the
prospect of many wars, unimaginable suffering, and disastrous upheavals,
not least of which would be the victory of an 'Islam' fully ready to play the
role prepared for it by reaction, orthodoxy, and desperation. By even the
most sanguine of standards, this is not a pleasant possibility"32(emphasis
added).
There is no intention here to search for an "authentic" Islam. Rather, the intention
is to promote an intellectual pluralism in which the so-called "orthodox" are side-
lined to facilitate the establishment of an intellectual elite. Only then can
community and "moral sense" claim victory.
I suggest that this above analysis of Orientalist and secular perspectives
demonstrates the difficulties of utilizing non-Muslim methodologies. Islam must
be allowed to breathe freely and to articulate itself independently of liberal and
secularist agendas. I contend that one is more likely to obtain a clearer
understanding of the role of the accused in Islamic criminal justice if we adopt
Muslim perspectives and methods.
30See Sklair, L. (1970), The Sociology of Progress, Routledge and Keegan Paul, London, pp. 28-
29.
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ii)Akbar Ahmed:
One of the most recent and well publicised works which lays out a Muslim's
methodological approach to Islam, is Akbar Ahmed's Postmodernism and
Islam.33 In the chapter entitled "Studying Islam," he separates Muslim and non-
Muslim writers and divides both of them into three sub-categories. 34The former
are divided into: traditionalists, radicals and modernists; the latter into orientalists,
"new scholars" and generalists and media persons. He notes that within the
triangle of Muslim writers, it is the traditionalists who believe in "the larger
message of Islam, rather than the narrower sectarian or personal squabbles.. .They
believe in the universal message of God and in inter-faith dialogue."35Their
interests are Arab philosophy, mysticism and sectarian polemics. Within this
group, he includes such writers as: Ismail Faruqi, Ali Shariati, Hossein Nasr, Ali
Ashraf and Fazlur-Rahman.
The second group, which he terms the "radicals", comprise "angry young men"
writing political diatribes in response to the injustices which they see around them.
Ahmed writes: "Some of the radicals are not scholars of any kind and wish to
implement an Islamic order through armed struggle or confrontation. They are
usually driven by hatred and contempt for what they call 'the West'." 36 Included
within their ranks are: Shabbir Akhtar, Parvez Manzoor, Ziauddin Sardar, M.W.
Davies and Kalim Siddiqui.
'(1992), op. cit., p. 189.
32Covering Islam, op. cit., pp. 172-173.
1992, Routledge, London and New York.
34Ibid, pp. 154-191.
35Ibid., p. 158.
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His third group, the modernists, share a "general belief that religion as a force,
nostrum or guide is no longer valid." 37They have succumbed to the intellectual
(and other) temptations of the West and prefer Marxist, socialist and secular
patterns of thought to Islamic traditions. Within this group, Ahmed includes
Hamza Alavi, Eqbal Ahmed, Tariq Ali and Salman Rushdie.
Ahmed's triangle of non-Muslim writers begins with the Orientalists; those
traditional scholars who occupy chairs in the most famous universities of the West
and whom I have examined earlier. Ahmed rebukes Edward Said for his vitriolic
attack on Orientalists 38and his reductive characterisation of them as sharing "a
pathological hatred towards Islam". 39 Some, he argues, were sympathetic and
positive in their representations of Islam. Ahmed admires their command of
foreign languages and the contribution which they have made through their
translations of classical works. But he also condemns their desire to control the
production of Islamic knowledge and their attempts to secularise Isl4rn. As a
result of their determination to gag native Muslim voices, and their dehumanizing
characterisations of them, Orientalism ended up as "either cultural schizophrenia
or a complex form of racism."4°
In Ahmed's scheme of things, the "new scholars" do not share the cultural
prejudices of the earlier generations.	 They are deemed scholarly, fair,
36Ibid., p. 160.
37 Ibid., p. 163.
38See: Orientalism, (1995), reprint with a new Afterword, Penguin, London.
390p. cit., p. 180.
40Ibid.,p. 183.
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sympathetic, genuinely inquisitive and impeccable in their methodology (because
they allow Muslims to speak for themselves). They are still in the minority and
are often drowned out by media personalities who form the third group, but he
argues that they have dispelled Edward Said's myth that Western scholars are
incapable of knowing the Orient except through a prism of cultural dominance and
intellectual superiority. 4 ' Among this group, he includes John Esposito, Michael
Gilsenan, Francis Robinson and William Chittick.
Ahmed' s final group comprises the generalist anc the mec	 Sectcie,
imagery and general impression are more important to this group than facts and
fair treatment. Their intent is to sensationalise and to provoke fear and hatred
towards Muslims. They do not to pretend to be scholars, but often rely
parasitically on the more culturally biased orientalist works. Ahmed writes:
"For most people in this group Islam is an instant media villain, a
monstrosity to be reviled and beaten. It is the volume and power of these
voices in the media that have drowned the more sober tones of the scholar.
Indeed, they raid the orientalist cupboard for alimentation, picking up old
prejudices and scatological bits of information. In turn, they use these in
the most tendentious and absurd manner."42
In several respects, Akbar Ahmed's categorisations provide a useful,
contemporary analysis of those who claim to speak on behalf of Muslims or who
4t Ibid., see pp 184-185.
42Ibid., p. 186.
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write about Islam. In contradistinction to the images presented by the media, he
presents different faces of Islm and admits there are elements within the ranks of
Muslims who provide the ammunition for media polemics and invective. He also
points to more humanitarian, liberal and free-thinking commentators whose views
are often ignored by press and television because they are neither sensationalist
nor in line with media stereotypes.
Yet, there are a number of problems with Ahmed's analysis. While he admits his
definitions and categorizations are "broad," "in need of clarification" and even
"crude,"43 he cannot rely on this waiver to ignore, as he does, a large shaft of
Muslim opinion. It is revealing that in his description of the so-called
"traditionalists", he mentions only those writers who subscribe to a certain form of
universalism and who hold themselves above "the narrower sectarian or personal
squabbles." By this, he means that if you regard yourself as a Sunni by conviction,
for example, and oppose those who depart from the accepted practices and beliefs
of the Sunnis, you are not following the "Islamic" tradition. In his construction,
Islam has a broad canvas and is inclusive rather than exclusive. Thus, if you are a
Shi"i, a philosopher, a Sufi (however that is defined), an orthodox or an heterodox
Sunni, you are all included within the complex tapestry of Islam. Yet one's views
are only given weight if one espouses values which rise above such sectarian
divisions.
Paradoxically, what seems an inclusive and universal approach is in effect
exclusive in that it denies authenticity to those who follow the footsteps and
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methodology of Ahlus-Sunnah wa-i Jam"ah (or any other so-called "sect"). It
promotes the elevation of the free-floating intellectual (such as Fazlur Rahman) at
the expense of the Aalim (religious scholar) who binds himself to the texts and to
expounding the "truth." Inevitably, the latter may denounce "falsehood" wherever
it appears because that is a religious obligation.W Complying with an Islamic
obligation, however, seems a strange reason for exclusion and isolation from
interpretative frameworks of Islam.
As for his other categories of Muslim writers or commentators, on the whole
Ahrned has identified the radicals correctly as being "angry young men" and
extreme, but he has not illustrated their methodology nor the channels through
which they gain their knowledge of Islam and by which they seek legitimisation of
their views. In fact, this is true in respect of all his categories. For a chapter
entitled, "Studying Islam," it is a serious omission not to include the mechanics
and processes by which Islam is actually studied.
In respect of his so-called "modernists," it is difficult to see why they have been
included within the triangle of Muslim writers. If they no longer believe that
religion is a force or a guide to life, they are not Muslims. Being Muslim is a
religious matter and a question of conviction;, it is not based on ethnic or racial
identity, though in certain instances that may provide an external indication. The
meaning of the Islamic testification of faith, ash-hadu alla ilaha illallah, wa ash-
hadu anna Muhammadar-Rasulullah, is: "I know, believe and declare that no one
431b1d., p. 157.
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is God but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah." 45
 The person is
not called a Muslim unless he accepts the tenets of the Islamic belief ("aqidah). It
would have been more appropriate if the so-called modernists had been placed
within the triangle of non-Muslim writers.
In his depiction of the non-Muslim writers and commentators, Ahmed is right to
point out that they are not uniform in their views, and that a new perspective has
emerged among the younger generation which allows for Muslim writers to speak
for themselves.46
 Yet, he has failed to emphasise the secular and liberal values
which these writers articulate and which affect the way they express their
interpretation of Islm. One of the important insights of Michel Foucault47and
Edward Said48is that interpretation is not a value free exercise and is never without
interest, and that however benign it may appear to be, it has a tendency to support
particular patterns of thought.
3. An Alternative Framework:
I suggest that because of the deficiencies of Ahmed's approach a different method
of analysis is required which combines an explanation of the sources and
processes by which Islm is studied and interpreted, with an analysis of the over-
44The Qur'an states: "Kuntum khaira ummatin ukhrijat linnas wa ta'muruna bi-1 m"arjfi wa
tanhawna Aanil munkari wa tu'minuna billah" (You are the best of nations brought to the people,
bidding the lawful and prohibiting the unlawful, and believing in Allah); Surah al-"Imran, v. 110.
45Scholars from all of the four main Sunni schools (madhahib) agreed that if one does not believe in
Allah, His Messenger, His Rules and His Rites, one is a non-Muslim (kafir); Shaykh AAbdullah al-
Harariyy (1999), Ash-Sharh-ul QawimfI Jal al-Fadz As-Sirat-ul Mustaqim, Beirut, Dar-ul
MasharV'a, p. 33.
46This observation has also been made by Edward Said, who calls the new generation, writers of
"antithetical knowledge" (Covering Islam, op. cit., pp. 157-16 1).
47See The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), London, Tavistock.
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arching structure in which those interpretations are given effect. This will provide
the reader with a better understanding of the relationship between theory and
practice.
i)The Juridical Tradition:
I argue that the Islamic juridical tradition is best explicated through a
"traditionalist" framework. Unlike Akbar Ahmed, I use this term in its original
sense. Linguistically, the word "traditionalist" means a person who transmits a
narrative, belief or custom by word of mouth from age to age. 49 In the Islamic
context, it refers to three types of people: first, those who orally transmit the
Sunnah50of Prophet Muhammad, the Athar, 51the Ijma", 52and the Ijtihad53of the
top Muslim scholars (the Mujtahidun54), such as AI-Shaf'i, Abu Hanifah, Ahmad
Ibn Hanbal, Malik and others. Second, it refers to those who interpret and apply
48Covering Islam, op. cit., pp 164-165.
49See Collins Universal Dictionary, (1973), ed. Irvine, A.H., Collins, London and Glasgow.
500p. cit.
51 Literally, this means "trace or mark." In this context, it refers to the sayings and precedents of the
Companions of the Prophet; see Kamali, M.H., op. cit., glossary.
520p. cit.
531n this context, this means the effort that is exerted by the top Muslim scholars to deduce the rule
or judgment directly from the Qur'n and the Sunnah (in the case of a mujtahid mutlaq [the
complete scholar]; see below), or from the opinions of another scholar. The opinions of a layman
are not regarded as tjtihad; see Kamali, M.H., op. cit., pp 488-492.
54Obtaining a PhD does not qualify a person to exercise ijtihad. In order to be able to deduce the
judgment directly from the original sources, prospective candidates must satisfy the following
conditions: 1) they are an authority in the Arabic language; 2) they have memorised all the verses
of the Qur'an pertaining to rules (a minimum of 500); 3) they have memorised all the ahadith of the
Prophet referring to rules (minimum of 500), along with their chains of narration and the reliability
of those who narrated them; 4) they know those verses and ahadith which abrogate rules contained
in earlier verses and ahadith, as well as those verses and ahadith that contain rules which have been
abrogated; 5) they know which verses and ahadith are general in application and those which are
confined; 6) they have superior intelligence; 7) they know and do not contradict the consensus of
the Muslim scholars (the ijm'); 8) they are trustworthy ("adi). See: Shaykh AAbdullah al-
Harariyy, (1999), Ash-Sharh-ul Qawim, op. cit, pp. 404-413. See: Al Ghazzali, Mustafa, vol. II,
pp. 10 1-103; Al- Mawardj. Al-A hkam al-Su4qniyya , pp. 6 1-63.
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the above narrations: the Faqih55, the AAlim56 and the Mujtahid (i.e. the Muslim
scholars). Third, it applies to those who learn from and copy the above by way of
oral transmission. These categories are not mutually exclusive, as a Mujtahid may
be a transmitter of the Sunnah, an interpreter and a student. Imam Al-Shaf'i, for
example, was a transmitter and an interpreter, as well as a former student of
Imam Malik.
The object of the traditionalists is to maintain the link with the Companions (the
Sahaba) of Prophet Muhammad who were the most pious generation of Muslims
and the best interpreters of what the Prophet said and of what was revealed to him.
Some of these matters are very well known and are transmitted by at-tawQtur
(from one large group of people to another and then to another). Other matters are
known by solitary narrations (i.e. ahad) the reliability of which are determined
according to very strict criteria, and which are known and applied by the
Muhaddithun. 57
According to al-Khajb al-Baghddiyy, "Knowledge is taken from the mouths of
the scholars and not from the pages of books." Yet, this emphasis on oral narration
(talaqi), does not mean that the traditionalists object to written accounts. Indeed,
they authored thousands of books. However, ambiguities, unintentional errors and
even fabrications appear occasionally or have been inserted in these texts, and
which require clarification, explanation and correction from the original scholar,
55This refers to a scholar of fiqh (ie. the rules relating to prayer, transactions and the like).
56This is the general word for a scholar.
57This refers to the scholars of hadith.
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or from a reliable teacher58who received the explanation directly or indirectly from
him/her. This methodology preserves the accuracy and authenticity of the Islamic
knowledge which has been passed down from generation to generation since the
time of the Prophet.59
Another characteristic of the traditionalists is their advocacy, application and
adherence to the doctrine of jima". This is defined as the unanimous agreement
(whether explicitly stated or through silence) of the Mujtahidjn during any period
of time after the demise of the Prophet on an Islamic matter. 601t gains its doctrinal
authority from both the Qur'an 61 and the Sunnah62and is regarded as
impeccable. 631ts object is to preserve the Islamic tradition bequeathed by the
Prophet and to protect it from corruption.
To form a consensus does not need the agreement of laymen, politicians, heads of
state nor of academics. Nor does it require the agreement of those who hold
opinions which are deemed untrustworthy or those who have contravened the
58There are also criteria as to who can give these explanations. A Muslim cannot blindly take
knowledge from anyone. Imam Muslim (one of the famous narrators of hadith) narrated that Ibn
Sirin said: "This knowledge is religion, so look thoroughly at whomever you take your religion
from." If there is no one who fits the criteria in your locality, one is encouraged to travel to find a
trustworthy and knowledgeable teacher. Ibn Risln said: "If one does not find a teacher where he is
residing, then let him go to where he can find a trustworthy and knowledgeable teacher." See:
"Knowledge: The Gateway To Success," published on the internet by the Association for Islamic
Charitable Projects at : II www.aicp.org . See also: Association of Islamic Charitable Projects,
Knowledge: The Gateway to Success, (1995), pamphlet, 4431 Walnut St, Philadelphia, PA 19014,
pp. 12-13.
59Ibid., p. 10.
60See Kamali, op. cit., p. 213; Mahmassani, op. cit., p. 77.
61 See An-Nisa', v. 59, v. 115; al-Baqarah v. 143; a1-"Imrn v. 8, vv 102-103, v. 110; al-Tawbah, v.
119; al-Shura v. 10. See also the opinions of Imam Ohazali and al-Shaf'i cited in Ghazali, op. cit.,
p.111;
62There are a number of ahadith which support it. See Kamali, op. cit., pp. 224-226; Ghazali, op.
cit., p. 111; Al-Amidi,Al-Ihkamfi Usul al-A hkam, vol. 1, pp. 220-221.
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consensus on previous occasions, however qualified they may otherwise be,64as
they are not included within the definition of Mujtahid.65
I have written chapter five within this traditionalist framework. It refers, without
critique, to previous juristic opinion documented within the four main schools of
Islamic jurisprudence. In compliance with the methodology, I have sought
corroboration for my findings by talaqi (oral narration) from Sheikh AAbdullah a!-
Harariyy (known as "al-Habashi"), a Mujtahid from the school of Imam Shaf'i
and the Muhaddith of the countries of ash-Sham.66
The questions and answers were all made in Arabic, the accuracy of which were
checked by this Sheikh's students before and after our meeting. Where possible,
the question and answer sessions were tape recorded and then later transcribed.
On some occasions, however, meetings were held impromptu due to the Sheikh's
heavy schedule and/or illness in which tape recorders were not used. During these
occasions, the Sheikh's answers were immediately noted down on paper. English
translations of his answers have also been checked and double-checked by his
students who were present during our meetings.
63The content of many of the ahadith is that the scholars would not agree upon an error. These
ahadith are saheeh (authentic without any defects in the chain of narration) and narrated by Ahmad
ibn Hanbal (in his Musnad), a-Iabaraniyy, al-Hakim, al-Khatib and Ibn Hajar.
Hashim Kamali's view that no ijm' can be formed without the agreement of these groups (op.
cit., p. 217) does not represent the beliefs of the traditionalists. This would also explain why he
regards the doctrine as utopian - for if all groups were included within the ranks of the mujtahidun,
it would be impossible to denounce anyone.
65For definition, see earlier. It is on this basis that the traditionalists do not regard the opinions of
Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah as authoritative. Ibn Taymiyyah was imprisoned in
Damascus, along with his student, Ibnul Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, for contravening ijmgf' in more
than sixty issues according to the fatwa (religious ruling) given by four judges from the four main
madhahib (schools of Islamic jurisprudence). This ruling is recorded by the historian Ibn [lj in
his book: "Dhkha'ir-ul-Qasr fi Tarjimi Nubala'-il-"Asr", and manuscripted in al-Khaznah at-
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ii)The law in practice:
The contextualisation of the Islamic juridical tradition can be explained through a
set of typologies that are sensitive to Islam's internal dynamics and to the
particular culture in which that contextualisation takes place. For reasons of
familiarity and experience, I have chosen to analyse the implementation of Islamic
Law in the Malaysian peninsular, and have selected the typologies adopted by
a famous Malay commentator and critic. 67 Although he was writing in
the 1930s, I suggest that the following typologies are broadly representative of the
dynamics found in the Muslim world today and in earlier generations.
He identified a number of different movements which had conservative, reformist
or secular tendencies. They were called the: Kaurn Tua, Kaum Muda and
Modernists, respectively. The Kaum Tua represented the "traditional" view point.
They claimed to follow taqiid and thus adhered strictly to the teachings of the four
great imams 68and the first three generations of scholars. They argued that as these
scholars were closer in time to the Prophet and more qualified than scholars of the
present, they understood Islamic teachings better. They also maintained that it
was unnecessary for Islam to find ways of incorporating western education, its
Taymiriyyah in Cairo. This is evidence that the consensus of the scholars is not a hypothetical
issue.
66Lebanon, Jordan and Syria.
67His views are reproduced in the article, "The Malays and Religion", published in Tamadun Di
Malaysia (1980), op. cit., pp. 103-112.
68Abu Hanifah, Malik, a1ShafAi and Ahmad ibn Hanbal.
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lifestyle and its frameworks. Islam would regain its position in the Peninsular by
exhorting Muslims and modern society to become more religious.69
The Kaum Muda opposed the Kaum Tua and stated that Muslims had departed
from the original teachings of Islm found in the Holy Qur'n and in "genuine"
traditions of the Prophet. They claimed that the four great imams and those
scholars who followed them were not infallible. They had formed their opinions
on the basis of texts which were still available today and which could be re-
interpreted in the light of modern understandings and current circumstances.
Their first reference was to verses of t'ne Qur' an and th a'nadin ranei *laTI 'to 'trie
opinions of scholars. They stressed tjtihd and denounced taqlid as "blind
following" and contrary to the Qur'n. This group was influenced strongly by the
opinions of Jamaluddin al-Afghni, Muhammed AAbduh and the Wahhabis.7°
The Modernists were a group of independent-minded, western-educated
intellectuals whose views echoed the secularists in Kemalist Turkey. They refused
to follow the Kaum Tua on intellectual grounds and because they were reluctant to
accept the mere authority of religious teachers. They also rejected the opinions of
69"The Malays and Religion", op. cit., pp. 108-109.
70Ibid., pp. 109-110. More recent examples of this "reformist" approach are found in the works of
Abul AAIa Mawdudi (see: Human Rights in Islam (1990), Leicester, The Islamic Foundation;
Islamic Law and Constitution (1983), 8th Edition, Lahore, Islamic Publications Ltd), and Sayyid
Qutb (see A1-"Adalah aI-Ijti,nç"iyyahfi'l Islam (1954), 4th Edition, Cairo, "Isa al-B abi). Works
on 'Human Rights' in Islam tend to rely on their methods and analyses; see, for instance:
Mohammad Hashim Kamali (1986), "The Citizen and State in Islamic Law," Syariah Law Journal,
International Islamic University, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 15-46; Ismail Faruqi (Islamnic Thought and
Culture, 1982, lilT, Herndon; Tawhid: Its lnzplications for Thought and Life, 2nd ed., 1992, lilT,
Herndon.), Mohammed Arkoun, 1994, Rethinking Isla,n, Westview Press, Oxford; Abdul Hamid
Abu Sulayman (Crisis in the Muslim Mind, 1993, lilT, Herndon); Fazlur Rahman, 1982, Islam and
Modernity, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.
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the Kaum Muda because they had no means by which to judge the validity of their
claims. They judged matters, therefore, according to their individual conscience.71
I utilize these typologies in my analysis of the "Islamization" of criminal justice in
chapter six.
7! 
"The Malays and Religion", op. cit., p. 111.
174
Chapter Five
Confessions and Rules of Questioning in Islamic Law
1. Introduction:
The following account of confessions and rules of questioning in Islamic Law
should not be read as an exhaustive account and complete coverage of the subject.
Islamic law is vast, multi-dimensional and with a number of competing, and
sometimes conflicting interpretations. It is not possible, within a doctoral thesis, to
give an account of every single opinion within one recognized school of Islamic
thought, let alone the four main schools that are currently applied by Sunni
Muslims across the world. Rather, the object of this chapter is to provide a
glimpse of its richness, and to construct a window through which Muslims and
non-Muslims might better observe and understand the categorizations which
Muslim scholars have made, and the impact which they are making on the present.
Yet, our understanding of the role of the accused cannot begin until we have set
out the fundamentals upon which interpretations of Islamic law have been built,
and the administrative structure(s) into which they have been fed.
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2. Unity within diversity -interpretative pluralism:
The point which is made repeatedly in this chapter may appear obvious, but which
is frequently forgotten, is that Islamic Law in traditional formulations is
fundamentally a religious law, and should be understood in religious terms. Islam,
in terms of religion and law, has existed to guide Muslims and the whole of
humankind to worship God correctly, and to follow His commandments. These
commandments are embedded in revealed scripture (Qur'an) and Prophetic
example (Sunnah); it being the job of the Is)amic scho)ar to ex/raci and efiscove,
them rather than to formulate anew or develop.
In some cases, the source of a ruling is found explicitly in the revealed texts. The
scholar extracts the rule and applies it to his situation. In other cases, where he
cannot find an explicit text, he is encouraged to exercise his individual judgement
(Ijtihad). It should not be thought, however, that this ijtihad is either a mechanical
and formulaic exercise or a case of free interpretation. Each scholar brings with
him his interpretative baggage which weighs heavily on the way he performs his
if tihad. This will comprise his understanding of the essential benefits and interests
which underlie the Shari"ah (Maqasid al-Shari"ah), and which may receive
different emphasis from scholar to scholar.
	 Yet, in contradistinction to
formulations of the Common Law, they are not historically, ideologically or
politically contingent. They are rooted in the Shari"ah itself. Although the
scholar's thought processes cannot be divorced from his experiential reality and
contemporary circumstance, this interpretative exercise is a quest to discover the
"truth" within the boundaries of the Shari"ah as he honestly perceives it. This is
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reflected in his references to the Qur'an and Sunnah, or as in the case of a scholar
confined to a particular school, to the sayings and methodology (usul-alfiqh) of
the scholar who founded his school and who based his judgements upon those
sources. It is also reflected in his memorisation and knowledge of the different
narrators of the Sunnah and their particular qualities. This would include their
memories, piety, knowledge of the religion and source of their religious
instruction. For it is by these tools that he gives precedence of one hadith over
another, or gives more weight to one issue than another.'
In certain instances, these approximations of truth that are arrived at
independently, assume certainty and permanence. This is given concrete
expression in the doctrine of consensus (Ijma") which binds all future scholars to
its substantive rulings. In other instances, approximations of truth remain
(Ikhti1f). It is in this way that we observe both agreements and disagreements
within and between the various schools of Islamic Law. These agreements and
disagreements occur irrespective of time and place; that is, they may be found in
the same time and place, or at different times and different places. 2
 They provide a
core of certainty while simultaneously allowing for change as a society changes.
The differences between the Muslim scholars have been manifested in the
formation of separate schools of thought (madhahib). Historically, four schools
'All of these matters were confirmed by Shaykh Samir al-Qadi, by talaqi, on 10/9/97 at 6.O5pm,
during a session at the Musolla Ahlus-Sunnah Wa-al Jama'ah, in Philadelphia, USA. It represents
his explanation of the texts: Sirgj-ul Mustaqim, (1993), Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, Dar ul-
MasharV'a, Beirut, pp. 103-106, and the recently published A1-Shar/l-ul Qawimfijal alfadz As-
Sirat-ulMustaqim, (1999), Dar-ul Mashari"a, Beirut, pp. 404-421.
2See The Ethics of Disagreement in Islam, (1993), Taha J. alAAlwani, lIlT, Herndon, Virginia, p.
80.
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have been pre-eminent in the elaboration of Islamic law: the schools of Abu
Hanifah, Malik, Shf''i and Ahmad ibn llanbal. Technically, however, there is
(and has been) no limitation to the number of schools, as once a scholar reaches
the level by which he can exercise z:jtihd directly from the Qur'an and
Sunnah 3 (Mujtahid Muflaq), he is prohibited from merely imitating previous
scholars or even the Imam of his previous school. It is known, for example, that
although Muhammad al-Shaybaniyy and Qi Abj Ysuf began by applying the
sayings of their Imam Ab Hanifah, they eventually formulated their own opinions
independently.4
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the ability to exercise iltihad has been
limited to earlier generations. 5 Imam AAli, the fourth Caliph, is reported to have
said: "The Earth will not be without one who defends the religion with its
evidences." 6 Implicit within this statement7 is the notion of at least one scholar
3These include: memorisation of the verses of the Qur'an and ahadith of the Prophet which pertain
to religious judgments; knowledge of the chains of narrators of these ahadith and their different
statuses; knowledge of those verses of the Qur'an and ahadith of the Prophet which abrogated
earlier verses and ahadith; knowledge of those verses and ahadith which are general in application
and those which are confined to their particular context; knowledge of those verses and ahadith
which are absolute and those which are qualified; knowledge of Arabic to the extent that he has
memorised the meanings of the statements found in the texts in accordance with their original
meanings when the text was revealed; knowledge of all those cases where a consensus has been
reached; knowledge of mathematics; superior intelligence, and a deep understanding of the
purposes behind the rules and the benefits (which are regarded as beneficial by the SharV'ah) they
convey to the people. See Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, op. cit., p. 104 (confirmed by Shaykh
Samir al-Qadi, op. cit.). See also: Mohammed Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic
Jurisprudence, ( 1989), Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya, pp473-479.
4 Shaykh Samir al-Qadi, op. cit., Mohammed Hashim Kamali, op. cit., p. 489.
5After the fall of Baghdad in the 13th century (C.E.), many Sunni jurists declined from exercising
or advocating ijtihad for fear of persecution. This gave the impression to many that "the door to
ijtihad had been closed" (S.Mahmassani, Falsafat aI-Tashri'fi al-Islam, (1987), Pernerbitan Hizbi,
Malaysia, p. 93). It should be noted, however, that to view this event as prohibiting all future
ijtihad would be to denounce the traditional doctrine of consensus (,jniaA) which contemplated the
formation of opinions and agreements during "any period of time" (see chapter four).
6Qala Imam 'Ali: Li takhli-1 aru mm q'imin lillahi bijjujajihi. This saying of AAIi is narrated by
Ziyad and has been categorized as saeeij (see Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, Al-Sharh-ul Qawim,
op. cit., p. 416).
"Evidences" (huj aj ah), refer to the Qur'an and Sunnah, in this context.
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(Mujtahid Mulaq) who has reached the level to deduce religious judgements
directly from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and to perform his ijtihad. Furthermore,
the nineteenth century jurist, al-Shawkani, wrote in respect of the alleged closure
of the 'door of ijtihad': "Praise be to God, this is the greatest lie - buhtanun
Aadzim - and there is no reason in the world to vindicate it."8
Nevertheless, it is equally apparent that since the fall of Baghdad, the number of
scholars satisfying the criteria to make independent ijtihad has fallen, and there
has been greater evidence of scholars making opinions in accordance with the
methodology and sayings of the Imam of the school to which they belong. It is
this historical circumstance, rather than any alleged consensus precluding all
future ijtihad, 9which explains the crystallization and entrenchment of the four
schools in Islamic law.
3. A Plurality of Enforcement Structures
Although their respective functions and duties were not always demarcated or
separated,'° in one sense it was the function of the scholar to discover the legal
rule, and the job of the Caliph (Khaljfah) to enforce it." The organizational form
enforcement took depended on the ijtihd of the Caliph or the ruler specially
8lrshad, p. 94, cited in Mohammed H. Kamali, op. cit., p. 494.
9See Mahmassani, op.cit.
'°In order to be appointed as Caliph, the appointee had to be a great scholar (a mujtahid) himself.
See: Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddirnah - An Introduction to History [trans. Franz Rosenthal], (1967),
2nd Edition, Routledge & Keegan Paul, London and Henley, Vol. 1, p. 395; Al Mawardi, Al-
Ahkam as-Sultaniyyah - The laws of Islamic Governance [trans. Dr Asadullah Yate] (1996), Ta-Ha
Publishers, London, p. 12.
"Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 449; al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 28.
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appointed by the Caliph,' 2
 and was not restricted to any definitive framework. In
the history of Islamic criminal justice, we have thus witnessed a variety of legal
structures in different areas of the Islamic world and at different times.
During the Prophet's reign in Medina there was no separation of powers, owing to
the Prophetic nature of his rule, the size of the community and the relatively small
number of cases. The positions of Ruler (Khalifah), Judge (Qpi) and Supervisor
of Torts/Judicial Investigator (hib-al Madzlim) were combined in the one
figure of Prophet Muhammad.' 3 Further, the collective duty to "command the
good and forbid what is bad," 4otherwise known as the hisbah,' 5was not
performed by any designated policing body, but was taken up by all members of
the Muslim community.'6
Gradually, as Muslim territory and community expanded, powers were allocated
to governors of new lands (Emirs),' 7 such as AAIi who was dispatched to
Yemen.' 8 These provincial governors combined administrative and judicial
functions. In Medina itself, the legal structure remained unitary' 9 until the
accession of the first of the four rightly-guided Caliphs (Khulaf Rashideen), Abu
2Shaykh Samir al-Qadi, op. cit.
' 3 See: Hassan Ibrahim Hassan, "Judiciary System From the Rise of Islam to 567 AH", The Islamic
Quarterly (1963), London, Vol. 7, p. 23; Hamoodur Rahman in Mahomed UIIah, (1986), The
Administration of Justice in Islam - An Introduction to the Muslim Conception of the State, Kitab
Bhavan, New Delhi, pp. 3-4; Taha J. al-'Alwani, (1994), "The Rights of the Accused in Islam",
The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 3, p. 349.
' 4This is taken from the Qur'anic verse: "Wa-I takum-minkum ummatun yad"jna ila-I khairi wa
ya'muruna bi-1 ma'rufi wa yanhawna Aanil munkari" (Surah aIAImran, verse 104).
' 5A1-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 337.
6See Dr Asadullah Yate's Forward to his translation of al-Mawardi's Al-A hkam as-Sultaniyyah,
op. cit., p. 6.
' 7Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 4.
' 8Taha J. alAAlwani, op. cit., p. 349.
19Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 4.
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Bakr as-Siddiq, who delegated the judiciary to 'Umar al-Khattab. 2° This practice
was carried on by "Umar, the second Caliph, who appointed Ab Dardah, Abu
Musa al-Ash"ariyy and Shurayh as judges in Medina, Kufa and Basra
respectively.2'
There also arose a practice at this time of limiting judicial jurisdiction to civil
matters,22 leaving the Caliph or his appointed Governor (Emir) to handle cases of
qisas, 23 hudud24 and ta"zir.25 It is clear from the instructions of "Umar al-Khaflb,
that no punishment which involved execution, could ever be carried out without
presenting the accused to the Caliph; 26a practice which was explicitly continued
20Ibid., p. 5. According to Hassan Ibrahim Hassan, although AUmar was entrusted with passing
judgments, he was not officially given the title of "judge" (op. cit., p. 24). See also: Taha J. al-
'AIwani, op. cit., p. 350. The first Caliph to officially nominate judges, as such, was AUmar
himself.
21 Taha J. al-"Alwani, op. cit., p. 350; Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 5.
22Taha J. alAAlwani, op. cit., p. 352; Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 9.
23This refers to all cases of intentional killing and intentional injury where the victim, or his heirs,
are given the right to respond in kind, or to ask for "diyat" (a specific sum of money representing
compensation for the type of harm caused), if they so wish. See : al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 325-
326; 'Abdu1 Qadir 'Oudah, (1987), Criminal Law of Islam, Vol. 1, Aklaq Hussain, International
Islamic Publishers, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 86.
24Literally, "add" means limit or boundary (Dr Rohi Baalbaki,(1997), Al-Mawrid, 9th Edition,
Dar-al-"Ilm LilMalayin, Beirut, p. 455), but in this context it refers to those offences with
punishments prescribed in either the Qur'an or the Sunnah, and which cannot be annulled or
pardoned: AOudah, op. cit., p. 85; AAbdur..Rahman I. Doi, (1984), Shari'ah: The Islamic Law, Ta-
Ha, London, p. 221. Al-Mawardi also defines it as those "restraints imposed by Allah ta'ala, to
prevent people committing what He has forbidden, or from abandoning what He has commanded
them to do" (op. cit., p. 312). He includes a failure to perform obligations, such as prayer, fasting,
payment of zakat and pilgrimage, in addition to committing the offences of zin (fornication and
adultery), qadhaf (imputation of zina without four witnesses), sariqah (theft), hirbah (brigandage),
shurb (drinking intoxicants), riddah (apostacy) and bughat (rebellion against the Caliph), which are
mentioned as "hadd offences" by most writers. See: 'Oudah, op. cit., p. 84; Hashim Mehat, (1993),
Islamnic Cri,ninal Law and Behaviour, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, pp.
15-48.
25A1-Mawardi defines it as comprising "discretionary punishments" which "are imposed for wrong
actions [so defined by the Shariahj, but are not defined as hadd punishments by the law" (op. cit.,p.
332). Instances of this would include 'khalwat' (unlawful proximity) and offences associated with
zina that did not involve penetrative intercourse; theft of an amount below the minimum threshold
figure (nisab) or of an amount above the nisab but which was not secured in a place of safe-keeping
(al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 333-334). These offences can be pardoned by the Amir or the Khalifah
(ibid).
26Abu Yusuf reported that 'Umar al-Khattab "wrote to the governors of the towns that none should
be killed without presenting him to him" (Kitab-ul Khargj (1979), trans. Dr Abid Ahmad AAIi,
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by the Mujaddid27of the second Hijri century, Caliph AUmar ibn "Abdul "Aziz
He is reported to have said: "The ruler will deal with one who fights against
religion, even if he kills the brother of a man or his father." 28The Caliph would act
as the final judge, and would review the evidence even if the offence was
committed openly, in full view of the public. 29
 It should be remembered that the
Caliph was not simply a political appointment; he was also a judge and a
Mujtahid.3°
In terms of procedure, it remained relatively simple under the rule of the four
Rightly-Guided Caliphs (and after). Arrests and initiation of proceedings were
conducted by a Department of Police (Ahdas) 31 acting under the Caliph or Ainlr
(Governor). 32
 There was no perceived need for elaborate procedural mechanisms,
as accused persons sought not to avoid legal censure. Al-Mwardj wrote:
"No one sought redress for a wrong from any of the four khulafa as they
were at the very beginning of the affair when the deen had just appeared
among them - among men who willingly allowed themselves to be
guided to the truth and who desisted from wrong action by mere
admonition; any disputes occurring between them were confined to
dubious matters, which judicial judgement then explained to them; if a
revised by Professor AAbdul Hameed Siddiqui, Islamic Book Centre, Lahore, p. 308); see also the
original Arabic text, "Kitab-ul Kharj" (1346H), Al-Matb"at al-Salafiyyah, Cairo, p. 183.
27This means a "renewer" of the Faith. It is reported that one mujaddid appears every century
(check this).
28Abu Yusuf, op. cit., p. 308.
29Ibid., p. 309.
30A1-Mawardi, op.cit., p. 12; Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 395. For the conditions of a Mujtahid, please
see the previous chapter.
3 Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 8.
32A1-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 310-312.
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brutish bedouin committed an injustice, admonition alone sufficed to make
him renounce it, and rough treatment made him act correctly."
After the Caliphate of AAli ibn Abu Talib, however, people began to act more
openly hostile to each other, and it was difficult to enforce legal judgements. This
necessitated separating the legal office of Judicial Investigator (Sahi b-ui
Madzaiim), that combined the "power of authority with the fairness of the legal
system." 34
 If the Caliph was able, he took up the post personally, 35
 or else he
personally delegated a Wazir or an Amir. 36
 This did not mean that the Caliph, his
ministers or his governors were free to disobey the Sharj'ah themselves. Indeed,
during the AUmayyads, judicial authority epdd to
	 cd ccca(
jurisdiction 37which brought Governors, Ministers (wuzura'), their assistants and
even the Caliph under the supervision of the Qi.38
Organizational structure and procedure became more sophisticated during the rule
of the AAbbasids. This was the so-called "golden age" of Islam which witnessed
not only a flourishing of scholarship in the figures of the four great Imams, but
33A1-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 117.
34A1 Mawardi, op. cit., p. 117.
351t is reported that AUmar ibn AAbdul dAziz was the first Caliph to perform this task, and that it
was continued by the AAbbasid Caliphs: al-Mandi, al-Hadi, ar-Rashid, alMaAmun and aI-Muhtadi;
with the result that goods which had been illegally seized were returned to their rightful owners
(ibid., p. 118).
36Ibid., p. 127.
37 Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 10.
38Hassan Ibrahim Hassan, op. cit., p. 26; Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 10; Taha J. alAAlwani,
op. cit., p. 352 (citing Ibn Khaldun, AlMuqaddimah, p. 741). During the rule of the Khulafa
Rashideen, it was not necessary to have separate judicial procedures to bring the Caliph to account,
because of their great piety and their proximity to the Holy Prophet. AUmar for instance, even
applied the hadd to his son for drinking alcohol. It should be noted that the Caliph or the Governor
never enjoyed immunity for offences committed against individuals. If immunity ever existed, it
was only in relation to hudud crimes where there was no victim. This was for the reason that the
Caliph was the one responsible for carrying out such punishments and that there would be no
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also greater "institutionalization." Apart from reviewing death penalty cases,39the
control of crime was no longer the particular responsibility of the Caliph or
Governor, but was delegated as a special task to the qhib ash-Shurtah (Chief of
Police) and the Muiitasib (Market Controller). 4° They were given executive as
well as investigative powers.4 ' Less serious ta"zlr or uncomplicated offences,42
forming the hisbah, fell within the jurisdiction of the Muhtasib. 43 The more
serious and complicated offences were handled by the hib ash-Shurtah and
Qadi. Although the hisbah also came within the latter's general jurisdiction, as a
rule he did not intervene unless a matter was in dispute. 44 In matters where the
Muhtasib and Qçi had insufficient authority to compel compliance with the law,
it was left to the Sahib-ulMadzalim.45
After the collapse of AAbbasjd rule, following the sacking of Baghdd by the
Mongols in 1258 C.E. (606A1-I), separate states emerged in the Muslim world with
their own legal institutions. 46 Although the principal foundations upon which they
were based were the same as their predecessors, they differed quite substantially in
beneficial deterrent if he inflicted it on himself; Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 17 (citing
Marghinani's Hedaya).
39This is confirmed by Abu Yusuf, who was the Qi al Qudah (Chief Justice) during the reign of
the AAbbasid ruler, Harun ar-Rashid (op. cit., pp. 308-309). It was also clearly revived by the later
Ottoman Caliphs; see Hamoodur-Rahman, op. cit., p. 15.
401bn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 456-457.
41 Ibid., and p. 463.
42Eg: unlawful obstruction of the highway, unlawful beatings of pupils by their teachers, fraud and
deception in weights and measures (ibid); non-payment of debts when the debtor is able to pay;
failure to perform congregational prayer, or the call to prayer; improperly performing the prayer;
unlawful proximity (khalwat); blatant drinking of wine or alcohol; etc. See further: Al-Mawardi,
op. cit., pp. 34 1-362.
43A1-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 356.
44Op. cit., pp. 338-340.
45Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 125.
46The seeds of independence had been sown early in AAbbasid rule, when the toppled Aumayyad
ruler fled to Spain establishing his own sultanate. See further, the History of A-Iabari.
184
matters of organization and procedure. 47
 Due to weaknesses in the Caliphate, a
process of secularization also began, which separated the Caliph from legal
administration. He no longer assumed the post of Judicial Investigator/Supervisor
of Torts; this was transferred to the rulers without any delegation. The correct
processes of appointment and delegation, which had been a feature of the Rightly-
Guided Caliphs, the early AAbbasids, Ar-Rashid and some of his children,48and
which attempted to ensure the competence, ability and loyalty of those entrusted
with enforcing the Shari"ah, were neglected by later rulers. 49
 Officials were
appointed in the service of the political establishment without reference to the
religious laws, and who commanded little respect. Ibn Khaldn wrote:
"In the kingdoms that succeeded the rule of the caliphs, the functions of
the caliphate became the prerogative of this kind of urban weakling. They
were no longer exercised by people of prestige, but by persons whose
qualifications were limited, both by their descent and by the habits of
sedentary culture to which they had become accustomed. They were
despised as sedentary people are, who live submerged in luxury and
tranquillity, who have no connection with the group feeling of the ruler,
and who depended on being protected by others."5°
In this brief review of the history of the Islamic criminal justice system, we can
draw some important observations. First, the system was not static or fixed to a
particular organizational framework. The Caliph, in his capacities of defender of
47Taha J. a1AA1wani, op. cit., p. 353.
481bn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. , 412-414.
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the religion, guarantor of rights and enforcer of the Shari"ah, 5t was obliged to
exercise his ijtihad to ensure that the commandments of God were implemented to
the best of his ability. This necessitated establishing new offices and changing
procedures to fit with contemporary reality. Second, many criminal matters came
within the purview of executive authority. Although the Qciis were able to hear
hudud, qi	 and ta"zir cases, 52their jurisdiction was sometimes limited to civil
matters, particularly in the centuries following the fall of Baghdad. 53
 This meant
that the competency, character and religious integrity of those holding the key
executive positions of : Caliph, Wazir, Amir, Sahib-ash-Shurtah and Muhtasib
were central to the proper administration of Islamic criminal justice.
4. The Necessity and Integrity of Executive Authority:
The Caliph was the fount of executive authority and the most important of all
offices of state. Although some factions, such as the Mu"tazilah and the Khawarij,
regarded the Caliph as unnecessary, this did not reflect the predominant position.
It was generally stated that the Shari"ah itself demanded an Imm (Caliph). 54
 This
general agreement covered the majority of qualities and competencies required of
the Caliph-to-be. 55
 First, he had to be "ad156 and have high moral rectitude57
49Ibid., p. 457.
50A1-Muqaddiinah, op. cit., p. 458.
Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 28.
52Ibid., pp. 107-108.
53Taha J. al-"Alwani, op. cit., p. 354.
54A1-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 10; Ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 390-39 1. Ibn Khaldun states there is a
general consensus on the matter, op. cit., p. 390.
55These are set out by both al-Mawardi and ibn Khaldun at op. cit., p. 12 and op. cit., pp. 394-402,
respectively. Although they differ in the number of conditions, substantively they are the same.
Similarly,although the schools differ on the number of persons who are given the power to appoint
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Known commission of unlawful acts disqualified him from the post. 58Second, he
had to be a Mujtahid. 591bn Khaldun wrote:
"His knowledge is satisfactory only if he is able to make independent
decisions. Blind acceptance of tradition is a shortcoming, and the imamate
requires perfection in all qualities and conditions" 60(emphasis added).
Third, he had to be brave and willing to go to war against the enemies of Islam
and to carry out the hudud. 61 Fourth, he had to have a vast knowledge and
understanding of the arts of war, diplomacy and political administration.62Fifth, it
was essential that he was physically able and free from any defects that would
have impaired his administration of the Shari"ah. 63Sixth, he had to be from the
tribe of the Quraysh (the Prophet's tribe).64
the Caliph, there is agreement with respect to who has the power to decide which candidate is the
best qualified. If the Muslim Ummah is currently without a Caliph, the process will be by election
from the "people of power and influence." This is not a general election, but a choice made by a
select group each member of which must be Aadl and possess the knowledge to determine who
would have the right to be Caliph. They must also have the wisdom and insight that would lead
them to select the best qualified candidate who would be the most likely to command obedience
from the whole of the Muslim Ummah (see al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp 11-16). If the Caliph was still
alive, and still had the capacity for making informed decisions, he would appoint a council of
appropriate persons to elect a suitably qualified successor after his death, or before his death if he
gave his consent (ibid).
56This means just and trustworthy, such that his testmony would be acceptable in an Islamic court.
57Al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 12; ibn Khaldun, op. cit., p. 395.
581bn Khaldun, ibid; al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 30.
59See p. 1 ante, for the pre-conditions of exercising juridical ijtihad.
600p. cit. See also al-Mawardi, who stated that Caliphs must have "knowldege which equips them
for ijtihad in unforeseen matters and for arriving at relevant judgments", op. cit.
61 1bn Khaldun, ibid; al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 12 and p. 29.
621bn Khaldun, ibid; al-Mawardi, op. cit., p.12.
631bn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 395-396; Al-Mawardi sub-divides these requirements into (1)good
quality of hearing, sight and speech; and (2) normal limb movement (ibid).
64This is derived from the agreement of the companions on the day of Saqifah, when the Ansaris
agreed with Abu Bakr's repetition of the Prophet's statement that "the Imams are from among the
Quraysh" (ibn Khaldun, op. cit., pp. 306-307; al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 12). According to Ibn
Khaldun, the purpose behind requiring Qurayshi descent was to facilitate acceptance of the Caliph
by the whole Muslim community. The Quraysh was the only Arab tribe that was universally
respected and revered for its nobility (op. cit., pp. 399-400).
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If the appointee satisfied all of the pre-conditions of the Caliphate, it was more
likely that he would take an active concern in the proper administration of the
Sharv'ah and appoint only those persons whose piety, reliability and competency
he was certain. In order to ensure efficient administration, the Caliph was
encouraged to appoint a Wazjr of Delegation (First Minister) to carry out some of
his affairs. The Wazir, who was entrusted with appointing judges, listening to
grievances and correcting abuses (or appointing another to act on his behalf), et al,
had to conform to all of the above pre-conditions of the Caliphate 65apart from
lineage. 66
 His actions were also subject to the overall supervision of the Caliph.
Al-Mawardi wrote the Caliph,
"should inspect the actions of the wazir and his management of affairs, so
that he may endorse what is correct and curtail what is incorrect, as
government of the Ummah is entrusted to him and is dependent upon his
efforts."67
In certain circumstances, the Wazir would be appointed as an Artiir of a province,
and he would have the same responsibilities of appointing magistrates and judges,
collecting zakat and land revenue (kharj), establishing Friday Prayer and
implementing liadd punishments. According to al-Mawardi, the only difference
65A1-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 37.
66This is derived from Abu Bakr's statement to the Ansaris on the day of Saqifah: "From us the
Amirs; from you the Wazirs" (see al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 12).
670p. cit., p. 41.
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between a Wazir of Delegation and this type of Amir 68was that the former had a
general as opposed to a specific jurisdiction. The same pre-conditions of
appointment applied to both. 69 If, however, the appointment was contracted as a
Special Amirate, the Amjr's jurisdiction was limited to the scope of his particular
contract: to public order, organization of the army or defence, for example. In
terms of public order, he was not authorised to act as a quasi judge. His authority
extended only to administering punishments or helping plaintiffs/victims in the
fulfilment of their rights. Because of this limited jurisdiction, ability to exercise
ijtihad was an advantage as opposed to a pre-requisite.7°
It has already been mentioned that the Wazir of Delegation/Provincial Amir was
responsible for the appointment of Qadis. Appointment was a serious matter that
required careful investigation of the appointees. The view most widely accepted
among the different schools, was that the investigation had to confirm the
appointee was among those qualified to exercise ijtihad, in addition to being Aadl,
free, male, 7 1 extremely intelligent 72, Muslim,73and sound of hearing and
68The Amir of a province could be a specific prior appointment by the Caliph, or an ex-post fact
acknowledgment by the Caliph where the Amir had successfully conquered new territory. If the
latter category of Amir did not satisfy all of the conditions of the Wazir of Delegation, the Caliph
would have to appoint a Wazir or representative for him who possessed all of the necessary
qualifications stated earlier. See al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 54-56.
690p. cit., p. 49.
70Ibid., pp. 5 1-53.
7t Abu Hanifah allows a woman to be a judge in those cases where she can give testimony. Ibn Jarir
at-Tabari allows a woman to be a judge in all cases; see al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 98.
72According to Sheikh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, profound understanding and discernment is not
simply a pre-requisite for the proper exercise of ijtihad, but a fundamental pillar ("rukunun
"adzimun"); Al-Sharhu-ul Qawim, op. cit., p. 412.
73mis referred only to cases where Muslims were litigants. If the case involved non-Muslims only,
it was permitted to appoint a non-Muslim judge to hear their case; ibid., p. 99.
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sight.74However, he did not have to be a complete Mujtahid (mutlaq); he could be
a mujtahid within a school, within a given area or in relation to a particular case.75
Beneath the Oi, was the Muhtasib (Market Controller). He was appointed by
the properly delegated authorities and had to be "a free man, just ("adl), of sound
judgement, firm and severe in the deen, and clearly aware of what evil behaviour
is.,,76
It is apparent that at all levels of authority, the fairness, religious integrity and
competence of those holding executive offices were pre-conditions for
appointment. Further, that those who held the positions of Caliph, Amir (with
general jurisdiction) and Qi had to be Mujtahids. They were responsible for the
subordinate appointments77and for ensuring that those whom they appointed,
conformed to the conditions required by the Shari"'ah.
It will be suggested that when we come to analyse the various positions taken by
the principal schools of thought in respect of the rules pertaining to the powers and
limits of questioning of the accused, these pre-conditions for appointment were
crucial for the proper running and fairness of Islamic criminal justice; for in
practice, it was these pre-conditions, in addition to the substantive rules on
74Ibid., pp. 98-101; see also: ibn Qudamah, A1-Mughni, Dar al-Manar, (1367H), Vol. 9, pp. 39-41;
al-Marghinani, al-Hidayah, nd, Qur'an Mahal, Karachi, Vol. II, p. 131. Abu Hanifah allowed a
non-Mujtahid to sit in judgment, but only where he asked the opinions of a Mujtahid (al-Mawardi,
op. cit., p. 100). Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy confirmed that a Mujtahid must be appointed
except in cases of darurah (necessity); meeting 11 March, 2000.
75This is implicit in al-Mawardi's work, because he states that the jurisdiction of a qadi can be
limited in this manner (op. cit., p. 110).
76A1-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 338.
77This would have included the hib al-Shur1ah (Chief of Police), who would have been a specific
delegate of the Amir/Caliph, depending on the circumstances.
190
confessions and powers of questioning, which determined (and determines) the
role played by the accused.
5. Confessions, Questioning and Categorizations of the Accused
i)The Centrality of Confessions:
Although there are other methods of proving criminal cases, such as direct
testimony (shahadah), judicial knowledge ('ilm-ul Qi) and oath-taking (yamin
and qasamah), 78there is no doubt that the confession (iqrar), occupied an
important place in Islam's system of proof. First, in practical terms, and with the
exception of the oath (qasamah), it may have been the only means to secure a
conviction because of the secretive circumstances in which some offences were
committed. Second, the confession was seen as the strongest proof for the
establishment of a claim or charge. 79
 It was assumed that an accused, who
knew80the punitive consequences of his confession, would not admit to something
which he had not committed. Moreover, for Muslims in particular, there was no
781bn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah is among a small minority who also allow circumstantial evidence
(qara'in) to prove any type of case (hudud, qisas, ta"zir, diyat or kaffarah) in relation to any
accused. The majority reject circumstantial evidence as a sole base for conviction unless it comes
in the form of qasamah. According to Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, circumstantial evidence can
form the basis for a conviction if the accused is known to be a bad person; meeting, 11 March
2000.
79Mahmassani, S. (1987), Falsafatat-Tashri'fl al-Islam, Penerbitan Hizbi, Malaysia, p. 173; as-
Suyuti, Jalal ad-Din, (1983), Al-A shbah wal- Nadza'ir, Dar-ul Kutub Allmiyyah, Beirut, p. 53;
Shaykh Ibrahim ibn Muhammad ibn Salim ibn uyn, Manar al-Sabil ("Crime and Punishment
Under Hanbali Law" trans. George M. Baroody), n.d., SOAS catalogue no: 350706, p. 113.
80Sinful and punishable acts under the Shari"ah, and basic evidential matters, are included in
summaries of individual obligatory knowledge taught to children and adults. See for instance:
Muktasaru "Abdullah al-Harariyyu, al-Kgfulu bi-"Ilmi-d-Dini-d-Daruriyy, (1996), Dar-ul
MashariAa,
 Beirut, pp. 39-46. This book is based on a much older text from a Yemeni scholar,
AAbdullah Ibn Husayn Ibn Tahir.
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value in making a confession that was false because of the dictates of their faith.8'
Confessions, in part, were associated with sincere repentance (tawbah) which
relieved the believer from possible punishment in Hellfire. 82
 It was envisaged that
a Muslim's conscience would be pricked, and that s/he would come forward
voluntarily. 83
 This is illustrated by a hadith (tradition) of the Prophet relating to
the case of Ma"iz, which is mentioned across the four principal schools. Having
confessed to zina (adultery/fornication) four times, and at different sittings, Ma"iz
came again to the Holy Prophet who asked him a series of questions in order to
check his sanity and to confirm that Miz had not mistaken zin for a less serious
sexual offence. After he had completed his questioning, the Prophet asked Ma"iz,
"What do you want from me?" MW'iz replied: "To be purified." 84
 Third, in legal
terms, it was an irrevocable source of evidence as it could never be removed by
positive legislation. Confessions had clear Qur'nic authority for their place
within the Shari"ah. Surah an-Nisa' exhorts the believers:
Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against
yourselves. 85 (emphasis added)
See: aI-Sarakhsi, Muhammad ibn Ahmad, (1987), Al-Mabsut, vols 17-18, Idarat AUlumul
Qur'an, Karachi, p. 298.
82Voluntary confessions relieve the Muslim from punishment in the Hereafter only where all of the
conditions for a valid repentence (which include regret and desisting from the conduct) are present;
meeting with Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, 11 March 2000.
83 See the comments of al-Mawardi cited earlier in the chapter at p. 5.
84See: Al-Qurtubi, op. cit., vol. 9, pp 104-105. There is also Imam Muslim's version of this hadith
(hadith no. 1695, Kitab-ul Hudud), which is reprinted in the footnotes to al-Mawardi's Al-Hawi al-
Kabir, op. cit., p. 38, in which Ma"iz said to the Prophet four times: "Ya Rasulullah tahhirny" (0'
Messenger of Allah, purify me!) The Prophet responded: "fima atahhiruka?" (From what do you
wish to be purified?). Miz replied: "Man-iz-zina" (From adultery).
85"Y ayyuhalladhina mani, ki n qawwmina bi-1 qisti shuhada' lillhi wa law 'ala anfusikum"
(v. 135). The Shaf'i scholar, ar-Ramli, confirms this verse as a proof (Nihyat-u1 Muhtgj, (1967),
Vol. 5, Matba't Mustafa Albabi, p. 65). See also: Siirah al-Baqarah, v. 282; Surah al-Qiyamah, vs
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Fourth, a confession could form the sole basis for a conviction. If the Caliph,
Qadi or AmIr was satisfied with the confession, there was no need to confirm the
conviction from evidence independently obtained. Ab Ysuf, who was the Chief
Qi of the "Abbsid Caliph Harun ar-Rashid, the best student of Abu Hanifah,
and a complete mujtahid in his own right, wrote:
"..if a murderer confesses his murder willingly without any evidence,86even
then punishment would be imposed on him" 87 (emphasis added).
It is evident from the above, that a possible tension existed between the spiritual
dimension of the confession and the temporal temptations of those in authority to
extract it when there was no other evidence available to secure a conviction, or to
vindicate the rights of victims. The fuqaha'88 recognized that the benefits
(maqg_sid) underlying the Shari'ah presented a balance between facilitating a
genuine repentance on the one hand, and enforcing the Shari"ah on the other. But
as that balance depended on the ijtihd of the particular scholar and the social
circumstances he was asked to address, it had the potential of producing different
interpretations as to the role played by the accused within the legal process. This
14-15. The Flanbali scholar, Ibn Qudamah, reports ajuristic consensus on the validity of
confessions as a source of evidence (see AlMughni, op. cit., Vol. 5, p.271).
86The Arabic text uses the words "mm ghairi bayyinat" (op. cit., p. 183). "Bayyinat" is a general
word that can refer to both eye-witness testimony (shandah) and circumstantial evidence
(qara' in)[see Othman,M.S.A (1991), Undang- Undang Keterangan Islam, Dewan Bahasa, Kuala
Lumpur, p.p. 8 -9 ] . Iqrar is a separate species of proof with its own conditions (arkn) and
procedures.
87Abu Yusuf, (1979), Kitab ul-Kharaj, trans. Dr Abid Ahmad AAli, revised by Professor AAbdul
Hameed Siddiqui, Islamic Book Centre, Lahore, p. 309. This is also explicitly stated by Hanbali
scholars; see Ibn Qudamah, Muwaffiq al-Din, Abu Muhammad, AAbdullah, bin Ahmad, bin
Muhammad, (1983), A1-Mughni, Dar ul-Kitab-ul AAJabjyy Beirut, Lebanon, Vol. 5., p. 281.
There are no reported disagreements in the Maliki or Shaf"i schools.
88Scholars of "fiqh" (rules drawn from the Shari"ah).
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will be illustrated by setting out the opinions of the four main schools in relation
to powers of questioning and the admission of confessions.
ii)Questioning of the Accused:
Powers to question accused persons were based on distinctions found in both the
Qur'an and Sunnah which appeared to construct the accused in terms of piety and
degree of adherence to the religion.
In his interpretation of the meaning of the Qur'anic verse: "0 ye who have faith!
Avoid being overly suspicious; for suspicion in some cases is wrong; and spy not
on one another", Al-Qurtubi mentioned that according to the religious scholars,89
in this context the word "dzann (suspicion)" meant "tuhmat (accusation/charge)."
He continued:
"And the evidence that 'suspicion' here means 'accusation' is the saying of
Allah ta "ala: 'And do not spy on one another'. This is because one might
be tempted to make an accusation and then confirm it through spying,
inquiry, surveillance, eavesdropping and other things. Thus, the Prophet,
allallhu "alayhi wa sallam, prohibited spying. If you wish, you may say
that what	 distinguishes the kind of suspicion (which is prohibited)
that must be avoided from all other kinds of suspicion, is that the former is
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without a valid proof or known apparent reason. So, where there is no
good reason, it is prohibited to suspect a person of corruption or fraud
when he is well-known for his virtue and respected for his apparent 	 I
honesty. The case is different, however, when the person is notorious for
dubious dealings and unabashed iniquity. Thus, there are two kinds of
suspicion: first, that which is brought on and then strengthened by proof
which can form the basis of a ruling; second, that which occurs for no
apparent reason.. .This second type of suspicion is the same as doubt, and
no ruling can be based on it. This is the kind of suspicion that is
prohibited in the verse" 90 (my emphasis).
Al-Qurtubi thus reports that the scholars differentiated between those who were
well-known for their piety with those who were well-known for their bad
character. The powers of ordinary individuals and legal officials to question (and
other similar activities) against pious individuals would not be triggered without
valid proof (e.g. the testimony of just persons). These limitations on power,
however, did not apply when the accused was already known for his bad character.
These categorizations were also based on the Sunnah. On the one hand, there
were hadiths (traditions) of the Prophet which prohibit Muslims from suspecting a
fellow Muslim of wrong doing, such as:
89He does not refer to any exceptions in his text.
90A1-Qurtubi, (1967), op. cit., vol. 16, pp. 33 1-332. See also the English translation of this passage
by Yusuf Talal Delorenzo in Taha J. alAAIwani's work, "The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part
one)", op. cit., pp. 362-363.
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Do not seek to uncover their secrets ("awrat), for certainly he who seeks
to uncover the secrets of his fellow Muslim, Allah will expose what he has
kept hidden.9'
If Muslims were known to be pious, or nothing was known about them, it was
prohibited to question them about an offence without evidence because this was
"seeking to uncover" unlawful behaviour which had not been made apparent. In
the words of the Shf"i scholar and Judge, al-Mawardi, this was a case of "mere
suspicion," (wahm) so "immunity is required by the dictates of the deen
[religion]."92 Similarly, Abu Yusuf, from the Hanafi school, stated: "The Holy
Prophet (sallallahu Aalayhi wa sallam) did not take people to account because of
mere accusation."93
On the other hand, this protection from questioning did not apply to those
Muslims whose illicit behaviour was widely known or against whom there was
pre-existing evidence.94
 Malik,95 for instance, appeared to allow questioning of an
accused even in hudud cases involving the pure rights of Allah, so long as there
91 This is reported by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, in his Musnad, Vol. 19, Dar-ush-Shihab, Cairo,
n.d., hadith no. 124, Bb m j' fl-t- tarhibi min-at-tajassasi wa su'-udz-dzann, pp. 241-242. The
application of this hadjth to powers of questioning (whether by properly designated officials of the
state or ordinary individuals) was confirmed in my meeting with the Muhaddith, and Mufti of
Somalia, Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy. The Shaykh said: "If he is not known to be a bad person
or if he is pious, he cannot be questioned because we presume the Muslim is virtuous - <La tatlubi
Aawratinnas>[hadith]" (do not seek to uncover that which is concealed); July, 1998, Beirut,
Lebanon.
92A1-Mawardi, Abu Hasan, (1996), AlAhkam al-Su4aniyyah: The Laws of Islamic Governance
[English trans. Dr Asadullah Yate], Ta-Ha Publishers, London, p. 309.
93 Kitab-ul Khargj, op. cit, p. 356. The original Arabic uses the words "bi-1 qaraf", which means
"loathing" literally. The editors of the text, however, have provided a footnote in which they
explain the meaning as "tuhmat" (accusation) [op. cit., p. 209].
94This was confirmed by Shaykh AAbdullah, op. cit.
95 See also the comments on duress by al-Mawardi, ibn Abidin, Sahnun, ibn Qayyim and others,
referred to below. They all allowed duress to be applied to suspected thieves with a previous
record for theft, which implies that they also allowed questioning.
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was strong circumstantial evidence against him. 96 He reported AUmar al-Khattab
had once said: "I have found the smell of wine on so and so and he claimed that it
was the drink of boiled fruit juice and I am inquiring about what he has drunk, and
if it intoxicates, I will flog him." 97 The fact that "Umar mentioned the man
"claimed" to have taken a certain drink, implied that "Umar after noticing the
smell of wine on the man's breath, had questioned the man what he had had to
drink.
This protection against questioning did not apply to non-Muslim subjects of the
Islamic state (dhimmis). 98 They did not come explicitly within the protective
parameters of the Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions. Their "case" was not
the same as a pious Muslim or the Muslim about whom nothing was known
because their disbelief in the basic tenets of Islam was already public knowledge.
By a process of inductive logic, the scholars maintained that a person who did not
avoid blasphemy, also might not avoid less serious matters that were prohibited by
the Shari"ah. 99
 This position also received support from the traditions of the
Prophet. First, there was the hadith of Ibn AUmar in which he reported the
aftermath of the battle between the Muslims and the non-Muslim inhabitants of
In this context, circumstantial evidence refers to external probative signs of guilt; it does not
include obtaining physical evidence from a Muslim accused, such as fingerprints, hair or blood
(confirmed by Shaykh AAbdullah, ibid). This is based on a hadjth of the Prophet which means:
"Verily, your blood, your wealth, your reputations, and your skins are inviolable." This is reported
by Ibn Hazm in al-Muhalla, (reprinted 1352H), Muhammad Munir ad-Dimashqiy, [SOAS
catalogue no. A345.6] Vol. 11, p. 141. Blood samples, etc, could not be "extracted"; they could
only be "volunteered" by an accused.
97A1-Muwatta, narration of Yahya ibn Yahya al-Laythi al-Qayrawan (English trans), (1982), Diwan
Press, Norwich, Kitab al-Shurb, p. 401. This saying of AUmar al-Khattab also provides some
authority for judges relying upon their own knowledge before pronouncing a verdict and
administering a sentence.
98Confirmed by Shaykh AAbdullah, op. cit.
99Ibid.
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Khaybar.'°° The latter had sought refuge in their fortress and, upon seeing that
they had lost possession of their land and crops, agreed to make a treaty with the
Prophet. It was agreed that their lives would be spared and that they could take
with them all that they could carry on the condition that they did not hide
anything. If they ignored this warning, there would be no treaty and no protection.
However, some musk, money and jewellery belonging to ffuyayy ibn Akhab had
been hidden. This prompted the Prophet to ask uyayy's uncle: "What happened
to the musk that your nephew brought from the NaIr?" He replied: "The wars and
other expenses took it". The Prophet responded: "But he arrived very recently,
and there was more money than that... ." If we examine this hadith, questioning
took place without pre-existing evidence. An evidential foundation was
established only after the Prophet had questioned Fluyayy's uncle. This suggests
that it was the state of disbelief of the accused which gave the power to question.
Secondly, there was the hadith related by Anas ibn Malik, and included in the
collections of Bukhari, Muslim, Abu Dawud, Ibn Mjah, Ahmad and others, in
which a Jew was alleged to have crushed the head of Muslim girl with a stone.
Just before she died, the girl made a declaration that the offence had been
committed by the Jew. In the reports of this hadith, it was then mentioned that the
Prophet questioned the Jew.101
'°°This is reported by Abu Dawud, hadith no. 3006; al-Bayhaqi, Sunan al-A hkam, vol. 9, p. 137;
Ibn Hajr al-Asqalany, Fath alBari, Vo. 7, pp. 366-367. It is also referred to by Ibn AAbjdin in his
Hashjyah, see below, Vol. 3, p. 270; and by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, in AL-Turuk al-_Hukmiyyah,
see below, pp. 7-8. [These references are mentioned by Taha J. al AAlwani, "The Rights of the
Accused in Islam (Part Two)", The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, (1994), Vol. 11,
No. 4, p. 511 footnote].
°'Shaykh "Abdullah al-Harariyy confirmed that this hadith is a proof for being able to question the
non-Muslim; op. cit. The dying declaration of the victim should not be read as pre-existing
evidence against the Jew. For in essence, it was only an accusation made by the victim. If the rules
for pious Muslims and Muslims about whom nothing was known, were the same as for non-
Muslims, the accusation would have been disregarded as "mere suspicion", and not used as a basis
for questioning.
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While the power to question the accused seems to have relied upon the extent to
which s/he adhered to the religion of Islam, there is no evidence from the Qur'an,
Sunnah or juristic opinion that improper questioning would have excluded any
confession subsequently obtained. Indeed, this was confirmed in my first
meeting'°2with Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, who is a contemporary Mujtahid
within the school of Imam ShfAi. To suspect of wrong-doing a pious Muslim or
a Muslim about whom nothing was known, was a "sin of the heart."° 3
 The one
who carried and acted out these suspicions would be accountable for that in this
world 104
 and in the Hereafter. Questioning itself did not vitiate a confession. First,
it was not included within the categories of duress which, according to the
majority of scholars (see below), would have absolved the accused from legal
liability. Second, it was rationally assumed that ordinary individuals would not
have felt coerced into making a false confession simply by questioning. Islamic
Law had already taken into account vulnerable persons. Ibn Qudamah, the famous
Hanbali scholar, reported that the Prophet had said:
"The pen (responsibility) is lifted from three types of persons: from the
child until he becomes pubescent; from a person who is insane until he
recovers his sanity, and from the person who is asleep until he awakes."°5
' °20p. cit.
'°3Shaykh 'Abdu11ah al-Harariyy, (1996), Bughyat-Thlib, Dar-ul Mashari"a, Beirut, p. 352.
'°41n our second meeting (11 March, 2000), Shaykh AAbdullah stated that a police officer who
questioned a pious Muslim without legal authority and harmed him could be punished by the
Muslim authorities.
'°5A1-Mughni, (reprint 1983), Dar-ul Katib-ul AArabi, Beirut, Vol. 5, p. 271. See also: Sayed
Sikander Shah Haneef, (1994), Islamic Law of Evidence, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling Jaya,
Malaysia, pp. 33-35; Dr Anwarullah, (1994), Islamic Law of Evidence, Shar'iah Academy,
International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan, p. 44; Dr Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman,
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In criminal matters, therefore, confessions obtained from pre-pubescent children
or from adults of "unsound mind" were generally regarded as inadmissible.'06
iii) Voluntary Confessions:
As a general rule, the majority of Islamic scholars ruled that legal liability could
not flow from confessions which had been obtained by duress. This was based on
both Qur'nic verses and on traditions of the Prophet. First 1 the Qiir'n ciearJy
exempted from liability a person who was forced to utter words of disbelief:
Anyone who, after accepting faith in Allah, utters disbelief except
under compulsion- his heart remaining firm infaith-,...on them is
108ghadab107
 from Allah. And they will have a grievous penally (emphasis
added).
The scholars reasoned that if compulsion exempted liability from apostacy (kufr),
which was the most serious offence in Islam, then it would also exempt accused
(1991), Undang- Undang Keterangan Islam, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pendidikan
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 46-47.
'°6lbid. The Hanafis and Hanbalis allowed children below the age of puberty, but who had reached
the age of discernment (inurnayyiz) to make admissions in respect of transactions and property
matters; see Sayed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 34.
'°7This relates to the punishment of Allah. Its meaning should not be translated as "wrath", as this
would attribute an emotion to Allah. Emotions are created attributes and are applicable only to the
Creation (Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, Sirat-ul Mustaqim, (1993), Dar-ul Mashari"a, Beirut, pp.
3 8-39).
'°8S!lrah an-Nahl, verse 106.
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persons in offences which were less serious.109 The Sunnah was even more
explicit in the general applicability of this exemption. The Prophet informed us:
Responsibility is lifted from my people in cases of mistake, forgetfulness
and duress."°
On the basis of these texts, the majority of the scholars (jumhur), across the four
schools held that a confession had to be voluntary (mukhtar). For instance, Malik
[died 179H1759CE] and his companions generally considered that a confession
obtained from the accused by any form of duress or deception" 'was inadmissible
and could not be relied upon in hudud or non-hudud cases. 112 Duress included
beating, threatening, handcuffing," 3 or imprisoning the accused . Even if the
accused was a dhimmi, Mlik ruled that questioning could not take place while
s/he was detained. Detention was a discretionary punishment, and could not be
authorised without the testimony of just witnesses. In support of his view, Malik
referred to a saying of AUmar ibn al-Khattab who, having been informed that
people were being detained in Iraq on the basis of false testimony, replied: "By
Allah! A man is not detained in Islam without just witnesses." 114 If the confession
' °9Sayed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 38.
110 Rufi"a Aan ummati -l-khata'u, wa an-nisyanu, wa ma-stukrihu Aalayhi", Ibn Qudamah, op. cit.,
vol. 5, p. 273; Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, al- Muhadzdzab, Vol. 2, op. cit., p. 343; Shaykh Ibrahm ibn
Muhammad ibn Salim ibn Duyan, op. cit., p. 113. Shaykh 'AbdulIah confirmed in my meeting with
him that this hadith is a proof, op. cit.
''Tah J. Al. AAlwani, (1994),"The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part Two)", The American
Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, Vol 11, No. 4, Association for Muslim Social Scientists and the
International Institute for Islamic Thought, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, p. 514.
" 2Sayed Sikander Shah Haneef, (1994), Islamic Law of Evidence, Pelanduk Publications, Petaling
Jaya, Malaysia, p. 39.
3Muhammad "Ata Al-Sid Sid Ahmad, (1995), The Hudud, Muhammad AAta Al-Sid SidAhmad,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, p. 160.
' 14Imam Malik, Al-Muwatta, narration of Yaya ibn Yaya al-Laythi al-Qayrawan (English trans),
(1982), Diwan Press, Norwich, Kitab al-Ahkam, pp. 337-338.
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was ruled involuntary, punishment could not be imposed even if the confession
was corroborated through subsequent discovery of items mentioned by the accused
in his confession."5
According to Imam Shaf"i [died 204H1784CE], any harm or threat which
reasonably diminished free will, such as beating, imprisonment, detention and
starvation, was enough to invalidate a confession. He did not distinguish between
the type of offence, nor whether it involved the rights of Allah or the rights of
persons." 6
 Imam Ghazzali [died 505H11085CE] also objected to beating an
accused with a previous record for theft on the ground that it was "better for a
thief to be spared a beating than for an innocent man to be beaten."7
According to Imam al-Sarkhasi [died 483H11063CE], the majority of Hanafi
scholars had held that the accused could not be held liable on the basis of a
confession which had been obtained by duress." 8
 Qadi Abll Ysuf [died
182H1762CE], 1 ' 9for example, adhered strictly to the need for a voluntary
confession. He stated in general terms:
"He who is doubted or is charged with theft or any other offence, should
not be penalised with beating and should not be threatened and frightened.
If a person makes a profession (admission) of theft, or an offence invoking
" 5Sayed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 39; see also al-Zarqani, Sharh alMuwatta, cited by Taha
J. al-"Alwani, "The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part Two)", op. cit., p. 514.
116Sayed Iskander Shah, op. cit., p. 40.
" 7a1-Ghazzali, Abu Hamid Muhammad, (1937), A1-Mustafa mm "Jim al-Usul, Cairo, vol. 1, pp.
139-144, cited in Subbi Mabmasani, op. cit., p.89.
" 8A1-Mabsut, vol.9, pp184-l85, cited in TahaJ. A1-"Alwani, op. cit., p.510.
' 19N.B. He was a Mujtahid Mutlaq in his own right.
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punishment, or murders while he is charged with any of these offences, his
confession will have no validity and it will not be lawful to cut off his hand
or to take him to task for his confession."2°
Abu Yusuf also mentioned the case of a known thief who had been suspected of
stealing. He referred to a man who had been brought to Tariq in Syria on a charge
of theft. While under arrest, he was flogged and subsequently confessed to the
offence. He was then brought to Ibn AUmar who was asked for his opinion. Ibn
"Umar replied: "His hand should not be cut off, for he has made the confession
only after receiving a beating."2'
He also clearly stated:
"Also you (addressing the Caliph, Harun al-Rashld) should not accept the
charge of a man against another man in regard to murder and theft; nor
should punishment be imposed upon him except upon the valid evidence
[i.e. testimony of two "adil witnesses] or confession without coercion by
the Governor or a threat. It is not permissible to put a person into prison
on account of an accusation."122
The context of these statements seems to suggest that Abu Ysuf deemed
imprisonment as a form of duress, in addition to beating and verbal threats. This
is supported by his reference to the opinion of his colleague, Muhammed al-
' 20Abu Yusuf, (1979), Kitab ul-Kharaj, trans. Dr Abid Ahmad AAIj, revised by Professor AAbduI
Hameed Siddiqui, Islamic Book Centre, Lahore, p. 355; original Arabic text, op. cit., p. 209.
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Shaybani [died 189H/769CE], who informed him that AUmar al-Khattab had once
said: "A man who is kept hungry, or frightened or imprisoned, is not secure from
making a confession against his own self" 23 (emphasis added). The implication is
that imprisonment, which was a discretionary punishment, could not be authorised
without valid evidence, and that along with food deprivation, threats and beatings,
it could produce doubt in the truthfulness of any confession obtained. Hence in an
earlier passage, when commenting on the need to avoid doubt before imposing
punishment, he cites with approval the following saying of AA'isha, the Prophet's
wife:
"Ward off punishments from the Muslims in doubtful cases as far as you
can. If you find a way out for a Muslim, then set him free. If the Imam
makes a mistake in granting forgiveness, it is better for him than that he
should commit a mistake in imposing punishment."24
The mainstream position of the anbali school has been transmitted to us by Ibn
Qudamah [died 630H11252CE]. In his famous work Al-Mughni,' 25 he stated that a
confession which had been obtained by duress, generally had no legal validity.
Causation, however, had to be established. If, for instance, the accused was
' 2t Ibid., pp. 355-356; original Arabic text, op.cit., p. 209.
22Ibid., p. 356; original Arabic text, ibid.
' 23 Ibid., p. 355; original Arabic text, ibid.
' 24 Ibid., pp. 307-308; original Arabic text, op. cit., p. 183.
' 25 1bn Qudamah, Muwaffiq ad-Din, Abu Muhammad, AAbdullah ,
 bin Ahmad, bin Muhammad,
(reprint 1983), Dar ul-Kitab-ul AArabjyy, Beirut, Lebanon.
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coerced to confess in relation to property X, but his confession related to property
Y, the confession was deemed voluntary and admissible.'26
It is suggested that this demand for voluntariness reflected: i) a reluctance to
impose punishment unless the charge was manifestly proved;' 27and ii) a
recognition of the spiritual dimension of the confession. The latter was evidently
apparent in hadd punishments categorised as /iaqqullah, such as zina
(adultery/fornication) and shurb (drinking alcohol) where it was sunnah
(rewardable on the part of the decision maker) to discourage the accused from
making a confession.' 28 They based their opinions on the hadith relating to M"iz
and the saying of AUmar: "Turn away those who commit zina". 129 Some Ilanafi
scholars, in particular, argued that "concealment" and private acts of repentance
were sometimes more appropriate.' 30 Abll Ysuf appeared to extend this practice
to persons accused of theft. He stated:
126 See the explanation of al-Mughni by Ibn Qudamah al-Maqdisiyy, Shamsuddjn AbIA Farj
AAbdurRahman, (1983), A1-Shar/i-ul KabAr (printed in the footnotes of al-Mughnj, vol. 5), p. 35.
See also: Shaykh Ibrahim ibn Muhammad ibn Salim ibn Duyn, op. cit., p. 114; Sayed Iskander
Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 40.
' 27The majority of Islamic scholars do not accept circumstantial evidence as an independent source
of proof in criminal cases because they believe it is more prone to error. This conforms to the
meaning of the Prophet's statement: "It is better if the Imam errs in forgiveness than if he errs in
punishment" (see Abdul Qadir AAwdah, Criminal Law of Islam, Vol. 1, Karachi, International
Islamic Publishers, p. 264; see also Abu Yusuf, op. cit). According to Shaykh AAbdullah al-
Harariyy, generally a confession could not be used against an accused where it had been obtained
by force even if it was supported by circumstantial evidence. The confession was a basis only if
the judge had his own personal knowledge of the issue, and was certain as to its truth (meeting in
Beirut, op. cit). The latter form of evidence is categorised as "Ailmul qadi" (judicial knowledge)
and is accepted among some of the scholars of the Shafi school. It is based on the status of the
judge himself. For the qualifications required of the qadi, see my earlier comments in the chapter.
28 Confirmed by Shaykh AAbdullah; meeting 11 March, 2000.
' 29Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, (1996), op. cit., p.41.
' 30Ma'moun M. Salama, op. cit., p. 119; Osman AAbdelMajek al-Saleh, op. cit., p. 73;
Muhammed AAta al-Sid SidAhmad, op. cit., p. 162. They maintain that this is implied from the
Prophet ' s questioning of Miz. They also rely on the hadith of the Prophet which means: "He who
has committed a big sin, he conceals and privately repents of it; but if he has revealed to us his
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"The Companions of the Holy Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)
avoided to inflict punishment which is unnecessary and preferred to
postpone it due to doubt, so that they used to say to a thief brought to
them: Have you committed theft? Say: No."3'
These concerns were also reflected in the requirements that the legal decision-
maker carefully examine the validity of the accused's confession, particularly in
cases of zina. 132 For the Hanafis' 33 and the Hanbalis,' 34 their carefulness was such
that they required the accused to repeat the confession four times and on four
different occasions. Some of the scholars from these schools also required
face, we administer the hadd punishment of Allah upon him"(narrated by Zayd bin Aslam, cited by
Al-Mawardi, ibid., footnote).
' 31 0p. cit., p. 357; original Arabic text, op. cit., p. 209. Some writers have argued (Muhammad
AAta al-Sid, supra) that judicial dissuasion was limited to cases where the accused voluntarily caine
forward, and did not apply where he was arrested following an investigation. The words of Abu
Yusuf, however, do not appear as restrictive, as it mentions the words "brought to them". Perhaps,
Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman is more accurate when he states that this practice was
"commendable", rather than a legal obligation imposed upon the judge (op. cit., p. 41), and that it
was subject to judicial discretion. It could also be argued that this was merely an illustration of the
fine qualities of a Qadi; namely, that he would not suspect another of wrong doing without valid
evidence.
132See the case of Ma"iz cited earlier.
' 33A1 Mawardi, Al Hawi al-Kabir, op. cit., vol. 17, p. 38; Abu Yusuf, op.cit., pp. 327-328;
Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, op. cit., p. 39; Sayed Sikander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 64;
Muhammad "Ata al-Sid SidAhmad, op.cit., p. 161. They base their opinion on the hadith of the
Prophet relating to M"iz. In the version reported by Imam Bukhari, the accused's confession was
accepted only after he had confessed a fourth time. The Shf'is and a majority of the Malikis held
that one confession was sufficient in all cases. They based their decision principally on the case of
Aseef, in which the Holy Prophet told Unais to "go to the woman, (and) if she confesses, stone her
to death." There is no mention in this hadith that the woman had to confess a specific number of
times or on different occasions. The Malikis reasoned that the hadith relating to the case of Ma"iz,
necessitated judicial questioning of the accused to ensure that he knew precisely the nature of the
offence to which he was confessing. See: Syed Iskander Shah, op. cit., p. 64; Bahnasi, Ahrned
Fathi, (1983), Nadzariyyat Al-Isb t Fi-1 Fiqh al-Jina"i Al-Islami, Dar Al-Shuruk, Beirut, p. 177;
Dr N. Sanad, (1991), The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility in Islamic Law, University
of Illinois, Chicago, p. 103; Muhammad "Ata al-Sid SidAhmad, op. cit., p. 162. In the Muwatta,
op. cit., Malik cites different prophetic traditions, some of which appeared to require the accused to
repeat his confession four times; others once (see pp. 390-39 1). Al-Mawardi maintained that the
school of Malik and of Ibn Abu Layla would not accept a confession for zina unless it was made
four times (it could be made at the same sitting): Al Hawi al-Kabir, (1994) Dar al-Fikr, Beirut,
Kitab ul-Hudud, Bab ul-Zina, p. 28.
' 34They required the accused to repeat his confession four times in cases of zina, and twice in theft
and hiraba cases Sayed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 67; Dr Anwarullah, op. cit., p. 43; Dr
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repetition in cases 0f theft. Abu Ysuf held that the accused should repeat his
confession twice. 135 Even in those cases where the accused had repeated his/her
confession, the four principal schools allowed the accused to retract it before any
punishment was administered.' 36 They based their rulings on the Sunnah,'37the
practices of the Companions of the Prophet' 38
 and on their consensus.' 39 These
scholars wanted to be sure that the accused was completely conscious of what s/he
was saying, and aware of the temporal consequences that would befall him/her.'4°
Nagaty Sanad, op.cit., p. 103; AAbdul Rahman al-Jaziri, op. cit., p. 74 (but this view is contradicted
without evidence by AAta al-Sid SidAhmad). They refer to the same proofs as Abu Yusuf.
' 35He relies upon a saying of Imam AAlj, the fourth Khalifah, who demanded that a man testify
against himself twice before applying the hadd punishment; see al-Mawardi, ibid; Abu Yusuf, op.
cit., p. 343. See also: Sayed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 67. He applied the same reasoning
to cases of intoxication when the smell of wine could be detected on the breath of the accused: Abu
Yusuf, op. cit., p. 342; Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, op. cit., p. 40. But according to Abu
Hanifah, these cases were different from zina, and ruled that the hadd punishment could be
imposed on the accused if he confessed once, so long as he was steadfast in the confession. Al-
Mawardi, Al-Hawi al-Kabir, op. cit., p. 209; Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, op. cit., p. 40;
Sayed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit., p. 67.
' 36This includes Abu Hanifah (see al-Mawardi, al-Hawi al-Kabir, op. cit., p. 43; Muhammed 'Ata al-
Sid SidAhmad, op. cit., pp. 163-164)and Abu Yusuf, op. cit., p. 343. The Malikis allowed the
accused to retract his confession in cases involving the rights of Allah, such as zina (adultery and
fornication), sariqah (theft), hirbah (robbery) and shurb (consuming intoxicants), so long as he
offered a reason (Malik, Muwatta, op. cit., p. 391; Muhammad AAta Al-Sid SidAhmad, op. cit., pp.
163-164). According to Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, the general position within the ShafAi school was that
an accused could retract his confession in hudd or non-hudud cases where only the rights of Allh
were involved (therefore theft would not be included; per Shaykh AAbdullah, meeting 11 March,
2000). The retraction, however, would have to be made expressly; al-Muhadzdzab, op. cit., Vol. 2,
p. 345. See also: Dr Anwarullah, op. cit., p. 57; Ma'mun M. Salama, "General Principles of
Criminal Evidence in Islamic Jurisprudence" in M. CherifBassiouni, (1982), The Islamic Criminal
Justice System, Oceana Publications, London, p. 119. The Hanbalis also allowed retraction in
hudud cases where the pure rights of Allah were involved; "Abdur .Rahman al-Jaziriyy, op. cit., p.
87.
' 37Specifically, they cite the hadith relating to M'iz (narrated by Abu Hurayrah and reported by
at-Tirmidhiyy), in which the Prophet, after seeing the former's attempt to run away, is reported to
have said to the stoners: "Why didn't you leave him?" They also cite the hadith which has general
application in cases relating to hudud, which means :"Avoid the hudud where there is doubt" (see
al-Mawardi, Al-Hawi al-kabir, op. cit., p. 44). The retraction, according to these scholars,
generates a doubt in the genuineness of the confession which prevents the hadd punishment from
being applied.
' 38They refer to sayings of "Umar al-Khattab (reported by al-Bayhaqiyy - see al-Mawardi, ibid., p.
45; Abu Yusuf, op. cit., p. 343).
' 39This is cited by al-Mawardi, ibid. See also: "Abd-ur-Rahman al-Jaziriyy, Kitab aI-Fiqh "ala al-
mnadha hi b-il Arb"ah, Dar al-Kutub al-"Ilmiyyah, Beirut, Lebanon, vol. 5, Kitab-ul Hudud, p. 87.
' 401t should be mentioned that Imam Shafi and his followers did not require the accused to repeat
his confession for any type of case. They relied upon the Prophet's instruction to Unays, as well as
upon the practices of Abu Bakr and "Umar al-Khattb (Al-Mawardi, Al-A hka,n al-Sultaniyyah, op.
cit., p. 316). There do not appear to be any differences within the Shafi school in this respect. See:
Al-Mawardi, Al-Hawi al-Kabir, op. cit; Abu Ishaq al-Shirazi, Al-Muhadhdhab, vol. 2, Matba"ah
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In spite of the concern to avoid punishment and to facilitate genuine repentance,
the rights of victims were not ignored. Hence, if the case Was categorized'41
Haqqun-Nas (a right of persons) retraction was never allowed) 42
 In this category
of cases, the rights of the victim predominated. Hence Abfl Yiisuf Wrote: "nothing
will render the verdict invalid due to his revoking the confession." 43 In other
AIsa Albani al-Halabi, Egypt, n.d., p. 343-345; Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, (1996), An
Introduction to Islamic Law of Evidence, Hizbi, Shah Alam, pp. 39-40. Nevertheless, they still
required careful questioning of the accused before accepting his confession. Hence, they explained
that in the hadith relating to MaAiz, the Prophet hesitated and did not record his confession the first
time because he doubted his sanity; see Ahmad Fathi Bahnasi, (1983), Nazariat al-Isbat Fi-1 Fiqh
al-Jina'i al-Islami, Beirut, Dar al-Shuruk, p. 177, cited in Syed Iskander Shah Haneef, op. cit, p.
64; Dr Nagaty Sanad, (1991), The Theory of Crime and Criminal Responsibility, University of
Illinois, Chicago, p. 103.
' 41 Not all cases which involved victims were categorized as "Haqqun-Nas." The categorization
related only to those offences which the scholars stated invested a right in the victim (or his heirs)
to remit punishment, such as: qadhf, qi
	 and diyyat, which were actionable in response to a
demand (see Al-Mawardi, Al-A hka,n as-Sultaniyyah, (1996), op. cit., p 323 and pp. 325 post et
seq. See also: Mahmud Saedon A.Othman (1991), Undang-Undang Keterangan Islam, op. cit., p.
46; Mohamed Hashim Kamali, (1995), Punishment in Islamic Law, Kuala Lumpur, Institut Kajian
Dasar, p. 73; Abdul Qadir AOudah, (1987), Criminal Law of Islam, Vol. 1, Karachi, International
Islamic Publishers, p. 111) Where the punishment was fixed, such as for "sariqah" (theft), this was
classified as a "Haqq AlIgh" nothwithstanding the presence of a victim.
' 42The Hanafis agreed that it was unnecessary for the accused to repeat his confession if the case
related only, or predominantly, to the rights of persons ; see Abu Yusuf, op. cit., p. 342.
' 430p. cit., p. 342. Although he states that revocation is valid in cases of theft, he subsequenUy
mentions that in cases of qisas, minor offences and property (my emphasis), the revocation will be
invalid. This suggest that the accused, when he is charged with theft, will not be allowed to deny
the victim his right to his property. The revocation, therefore, will work only to con-rn-lute the
punishment. For the similar Maliki view, see Al Qarafi, Shihab al-Din, (1976), Al-Dhakhirah, Dar al-
MaArifah Ii al-Taba'ah, Beirut, vol. vii, p. 126, cited in Anwarullah, op. cit., p. 58; Ibn AArabi,
Muhammad Ibn AAbdullah, (1972), Ahkam Al-Qu'ran, Dar alMaArifah, Beirut, vols 1-3, p. 506;
Al-Qurtubi, Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Al-Ansariyy, (1967) [1378A.H.], Al-Jami"a liAhkam Al-
Qu'ran ,vol. 18, Dar-ul Katib-ul 'Arabi, Cairo, p. 102; TahaJ. Al AAlwani , "The Rights of the
Accused in Islam (Part Two)", op. cit., pp. 515-516. The evidence allowing for retraction in cases
involving the pure rights of AIlh, is based on the hadith of the Holy Prophet who, when he heard
that Maiz had attempted to escape, is reported to have said: "I wish you had left him and brought
him to me." The reason the Malikis did not allow retraction in cases involving peoples' rights was
because the Qur'an informs: Nay man will be evidenced against himself; even if lie were to put his
excuses (Surah al-Qiyamah, verse 15). In the ShafAi school, if the offence entailed breaching the
rights of persons, such as: murder, intentional injuries against the person (qip) and cases of
imputation of fornication without witnesses (qadhf), the accused was not allowed to retract his
confession on the ground that the rights of persons (victims) could not be nullified by doubt; Abu
Ishaq al-Shirazi, op. cit.,p.345 (this is also the position of the Hanbali school; see Ibn Qudamah, a!
Mughni, op. cit., p. 288.) In cases of theft, the retraction would have no effect if the stolen goods
were subsequently found at the house of the accused (ie. the hadd would be imposed); per Shaykh
AAbdullah meeting 11 March 2000.
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offences which also involved a victim, but in which the Huququllah'(Rights of
Allah) were said to predominate, confessional rules recognized the interests of
victims only in part. Hence, for the offences of sariqah and hirabah, retraction
commuted the sentence; it did not frustrate the victim's right to his/her property.'45
iv) The Validity of Confessions Obtained Under Duress - Another View:
Notwithstanding the position held by these Islamic scholars, there was a body of
opinion, held across the four schools, that endorsed the application of duress to
certain types of accused persons and in specified situations. Their opinion also had
evidential foundations in the Sunnah of the Prophet. They cited the hadith relating
to the non-Muslim inhabitants of Khaybar' 46in which, according to al-Bayhaqi's
report of this event, 147 the Prophet handed the accused to Zubayr who tortured the
man in order to extract information or to obtain a confession.
Explicitly, this hadith referred to non-Muslims in a state of war, but a group of
scholars interpreted this as a general matter of politics and proper administration
which empowered a Qi, a Caliph, a properly appointed Amjr or his assistants, to
inflict duress upon accused persons where appropriate. They reasoned that where
144 This includes abandonment of religious obligations (such as prayer and fasting) as well as
commission of religious prohibitions where the punishments are stated specifically in the Qu'ran or
Sunnah and which are not open to pardon. See al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 95-96 and pp. 3 12-322.
' 45See footnote 140. According to Abu Yusuf (see p. 18), the companions "avoided to inflict
punishment" when they discouraged persons accused of theft who had been brought before them.
If the accused initially confessed to the crime, that confession would confirm the victim's right to
his property but it would not guarantee the liadd punishment for theft unless the accused remained
steadfast in his statement. Rationally, an accused person in possession of property which he knew
belonged to another may have thought he was guilty of theft and initially confessed. But on
subsequent reflection, he may consider his sin to be "handling stolen goods" (which is a tAazir
offence) and retract the initial confession.
' 46The substantive facts of this hadith were cited earlier.
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the rights of victims were involved, these powers could be exercised against those
whose previous behaviour resembled that of the non-Muslims of Khaybar (i.e.
they were known for their bad character), and against whom there were additional
reasons to suspect of the crime with which they had been charged.
For example, within the school of Imam Malik, Sahnun [died 240H/820CE]
accepted the truth and validity of an involuntary confession' 48and the majority of
Malik's companions validated beating for matters other than determining
judgement. Hence, in cases of theft, they allowed the detention and beating of an
alleged thief only for the purpose of cecoveric.g, the sto l eu roperty.'49
Similarly, in the school of Imam a1ShafAi, al-Mawardi [died 45OHI1O72CE],
among others,' 5° allowed duress in certain circumstances. The power to effect
duress on an accused depended on three matters: first, the amount of evidence
already amassed against the accused; second, which legal official had been
empowered to investigate the case; and third, whether the accused was known to
be pious and honest, or was well-known for his bad character. 15t
 In respect of the
first matter, if it was a case of "mere suspicion"[wahm] (i.e. there was no pre-
existing evidence against the accused), there was no power to question, detain or
force the accused to speak, irrespective of the nature of the office of the
' 47Su,zan al-A hkam, vol. 9, p. 137, cited in Taha J. a1AAIwani, ibid, p. 511.
145A1-Shatibi, Abu Ishaq Ibrahim, Al-I"tisam, Cairo, 1332 A.H., Vol. II, pp. 95-116, cited in
Mahmassani, S. (1987), Falsafat al-Tashri'fi al-Islam, Penerbitan Hizbi, Malaysia, p. 89.
' 49Ibid. This stolen property, however, could not be used to strengthen or corroborate the original
confession: Awad M.Awad, "The Rights of the Accused Under Islamic Criminal Procedure",
published in M. Cherif Bassiouni, (1982) The Islamic Criminal Justice System, Oceana
Publications, London, p. 106.
' 50Al-Mawardj's views are not isolated opinions within the ShafAi school. See also ar-Ramli [died
1004H/1584 CE], Nihjyat-ul Muhtgj, op. cit., p. 71, whose views are remarkably similar.
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investigating official, or of the background of the accused.' 521f, on the other hand,
suspicion against the accused was supported by some evidence, but not enough to
obtain a conviction [dzann] (eg. there was only one trustworthy male Muslim
witness, or there existed merely circumstantial evidence against the accused), the
situation was different. Where the investigator was a Qi (Judge), and the
accused was charged with zina (fornication/adultery) or theft' 53a1-Mawardi
maintained:
"this accusation is of no effect for him; he may not imprison him, be it to
investigate or to await his being proved innocent, and he may not proceed
after compelling him to confess" 54(emphasis added).
Any such compulsion which the judge authorised would invalidate any confession
obtained, even if the accused was known for committing offences similar to that
which he had been charged.155
These restrictions on applying duress to the accused, however, did not apply where
the investigator was an Amir (including his deputies or assistants)' 56 or a
' 51 A1-Mawardi, Abu jiasan, (1996), AlAhkam al-Sultaniyyah: The Lizws of Islamic Governance
[English trans. Dr Asadullah Yate], Ta-Ha Publishers, London, p. 309.
'52Ibid.
' 531n an earlier passage, al-Mawardi also applied this voluntariness rule to "riddah" (apostacy),
"bughat" (rebelling against the Caliph) and "hirabah" (highway robbery); ibid, pp 87-95.
' 54Ibid., p. 309.
5Ibid., p. 310.
56This refers to a military leader or governor appointed by the Caliph (not the people or their
elected representatives) and whose trustworthiness and religious credentials had been checked
before appointment. According to Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, if a confession had been
obtained coercively by Aadl (ie. just, trustworthy, avoids religious prohibitions, etc) police officers
from a person accused of theft and the goods were found where the accused stated them to be in his
confession, the judge could impose the appropriate punishment by relying upon their statements
(meeting, 11 March, 2000).
211
Muhtasib. According to al-Mawardi, the different scope of their powers was due
to "the Amir's concern with administration and the qadi's concern with the
laws." 57 He gave similar reasons for the differences in power between a Muhtasib
and a Qadi, stating:
"The Muhtasib has to exercise the sovereignty of a government official,
and so he may have recourse to the haughtiness and arrogance of the
forces of order when dealing with reprehensible matters, whereas the
judiciary may not: hisbah	 involves enforcement and any excessive
behaviour on behalf of the Muhtasib is not regarded as an injustice or
undue harshness; the Qi, however, is there to establish justice and should
rather act with gentleness and gravity - and so any departure from this,
such that he assumes the imperiousness of the hisbah, represents an
outrage and an excess: thus the sphere of each is different, and when the
authority of each is exceeded, the limits are infringed."58
In respect of the powers given to the Amir, he was allowed to imprison the
accused for the purposes of an investigation and enquiry. He was also empowered
to apply duress. A1-Mwardj continues:
"if the grounds for the accusation are sufficiently strong, the Amir may
have the accused beaten as a discretionary measure.. .in order to compel
him to be truthful regarding his situation and the crime of which he has
7Op. cit., p. 312.
158 op. cit., p. 340.
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been accused; if he confesses during the beating, then account must be
taken of the reason for the beating: if he has been beaten to compel him to
confess, this confession has no legal status; if however, it was to extract
the truth about his situation and he confesses during the beating, then the
beating is stopped and he is asked to confess again; f he confesses, then
he is judged according to this second confession, and not the first; if he
restricts himself to the first confession and a second is not asked of him,
then he is not put under any more pressure, because one proceeds
according to the first confession - although we dislike this"59(emphases
added).
Although al-Mawardi allowed beating to occur in this instance, it should be
mentioned that it was not to be applied as a customary practice. First, he mentions
that it is a discretionary measure. Second, he states that it was evidently better for
the accused to be asked to confess a second time when he was not being beaten,
and for the beating to stop even in the case of withdrawal or denial. It was better
for a confession to be given voluntarily, and not directly in response to a beating.
It is apparent, however, that he did not presume that a confession given under such
stressful circumstances would be untrue. Hence, he allowed the Amir's judgement
to proceed even on the basis of the first confession. The beating was seen as a
means for releasing the truth, as opposed to obtaining a confession per se.
' 590p. cit., p. 310. Ar-Ramli makes the same distinctions, op. cit. Al-Mawardi also comments that
the Amir (rather than the Qadi/Judge) was empowered to compel such an accused to swear on oath,
and to exert pressure on him during the course of an investigation, regardless of whether he was
charged with an offence involving the rights of Allah or the rights of man (op. cit., p. 311).
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It should also be noted, however, that even here the ability to apply duress
required strong grounds. It was incumbent upon the Amir to become actively
involved in the investigations and to check the statements of his assistants
regarding the circumstances of the accused. If he was satisfied with their
statements that the accused had carried out similar acts in the past, or that he had a
"suspicious character" or was known to be "a scoundrel", or (in cases of murder or
violent assault) there were signs of blows on his body or that he had been found
with a sharp instrument at the time, only then could he be subjected to "rough
treatment."160
In al-Mawardi's view, the Muhtasib (the Market Controller/Chief Inspector of
Police), had similar powers of intimidation.
	
In terms of investigative powers,
he was able to investigate serious crimes - both relating to hudud and qi 	 and he
could exercise them in an intimidatory manner. Yet, as with the Amir, in the
application of these powers recourse was always made to the character of the
accused and the amount of evidence against him or her.'62
According to the minority of the anafi school, the validity of coercion as a means
of extracting the truth was not dependent upon the status or office of the person
who used it. Ibn AAbidin [died 1252H/1802CE]' 63sanctioned beatings to obtain a
confession in proceedings before a Qpçi. So long as the accused had the capacity
' 600p. cit., p. 310.
' 61 0p. cit., p. 340.
' 62He is not allowed to punish a person merely on the basis of accusation or suspicion (op. cit., p.
347).
163 Ibn AAbidin's general position on coercion is confirmed by modern text writers. See: Taha J.
a1 AAlwani, "The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part Two)", op. cit., p. 511; Awad M. Awad,
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to commit the act to which he had confessed, had been charged with an offence
such as theft or killing (i.e. involving victims), and was "ma"rfun bi-h" (well-
known for it), the confession remained valid. 164
 However, he did not allow a Qadi
to use such powers against an accused who was "mawfan bi -alahi" (attributed
with good qualities).' 65
 The same considerations applied if the confession had
been obtained during extra-judicial proceedings carried out by an Amir and his
assistants. If the accused was well-known as a "scoundrel," he could beat the
accused to confess if the charge concerned the rights of people. Where, however,
the accused was "shareef' (widely respected), the AmIr (or a person specifically
delegated by the Sultaii) vias empo'eec oj
	 \\'t	 '4\c'
("bi-1 kalam khashan")) 66
 The presumption was that persons known for their prior
criminality would need to be pressurized more than those from respectable
backgrounds, if the authorities were going to be successful in securing a
confession. According to the editors of this text, these powers were also given to
ordinary members of the public where there had been a general break-down in law
and order and the Sultan had lost his authority.'67
Even some of the Hanafi scholars from the selaph era, 168
 seemed to have
endorsed, or at least tolerated, a similar approach. It was reported that AIm ibn
(1982), "The Rights of the Accused Under Islamic Criminal Procedure" in M. CherifBassiouni,
(1982), The Islamic Criminal Justice System, op. cit., p. 106.
' 64Muhammad Amin Ibn "Abidin, (1966), Radd ul-Muhtar "Ala ad-Durr-ul Mukhtar: Sharh
Tanweer al-A bsar, Vol. 6, 2nd Edition, Dar ul-Fikr (1979) [reprint], Kitab ul-Ikrah, pp. 128-129
and p. 140.
' 65 Ibid., p. 140.
' 66Ibid., pp. 128-129. Nevertheless, the power to question necessitated pre-existing evidence
against such an accused; see the earlier section of questioning.
'67Ibid., P. 129 (footnote).
' 68This spans the first 300 years after the migration of the Prophet to Medina. This period has
important connotations for Muslims, as the scholars of this era were deemed to have more piety
than the generations who came after them. The four great Imams: Abu 1-Ianifah, Malik, Shaf"i and
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Yusuf, a companion of Abu Hanifah's disciples Abu Ysuf and Muhammad a!-
Shaybani, indirectly approved an Amir's beating of a thief which had resulted in a
confession and the subsequent discovery of the stolen goods. On seeing the stolen
goods, he remarked: "Praise Allah! Never have I seen injustice appear so similar
to justice in this case."69
Duress was also validated in certain circumstances by those who purported to
follow the Hanbali tradition. Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah [died 728H11308J and his
student, Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah [died 751H11331], for example, endorsed
beatings of someone accused of theft (etc.) if he 'was io'ii
	 h \	 'ttt'i
and had a previous record for similar acts. According to Ibn al-Qayyim:
"if the accused is beaten in order to obtain his confession, and he does
confess, and then the stolen goods are found where he said they would be,
his hand may be severed. The sentence will not be carried out as a hadd
penalty on the basis of the confession obtained under duress, but because
the stolen goods were found where he, in his confession, had indicated
they would be."7°
It would appear from this account that beating an accused into a confession was
tolerated and validated even for hadd punishments. Although formally, the
Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and their companions, were all Selaph. They established their schools during
the rule of the AAbbasids
' 69See Taha J. A1 AA1wani ,
 "The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part two)", op. cit., p. 512.
' 70At-Turuk al-Hukmiyyahfi Siyasati-Shar"iyyah, n.d., Matb"ah al-Madani, Cairo, p. 104 (see
generally pp. 93-108). This is the translation ofYusufTalal Delorenzo, where the passage is
reprinted in Taha J. alAAlwani's article "The Rights of the Accused in Islam (Part Two)", op.
cit., p. 513.
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accused was formally convicted on the basis of the discovery of stolen goods in
the place where he said they would be found, this statement clearly encouraged
coercive methods for extracting information from accused persons.
Ibn aI-Qayyini's sheikh, Ibn Taymiyyah, argued on similar lines. He maintained
that if the accused was charged with sariqah (theft), hiraba (highway robbery), or
qi	 (murder and the like), that he was known for his bad character, and there
was corroborative evidence linking him with the crime, it was not prohibited for
the investigator (no restriction is made on the type of official) to extract his
confession by beating or detention.'71
Conclusion:
At the beginning of this chapter, I set out some of the principles and sources of
Islamic Law and emphasised its potential for plurality of opinion within defined
and consensual frameworks. In the analysis of rules pertaining to powers of
questioning and confessions, it was apparent that all of the applicable schools
accepted the validity of uncorroborated confessions for determining judgement,
irrespective of the nature of the case, severity of possible sentence or type of
accused. Further, none of the schools objected to questioning of the accused
provided there existed grounds for reasonable suspicion. At the heart of this
consensus lay an assumption that confessions were the "best evidence" and the
most reliable indication of truth. In rational terms, it was presumed that accused
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persons would not speak against their own interests unless it was the truth. But the
confession was also regarded as something spiritual; an acknowledgement of the
truth that would facilitate a Muslim's repentance (tawbah) and save him/her from
the torments of Hell. The grant of powers of questioning over such individuals
was a means by which they' 72could spiritually "purify" themselves as well as a
way of arriving at the truth.
For the majority of the scholars across the main schools, the rational and the
spiritual considerations coincided in their stipulation that confessions be
voluntary. Involuntary confessions were both unreliable indications of the truth
and unhelpful in facilitating the individual's repentance; for it was only a willing
acknowledgement of wrong-doing which would constitute part of the individual's
repentance. The Holy Qur'an states there is no coercion in matters of faith;' 73 true
belief comes from the heart.
This emphasis on repentance and voluntariness might indicate that respect for the
freedom of all individuals was a corner stone of Islamic criminal justice. But that
would be a reductive analysis. Individuals were graded in terms of their piety and
degree of adherence to the religion. Freedom from questioning, for instance,
depended on whether suspects were known for their religiousness, or simply
71 See Sayed Iskander Shah, op. cit., p. 41. He cites Abu al-Ainain al Fattah, (1983), Al-Qada wal
Ithbçtfi Fiqh al-Islam, Maktabat-al-Damaniyah, Egypt, pp. 304-306. He also referred to the
hadith of Ibn AUmar cited earlier, relating to the inhabitants of Khaybar.
' 72Yet, this means of releasing the truth was restricted to those, such as the "fsiqn" (big-sinners),
who were undeserving of the presumption of innocence. For the "muttaqun" (the pious), it was
prohibited to question them because it was suspecting bad behaviour which was in opposition to
the known fact of piety. Rationally, it might be said that if such people had committed an offence
questioning would be redundant in any case because they would not need any prompting. Indeed,
this was the practice of the aibah at the time of the Holy Prophet; see p. 5.
' 73 Swah al-Baqarah, verse 256.
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whether nothing was known about them. Other individuals, such as the Kgflr
(unbeliever)' 74 , Murtad (apostate) and Fasiq (big-sinner) enjoyed no such
Immunity. The scholars had understood that not everyone shared their discipline
nor their love for the religion. To have applied universal standards would have
been detrimental to the collective needs of the community for peace and security,
and against the rights of individual victims to seek redress or compensation.
Yet for some of the scholars, their interpretations of the religious sources
exhibited a different perspective on rationality and spirituality. 	 Their
understanding of the maqasid-ash-Shari"ah emphasised externals over internals;
active enforcement over repentance. It was an obligation to follow the Shari'ah
and religiously rewardable to "bid the good and prohibit the forbidden." If the
collective needs of the community and the rights of individual victims were to be
upheld, strong-arm methods were occasionally required. Truth did not always
come forward of its own accord; sometimes it had to be extracted. But even here,
religious gradation operated to mitigate potential abuse. Coercion was only
legitimated for irreligious Muslims' 75 with a previous record and who had been
accused of violating, in some respect, the rights of others.
The views of these scholars were not reserved for a particular generation. It is
apparent from the various opinions that I have collated, that these differences
' 74This includes the dhimmi (covenanted citizen of the Islamic state) and the harbi (non-muslim
with no treaty relations); see further, 1\Oudah, op. cit., pp. 331 post et seq.
751t might be thought that the prohibition of coercion against the dhimmi is inconsistent in this
respect. But their rights to be beaten and detained flowed, not from their religious status, but from
the specific contract which they had entered into with the Islamic state; see al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp
207-208. It should be regarded, therefore, as a specific exception which does not vitiate the
general rule.
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existed within and between the different generations. 'Im ibn Ysuf and
Sahnun, for instance, were contemporaries of Abu Yusuf and Malik, respectively,
but their views could not have been more different. Differences and agreements
existed side by side.
I also suggest that the substance and plurality of opinion was not necessarily
affected by the changes in administrative structure and the developing power of
the Islamic state. In the earlier chapters observing the developments in English
Law, I observed a gradual consensus of opinion regarding the appropriate
relationship between the individual and the state. The more powerful and
"welfarist" the state became, the more the accused was reduced to a "suspect"
with fewer freedoms and rights. In the juridical history of Islamic criminal justice,
however, even when the state was at its height during the rule of the "Abbasids,
scholars such as Ab Yusuf were still reprimanding the Caliph's governors for
abusing their powers and failing to accord the accused his/her proper role within
the system. Islamic scholars were striving independently to expound the correct
interpretation of Islamic Law as they saw it.
Although the administrative structure and respective power of the Islamic state
was generally irrelevant with respect to the formation of juristic opinion, it was far
from irrelevant when it came to its enforcement. The practical justice of the
Sharj"ah depended to a great extent on the qualifications and the integrity of those
who held power. Islamic law of confessions in general admitted extra-judicial
confessions when they were witnessed by two male Muslims, who satisfied all the
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conditions of Aadalah 176 This, in turn, was dependent upon the Amir who was
charged with appointing appropriate and suitably qualified persons to investigate
offences and enforce the Shari¼ah. The likelihood of the Amir to carry out this
function, however, was reliant upon the religious integrity and piety of the Wazir
of General Jurisdiction and the Caliph. If their qualifications and piety were
lacking, it would infect the whole system and the role which the accused was
purported to play. Instead of being marginal, duress and oppression had the
danger of becoming increasingly central as the Islamic state became more
separated from its religious essence. The collapse of "Abbasid rule in the
thirteenth century following the Mongol invasion was a disaster for the integrity of
the Islamic state. Although it was temporarily revived by the Ottomans, secular
authority was beginning to hold the reigns of power as royal clans set up their
independent states. Religious gradation which had been enshrined in Islamic law
would diminish as individual states embarked on their process of secularisation; a
process which did not seek to protect the individual or the community, but which
endeavoured to enforce secular and royal power.
I will suggest in the following chapter, that the process of "Islamisation," upon
which several Muslim states are currently embarking, should be read as a process
of "secularisation." I will also argue that it carries with it some serious
76 For the Maliki position, see: Ma"moun M. Salama, "General Principles of Criminal Evidence in
Islamic Jurisprudence" in M. CherifBassiouni, (1982), The Islamic Criminal Justice System,
Oceana Publications, London, p. 119. For the Shaf'i position, see: Mahmud Saedon Awang
Othman, (1996), op. cit., p. 40; Ma"moun M. Salama (1982), op. cit., p. 119; Dr Nagaty Sanad,
(1991), op. cit., p. 103. For the Hanbali position, see: Ma'moun M. Salama, op. cit., p. 119.
According to Abu Hanifah and other Hanafi scholars, a confession would be invalid in cases
categorized as "Haqqullah" unless it was made in a court and before a judge; see Ma'moun M.
Salama, op. cit., p. 119; Dr Nagaty Sanad, op. cit., p. 103. It was unnecessary, however, for it to be
made in judicial proceedings. A special session of the court set aside for that purpose would be
sufficient; Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, op. cit., p. 40.
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consequences for accused persons which, if not addressed, could impact on the
perceived legitimacy of Islamic Law itself.
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Chapter Six
The "Islamisation" of Criminal Justice: Contextualising the Role of the
Accused in a Muslim State; a Case Stud y on Malaysia
Introduction:
Islamic development in Malaysia needs to be understood in the context of the
historical decline of the Caliphate and the development of autonomous Muslim
states. In the absence of this over-arching religious and political framework,
Muslim states (such as Malaysia) have engaged in a "rationalization" process
through a series of compromises with social and cultural influences antithetical to
Islam.' In the pre-colonial period2 when the Malay states were under the influence
of purportedly "Islamic" rulers who were given the titles of "Khaljfatu'l
Mu'minin" (Caliph of the Faithful) and "Zillu' Allhi fi-1 Aalam" (the so-called
'Shadow' of God on Earth), 3 a hybrid system of criminal justice developed in
which Malay customary law! "adat" mixed uncertainly with the Sharj"ah and
Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, "Towards a Syariah-based Society: Religious Rationalization and
the Development of the Islamic Legal Order in Malaysia", Jurnal Antropologi Dan Sociologi
(1990), Vol. 18, p.41.
2See further: Ibrahim, A., Saedon, M. and Hassan, M.K. (1992), "Islamisation of the Malay
Archipelago and the Impact of Al-Shafi's Madhhab on Islamic Teachings in Malaysia,"
International Islamic University Law Journal, K.L., Vol. 2; Balogun, S.U. (1997), "The Status of
Shari'ah in Malaysia," Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. XX, no. 2; Sandu and Wheatley (eds) (1983),
Melaka- The Transformation of a Malay Capital - c. 1400-1980, Vol. 1, K.L., Oxford University
Press.
3See the Undang-Undang Melaka, Bibliotheca Indonesia, Koninklijik Institut Voor Taal Land-En
Volkekunde, Leiden, Volume 13, introduction, lines 45-46.
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Islamic belief. 4
 In the various legal digests compiled under the auspices of the
Malay Sultans, 5
 the protections which the Shari"ah afforded to accused persons
through a system of religious gradation6
 and through adherence to religious
criteria in the appointment of officials, were either absent or expressed
equivocally. 7
 Although rules pertaining to duress appeared to conform in part to
the school of Imam Shaf"i, 8
 they co-existed and interacted with customary rules
which stressed traditional authority9and which seemed, at times, to subvert
categorisations made by Islamic scholars.'° As a result of political and religious
4The Malay criminal procedure of ordeal provides explicit evidence of fusion between the two
traditions (see the Undang-Undang Melaka, ibid., lines 458-475). For further evidence of hybridity
mentioned in texts other than the Undang-Undang Melaka and Undang-Undang Law', see W.H.
Shellabear (1967), Sejarah Melayu, Fajar Bakti, p. 28; Abdul Monir b. Yaacub, "Ulama Dan Fiqh
Di Malaysia," IKIM Law Journal (1997), Vol. 1, No. 1.
5See: Undang-Undang Melaka, ibid, (trans) Liaw Yock Fang, (1976), The Laws of Melaka, The
Hague, Martinus Nijhoff; Undang-Undang Laut (Maritime Code), (trans) Stamford Raffles (1879)
"The Maritime Code of the Malays," Journal of the Southern Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
No. 3, pp. 62-84; i.E. Kempe and R.O. Winstedt, (eds) (1947), "A Malay Legal Digest Compiled
for "Abd al-Ghafur Muhaiyu'd-din Shah, Sultan of Pahang 1592-16 14," Journal of the Malayan
Branch of the RoyalAsiatic Society (1948), Vol. 21, Pt 1, pp. 1-67; R. Winstedt and P.E.J. de
Jong, "A Digest of Customary Law from Sungai Ujong," Journal of the Malayan Branch of the
Royal Asiatic Society, (1954), Vol. 27, Pt 3, pp. 1-71; R. Winstedt, "Legal Digest from Perak,"
Journal of the Malayan Branch of the RoyalAsiatic Society, (1953), Vol. 26, Pt. 1.
6This means that the powers granted to officials or other individuals to question an accused, and the
limitations on these powers, depended on whether he was known to have committed offences
against the Shari"ah. Chapter six of the Undang- Undang Melaka authorises ministers of state to
'examine' ("periksa") accused persons during investigations ("siasat") [line 169] and chapter 35
(see infra) allows questioning to clarify what the accused may have confessed [line 1596]; but there
are no signs of any relevant religious categorisations. See also the Maritime Code which appears
to allow questioning of both a slave's master (Raffles, JSBRAS, 1879, op. cit., p. 83) and a
Nakhoda (ibid, p. 84) without any religious qualification.
7The Pahang Legal Digest contains the most direct references to religious criteria in the
appointments to ministerial and legal office; but the Undang-Undang Melaka itself refers to
traditional rules of appointment (termed "kanun"; ibid, chapter 1.3, lines 8 1-83) rather than to the
Islamic. There are no references to a required level of religious knowledge nor to Aadalah. There
are more specific religious requirements mentioned of the Sultan's ministers, but it has been argued
forcefully that these are part of the Undang- Undang Negeri which is an independent text that was
copied and added later to the Undang-Undang Melaka (see Liaw Yock Fang, The Laws of Melaka,
op. cit., p. 36). It seems to have been incorporated by one of the compilers of the code as a
religious "reminder" rather than as legal doctrine.
8 Undang-Undang Melaka, op. cit., chapter 35, lines 1581-1598; Liaw Yock Fang, op. cit., p. 149.
9See: Undang-Undang Melaka, op. cit., chapter 1.2, lines 74-79, chapter 12 (infra).
'°See chapter 12 of the Undang-Undang Melaka in particular, which appears to convert the ijadd
offence of zin (which scholars classified as haqq Allah) to ta'zir and haqqun-Nis, by empowering
the judge to order the guilty party to surrender himself to the wronged party or to fine him ten and a
quarter tahil if he refuses (ibid., lines 374-377). In the latter section of the same chapter which
appears to apply to rape (zina b-il jabr), the perpetrator is given a choice to marry his victim or to
pay a fine (lines 394-400).
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conflict between the various layers which made up Malay society," it was
probable that those charged with administering the law were given a discretion as
to which law to apply' 2and, as a consequence, accused persons might not have
been guaranteed the protections which the Shar"ah provided.'3
The hybridity within the system was given a further injection of non-Islamic
influence after the arrival of the colonial powers who utilised initially, and then
adapted, existing legal structures for their own purposes.' 4 The only Malay
official involved in the administration of criminal justice to survive colonial rule
was the Penghulu or Village Headman. Yet, he was no longer the representative of
Islamic or customary authority; he had become an agent of the new colonial
regime.' 5 The legal infrastructure of the ancien regime consisting of Sultan,
Bendahara, Temenggung and Syahbandar was replaced eventually by an English
"See: C.H. Wake, "Melaka in the Fifteenth Century: Malay Historical Traditions and the Politics
of Islamisation," in Sandhu and Wheatley, op. cit., pp. 146-15 1; J.E. Kempe and R.O. Winstedt
(1952), "A Malay Legal Miscellany," Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society,
Vol. 25, Pt. 1, pp. 17-18. There is also some evidence to suggest that the method of proselytization
taken by Muslim missionaries took account of traditional Hindu and Buddhist customs and
sensitivities; see Mohd Taib Osman, "Islamisation of the Malays: A transformation of culture," in
Taniadun di Malaysia (1980), op. cit., pp. 1-7; Syarifah Zaleha Syed Hassan (1990), op. cit., pp.
41-53.
' 2See Tome Pires, (1944), The Suma Oriental, The Hakluyt Society, 2nd Series, No. XC, p. 241.
The factual dominance of one over the other may have depended on the religious zeal of the sultan;
see: W.R. Roff (1974), Kelantan, Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State, Oxford
University Press, K.L.; H. Clifford, "Expedition: Terrangganu and Kelantan," JMBRAS, (1961),
Vol. 38, Pt. 1; B.Watson Andaya, "Melaka Under the Dutch, 1641-1795," in Sandhu and
Wheatley, op. cit., pp. 195-237.
' 3This evidence of hybridity leads one to doubt the accuracy of the assertions of Tun Salleh Abas
that Islamic Law was applied throughout Dar-ul Islam before those states became the victims of the
western colonial powers; see "Perlaksanaan Undang-Undang Islam di Malaysia," Jurnul Hukum
[1404H], p. 143.
14 See B.Watson Andaya, op. cit; C.M. Turnbull, "Melaka under British Colonial Rule," in Sandhu
and Wheatley, op. cit, pp. 242-293.
' 5This was given official recognition in Melaka which was under direct British rule (see: A.H.
Dickinson, "The History of the Creation of the Malacca Police," Journal of the Malayan Branch of
the Royal Asiatic Society, (1941), Vol. 19., Pt 2, p. 252). In other states, the Penghulu was used
informally according to particular circumstances (see infra).
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policing' 6
 and judicial system with its own set of competing values.' 7
 Islam was
incorporated instead within the "court system" established and then administered
by the British through the formal authority of the Sultan and the State Council
operating within each state.' 8
 They enacted laws providing for courts, personnel
and procedure for those professing the religion of Islam. 19 These laws, including
the codes relating to evidence and procedure, 2° were based on principles of
English law adapted to the colonial context. 21 Non-Muslims and colonials were
16 See further: P. Morrah, "The History of the Malayan Police," Journal of the Malayan Branch of
the Royal Asiatic Society, (1963), Vol. 36, Pt 2, No. 202; Hasan Yusoff, (1983), Perhubungan
Polis Dan Orangramai Di Malaysia - Satu Kajian Kes Tentang Sikap Penduduk-Penduduk Kuala
Luinpur, Masters Thesis, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, Bangi, Malaysia.
17 Tensions between crime and social control and due process were transported inevitably to the
colonies. While the evidential and procedural framework seemed more protective than that enacted
in England because of liberal sympathies and suspicions of malpractice by the new police forces in
Britain's colonies (see: sections 25, 26 of the Evidence Ordinance; section 113(1) of the old
Criminal Procedure Code;Empress v Babulal (1884), 6 All 509 (FB), per Mohammood J at
532,Abdul Ghani Bin Jusoh & Anor v Public Prosecutor [1980] 1 MU 25 (FC), per Wan
Suleirnan FJ at 27), there were still "gaps" and "devices" that could be exploited. There was no
prohibition on police questioning of the accused per se and no requirement for it to take place in
public or in the presence of an independent party. Questioning was not preceeded by any caution.
Although section 24 of the Evidence Ordinance (which referred to confessions) contained the same
protections as English law, it also had the same "get out" clauses. Sections 25 and 26 applied only
to "confessions" and not to other statements obtained from the accused. Case law also facilitated
the practice of using Penghulus, who had powers of arrest (see Mimi Kamariah Majid (1987)
Criminal Procedure in Malaysia, University of Malaya, K.L., p. 30), rather than "police officers"
to question accused persons thereby enabling the police to avoid the protection afforded by
sections 25 and 26 altogether (see: Jubri bin Haji Salleh v Public Prosecutor [1947] MU 88, CA,
where the Court admitted a confession made to a Penghulu because he did not have the same
powers as a police officer and could not be regarded as such).
' 8 See further: M. Yegar, (1979), Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya: Policies and
Implementation, The Magnum Press, Jerusalem; Syarifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, (1990), op. cit., pp
45-47.
19These laws, however, referred only to: matrimonial offences; unlawful sexual intercourse;
consumption of intoxicating liquor; offences relating to the spiritual aspects of individual and
communal life; offences connected to the teaching of Muslim doctrines, and to conversion;
see Mahmud Zuhdi, (1984), Criminal Responsibility in English and Islamic Law, op. cit., pp. 267-
268. In the Federated States, the majority of criminal laws were enacted first through a central body
under the direction of a British Resident General, and then through the British-directed Federal
Council; see R. Emerson, (1979), Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule, University of
Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, p. 139. For detailed treatment of the wider structure of "indirect
rule", see Jan Pluvier (1974), South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence, Oxford
University Press, K.L., pp. 12-15.
20 See: the Evidence Ordinance and the Code of Criminal Procedure.
21 See: Azizan bin Abdul Razak, "The Law in Malacca Before and After Islam," in Tamadun di
Malaysia, op. cit. Administrative familiarity and confusion over the precise relationship between
Aadat
 and Islamic law (see R. Emerson (1979), Malaysia: A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule,
University of Malaya Press, K.L., p. 139), led to the importation of the Indian Penal Code of 1860
and the Indian Evidence Act 1872. These were adopted officially by the Federated States through
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now pulling the strings of a criminal justice system whose values were orientated
within a secular legal structure. Islam had become marginalised as a "personal
law" rather than a law of general application.22
The de facto divorce between the state and Islam under the influence of
colonialism, gave rise to the perspectives which inspired Za'ba's typologies which
I set out in chapter four. The role that the accused has played within these
perspectives has never been set out or explored, but certain observations can be
made if we apply their broad orientation. One might expect The Kaum Tha, Thi
instance, to reflect the positions outlined in chapter six, with particular emphasis
on the school of Imam Shaf'i. Thus, powers given to state officials would reflect
the religious status of the person whom they wanted to question, as well as their
degree of Islamic knowledge and Aadalah. Confessions would be valid only if
obtained before a Qi or in front of two 'adil witnesses. Any confessions
secured while the accused was detained, in hand-cuffs or through beating would
be inadmissible or discouraged. 23
 Invalid confessions would remain invalid
irrespective of the discovery of circumstantial evidence suggesting their truth. And
finally, if the offence related to the rights of Allah, the accused would be able to
retract his confession but not if it related predominantly to the rights of persons.
the Penal Code and the Evidence Enactment of 1909 (see The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia,
Evidence Act 1950, Malayan Law Journal, (1996), K.L., p. 1).
22This should not be understood as implying that Islam had "stagnated" under colonial rule and
influence; indeed, in terms of education, links between religious schools in Mekkah, Medina,
Jeddali, Baghdad, Damascus and the Azhar in Egypt were enhanced (see: Syarifah Zaleha Syed
Hassan, (1990), op. cit., p.44; Mohd Taib Osman, "Islamisation of the Malays: A Transformation
of Culture", op. cit., p. 7. For more detailed treatment of the development of Islamic education, see
Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan, "The Development of Islamic Education in Kelantan", in Tamadun Di
Malaysia, op. cit., pp. 190-223). Rather, its values and laws had been made structurally inferior.
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The position of the accused within the projections of the Kaum Muda is more
difficult to assess. This is for the simple reason that within their framework,
interpretation of Is1m's primary sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah, are released
from the confines of previous juridical opinion. This leaves open the possibility of
interpretations which are in contrast to the received wisdom but are justified still
according to verses of the Qur'n and to certain statements of the Holy Prophet.
The role of the accused within the Modernist paradigm is easier to predict. This
would apply a fundamentally secular model, according powers to state officials
and rights to accused persons that reflected secuar cctecia. 	 'cik
"personal" matter, and would be irrelevant in the general administrative affairs of
the state. In all probability, this would mean a continuation or adaptation of the
values and principles of English Law that had been applied during the colonial
period.
I suggest that Za'ba's typologies, and the role which the accused has played within
them, may provide a useful insight into "Islamisation" intiatives when examined
in the context of the structural and historical forces which have influenced
developments in criminal justice in Malaysia since Independence. The rest of this
chapter then, will examine how they have been reflected in existing and proposed
rules pertaining to questioning and confessions within the "new" Malaysia.
23The ShafAi scholars al-Mawardi and al-Ramli permitted coercive techniques to "release the truth"
but did not encourage it; see further, chapter five.
228
This chapter will begin with a summary of the new constitutional set-up, and the
structure of criminal justice which the new Malaysian government inherited and
then continued. This will include a detailed treatment of the organizational values
of the Malaysian police force through a contextual analysis of statements of their
premier officers, through case law in the High Court and through an analysis of
relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Police handling of the
Arqam Movement and the case of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim,
will also provide recent examples of these operative values.
The second part of the chapter will concentrate on movements within Islamic Law
itself through an analysis of reported cases on iqrar in the Syariah24
 Courts and
current strategies for "Islamisation". The latter will refer, in particular, to rules of
questioning and of confessions that have been stated in the government-sponsored
Federal Territories Syariah Laws of 1997, in the PAS-proposed Hudud Bill of
1993 and in relevant state legislation referring to evidence and criminal procedure.
The final part of the chapter will analyse these existing and proposed rules in the
context of the over-arching structure of the system described in the first section of
the chapter.
2. The structure of criminal justice under "new" constitutional arrangements
The operation of Malaysia's criminal justice system since Independence, and the
role which the accused has played and is likely to play in it the foreseeable future,
cannot be divorced from the constitutional framework that was set up, nor from
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the cultural values of its founding fathers. The orientating ethos of this framework
was secularist. That is not surprising because first, the majority of indigenous
political leaders belonged to the Western-educated intellectual elites; 25and second,
the composition of the various states of Malaya had changed appreciably under
colonial rule.26
As a result of migration from China and from the Indian subcontinent during
British rule, Malaya had become an ethnically tripolar state with large groups of
ethnic minorities having religious beliefs that were associated, generally speaking,
with their ethnicity; Malays were Muslims, 27 Chinese and Indians were non-
Muslim. 28 Moreover, because of de facto ethnic separation, each of the
communities was deeply suspicious of the other. 29 In this context, sections of the
Malay intellectual elite, corresponding to Za'ba's Modernist typology, began to
regard the development of "Malayan nationalism" and secularism as pre-requisites
for self-government. As early as 1951, Dato Onn had founded the Independence of
Malaya Party upon a secular creed: "to unite the people in common loyalty,
irrespective of creed, class or race and 'to work together towards the goal of an
independent state of Malaya."3°
24This is the Malaysian spelling of "Sharj'ah."
25J Pluvier, (1974), South-East Asia from Colonialism to Independence, Oxford University Press,
Kuala Lumpur, p. 78.
260n Independence, Malaya was no longer a predominantly Muslim country. In 1962, 44% were
Muslim; 43% Buddhist; 11% Hindu and 2% Christian. See: Wan Hussein Azmi, "Islam di
Malaysia: Kedatangan dan Perkembangan," in Tamadun di Malaysia, op. cit., p. 150.
27This was given official recognition by the Federal Constitution which stated that Malays are
Muslims; see further, Wu Mm Aun, (1990), The Malaysian Legal System, Longman Malaysia,
Petaling Jaya, p. 37.
285ee Wan Hussein Azmi, op. cit.
29See: Wu Mm Aun, ibid; J. Pluvier, op. cit. ,p. 401.
30Ibid., p. 336.
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Nevertheless, the Malay community still retained its Muslim identity and the
Malay rulers, in particular, sought guarantees that in the new constitutional set-up
Islam would be given a special status. It was felt necessary, therefore, to balance
the perceived need for non-communalism with the need to retain a semblance of
Islmic identity. This was given effect by Articles 3 and 11 of the new Federal
Constitution. Under Article 3, Islam was made "the religion of the Federation" and
its followers protected against other religious beliefs by virtue of Article 11(4)
which provided that "state law and in respect of the Federal Territory, federal law
may control or restrict the propagation of any religious doctrine among persons
professing the religion of Islam." At the same time, non-Muslims were given
freedom of religious belief and to proselytise among other non-Muslims. Thus
under Article 11(1), the Federal Constitution stated: "Every person has the right to
profess and practise his religion and, subject to Clause (4), to propagate it."
Although Islam was the official religion of the country, the new Federation of
Malaya was not an Islamic state (in spite of recent attempts to have it defined
otherwise31 ). This was emphasised by the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul
Rahman, who stated during a debate in the Federal Legislative Council:
31 See Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MU 55, where the Supreme Court, in a
unanimous decision delivered by Salleh Abbas L.P., held that "Islam" in Article 3 referred only to
rituals and ceremonies. They stated also that it did not imply that Malaysian law should be imbued
with Islamic principles. See also: Muhamad Suffian Hashim, "The Relationship between Islam and
the State in Malaya", Intisari, Vol. 1, p. 8; Ahmad Ibrahim (1978), The Position of Islam in the
Constitution of Malaysia, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 48-49.
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"I would like to make it clear that this country is not an Islamic State as it
is generally understood, we merely provide that Islam shall be the official
religion of the State."32
Secularism, therefore, was the official ideology and its essential orientating
cultural value. It would be a mistake, however, to associate this secularism with
liberalism or with its underlying notions of the primacy of the individual.
Although Part II of the Federal Constitution set out "Fundamental Liberties,"
including rights of non-discrimination, and Article 5 promised: "No person shall
be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with law," 33 the Malayan
State and its organs of enforcement were endowed with considerable powers.
The new Federation of Malaya had been formed in the context of an ongoing
confrontation with communist guerilla forces and, since 1948, had been in the grip
of an officially declared Emergency. 34 The original constitution, therefore,
incorporated "special provisions" that would exempt the executive and legislature
from compliance with provisions protecting fundamental rights and the stated
division of powers between the Federation and indivdual states, 35when passing
ordinances and legislation to target subversive elements during periods of
"Emergency." Following Independence,36 states of emergency were proclaimed on
four occasions (1964, 1966, 1969 and 1977), with some overlapping others. The
32Official Report of the Legislative Council Debates, 1 May 1958; cited in Wu Mm Aun, op. cit.,
p. 37.
33Article 5(3) also states that the accused has a right to consult a lawyer.
34This first period of emergency lasted until 1960.
35See further, Wu Mm Aun, op. cit., pp. 179-189.
3OThe 1948 declaration of emergency remained until 1960.
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emergency proclaimed in 1969 to contain racial riots, was never revoked and
technically remains in force.37
The perceived need for a strong and secure central state with a very limited role
accorded to individual rights, is reflected in the powers that have been given to the
Royal Malaysian Police Force. It was noted earlier 38
 that colonial legislators,
fearful of widespread abuse and malpractice, were reluctant to accord the police
the same degree of powers that had been handed to police in England. It was
envisaged that the magistrate would play a more active and supervisory role.
Following Independence, however, Malaysian legislators thought it necessary to
equip the police with more powers, and proceeded to pass a number of statutes39
which gave them legal authority to formally question and obtain "caution
statements" from the acccused which would be admissible for all purposes. When
the Criminal Procedure Code was amended in 1976,40 these powers were extended
to cover all areas of police investigation.
Sub-section (1) of the new section 113 of the CPC admits in evidence "any"
statement of the accused, made to "or in the hearing of' any police officer of the
rank of Inspector or higher, and "whether or not wholly or partly in answer to
questions by that person." Similar to English legislation, these police powers are
balanced with procedural "safeguards" for the accused, through a statutory caution
37See Wu Mm Aun, ibid.
38See footnote 17.
39See: the Internal Security Act 1960, s. 75; Kidnapping Act 1961, s. 15; Prevention of Corruption
Act 1971, 5. 15. These existed in addition to legislation that had been passed at the end of the
colonial era, such as the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952, s. 37A, and the Emergency Regulations 1948,
reg. 33. For further details, see: Mimi Kamariah Majid, (1987), Criminal Procedure in Malaysia,
University of Malaya, Kuala Lumpur, pp. 80-82.
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upon arrest and the requirement that all such statements be given without "any
inducement, threat or promise." Yet, these safeguards have little impact because
questioning can take place without the above caution if the accused is not
technically under arrest. 41 The only protection afforded to the accused lies in
section 112 of the CPC, as subsections (2) and (4) state that a police officer "shall
first inform" such a person that s/he is not bound to answer any question which
would have a tendency to expose him to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.
Unlike section 113, however, there is no legal sanction if the police officer fails to
do so.
Further, the voluntariness requirement appears unenforceable. Even where the
suspect is under arrest and detained in custody, there is no requirement for tape
recording to take place or for an independent party, such as a lawyer, to be present
during the investigation.42 The police can continue questioning the accused for up
to fifteen days, without the presence of a lawyer, and without informing the
accused of his right to consult one,43 so long as they can convince a Magistrate
that further detention is necessary because "it appears that the investigation cannot
40See now the Criminal Procedure Code, FMS Cap 6; Act A324.
41 This was given official recognition by the Federal Court in Jayaraman & Ors v Public
Prosecutor [1982] 2 MU 306. As with English law, the person is not under arrest unless he is
touched with a view to detention, or a form of words are used that are calculated to and bring to his
attention that he is under compulsion; see Mimi Kamariah Majid, op. cit., p. 23. It is not an arrest,
therefore, if the person is merely "helping the police with their enquiries;" see Shaaban & Ors v
Chong Fook Kam &Anor [1969] 2 MU 219 at 220. Although the person has a right to remain
silent whether before or after arrest (see Karpal Singh v Attorney-General Malaysia [1987] 1 MU
76), he has no right to be informed of this until after arrest under the cautioning procedure.
42The Federal Court in Ooi Ah Phua v Officer in Charge Criminal Investigation, KedahlPerlis
[1975] 2 MU 198, held that although the accused has a right to consult a lawyer upon arrest by
virtue of Article 5(3) of the Federal Constitution, that right cannot be "exercised" immediately after
arrest because of the duty of the police to protect the public from wrongdoers by apprehending
them "and collecting whatever evidence exists against them"; per Suffian L.P. at 200. This
position was taken a step further in Hashim bin Saud, see below.
43See: Hashim bin Saud v Yahaya bin Hasim &Anor [1977] 1 MU 259.
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be completed within the period of twenty four hours."
	 There will be no
evidence, therefore, that the statutory caution has been given or that an
inducement, threat or promise has not been made, apart from the police officers
themselves.
The Federal Court has also made it more difficult to establish involuntariness.
Although the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that a confession is obtained voluntarily, 45
 in Abdul Ghani bin Jusoh46the
court held that a signature or thumb print on any statement of the accused is prima
facie evidence of its voluntariness.47
 This leaves the accused with the difficult
task of establishing that the confession was obtained involuntarily to the
satisfaction of the court.48
It is apparent from this account that the police have been given a de facto
discretion by the legislature and the Malaysian courts in relation to their conduct
of investigations. The scope of their powers of questioning, and the unenforceable
44Section 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is clear from judicial decisions that the purpose
of this detention is not to prevent flight, but to complete the investigation. See further: Hashi,n bin
Saud v Yahya bin Hashim & Anor [1977] 1 MU 259, per Harun J at 262; Maja Anak Kus v Pubic
Prosecutor [1985] 1 MU 311. Prevention of abuse rests with the ability of the Magistrate to
observe accurately what has occurred during detention of the accused from the arresting officer's
police diary.
45Public Prosecutor v Kambe bin Raspani [1989] 3 MU 269; Dato Mokhtar Hashini v Public
Prosecutor [19831 232.
46[l98l] 1 MLJ25 at 28.
47Arguably, this position has statutory justification through section 114 of the Evidence Act 1950.
This states that the court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened. This may include the fact "that judicial and official acts have been regularly perfornied"
(illustration (e)).
48The Malaysian courts have interpreted "if the making of the confession appears to the court" in
section 24 of the Evidence Act 1950 as implying an evidential burden of proof on the accused, but
with a lower standard of proof than that required of the prosecution. A "well-grounded conjecture"
based reasonably upon circumstances disclosed in the evidence is sufficient; see Public Prosecutor
v Law Say Seck & Ors [1971] 1 MU 199. However, there is no necessary reason why there should
be any evidential burden on the accused on the wording of section 24. A bald allegation of
235
limits to those powers, has meant that protection of accused persons has not been a
focul concern.
It is submitted that this climate of state power has generated a culture of executive
"untouchability" in the enforcement of criminal justice, and has had a profound
effect on the value orientation of the police force. They have regarded themselves
as a
	 political organisation as opposed to one that is concerned merely with
enforcing the substantive law. Indeed, Tan Sri Mohd Haniff Omar, the former
Ketua Polis Negara (Chief Commissioner of Police), admitted candidly that he
regarded the police force as an extension of government. He stated:
"The Police is the executive right arm of the Government in the
maintenance of law and order"49
 (emphases added).
According to him, allegiance, is not to "law", the Federal Constitution or to the
Malaysian people, 5° but to the government of the day. "Policing" is not simply
about the detection and apprehension of criminals; it is also about "removing
threats to the peace and tranquillity of the populace" originating from
"communal/racial/religious issues or differences, communist-inspired political
agitation, student unrest or industrial dispute;" 5 ' as the government perceives it.52
involuntariness is equally consistent with the wording of the section, for it does not state the
allegation must be "well-grounded."
49Mohd Haniff Omar, (1990), Kepolisan Dan Keselamatan, AMK Interaksi, Kuala Lumpur, p. 51.
501n a later chapter of his book, he equates the government with the people: "The government and
not the people is our direct and immediate employer but our government is the government of the
people in a free expression of choice" (ibid., p.400).
SI Ibid., pp. 52-53, emphases added.
52For the Malaysian government's perception of the relationship between "national security" and
Islam, see Government of Malaysia White Paper, 8/11/84. After this paper, the following religious
groups were placed under the Internal Security Act 1960: Golongan Rohaniah, KARIM, Golongan
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The political nature of the police function is clearly expressed in the role and
position given to the Inspector General of Police (IGP) who is the third most
senior public servant in the Malaysian government. He meets with all permanent
secretaries of the ministries once a month, to appraise them of any problems that
need addressing and those "of national and grave importance, particularly (to)
those engendered by race, language and religion."53 He also sits on the National
Security Council where similar matters are discussed. 54 If any Muslim groups are
causing disturbances among non-Muslims, the IEGP can appeal to the Conference
of Rulers (held four times a year), which is empowered to pass measures against
such Muslim groups in any Malaysian state. 55 All matters pertaining to race,
religion and the functioning of Malaysia's government, potentially, are within the
scope of "national security." 56 Tan Sri Mohd Haniff Omar gives the latter a very
broad definition. He states:
"It is related to the national interest of the country which can be described
as the forging of a strong, united, socially just, economically equitable,
progressive Malaysian nation through the process of parliamentary
democracy"57(em phases added).
Crypto, the Haji Muhammed Kamaruddin Group, Golongan Mohd. Nasir Ismail and Tentera
Sabilullah.
53Ibid., p. 72.
54Ibid.
55 Ibid., p. 73.
56This triggers the powers conferred under the Internal Security Act 1960.
57Ibid., p. 197.
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Any person or group which is perceived as threatening these state objectives,
however peaceful and law-abiding they may be, is potentially an object of
"national security." This includes those who speak openly of a more complete
process of "Islamization" and seeking to convert non-Muslims to the faith. The
same author cautions:
"To the Malays, Islam is Malay and Malay is Islam.. .The Chinese viewed
Islam, therefore, as an ethnic as well as a religious matter. This situation is
unique only in Malaysia. So in our country religious extremism is nearly
synonymous with racial polarisation."58
The role of the police, he repeats, is to "lend an important helping hand . . .to
concentrate on seeking out and destroying the organised terrorists and the
subversives, be they ideological or criminal" 59
 (emphases added).
It is clear from these statements that even if the police impose their own
restrictions on the powers that have been given to them, the degree of ostensible
piety of an accused, in the sense set out in chapter five, is not the principal trigger
for the exercise of their powers. Rather, it is the perceived potential for
threatening the political status quo that matters. Some recent high-profile
examples relating to Dar al-Arqam and Anwar Ibrahim may serve to illustrate this.
58Ibid., p.38!.
591b1d., p. 403.
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Dar al-Arqam was a tariqah religious movement which had existed in Malaysia
and outside the Peninsula since 1968.60 It revolved around the charismatic figure
of Asaari Mohamed who attracted followers because of his "Medinan lifestyle,"
knowledge and apparent attention to religious detail. 6 ' During most of those years,
they had operated without government interference, setting up their own schools,
mosques, shops, businesses, medical clinics and residential communities. They
were very successful. They had become a self-sustaining, independent community
in which the values of Islam appeared to dominate. They had followers from all
sectors of the community, including professionals and intellectuals. They had
never threatened violence, nor had any of their members engaged in criminal
activities or proposed any violent overthrow of the Malaysian government.
Initially, they merely presented themselves as an alternative "way of life". But in
1992, the stategy of al-Arqam appeared to change, when they attempted to
challenge the political hegemony of the current government, under the leadership
of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed. 62 It was envisaged by al-Arqam members
that Asaari would be the next Prime Minister, 63and by July 1994 they were
convinced that the Malaysian government would soon fall. This prompted a series
of events64
 (including the publication of an official decision by the National Fatwa
60Zabidi Mohamed, (1998), Tersungkur Di Pintu 'Surga'; The Untold Truth and Inside Story of al-
Arqain & I.S.A. (Detention Without Trial), Zabidi Publications, Kuala Lumpur, p. 20. The author
was a legal advisor and former committee member of the aI-Arqam movement. His text inevitably
carries an anti-government bias, but it is the first non-government and inside account of what
occurred to the movement in the mid 1990s.
6tIbid., p. 23.
621n 1992, Asaari Mohamed was reported to have told a journalist that a referendum should be held
to see whether he was more popular than the Prime Minister; ibid.
63Ibid.
640n 12 July 1994, an article appeared in Utusan Malaysia claiming that al-Arqam had a suicide
army based in Thailand which was preparing to overthrow the Malaysian government by force.
The existence of a military base in Thailand was proved false subsequently by Thai authorities.
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Council denouncing the movement and its tariqah, the "Aurad Mohammadiah," as
deviationist) which culminated in the leaders of al-Arqam being detained under
the Internal Security Act 1960 on September 6, 1994. No attempt was made to
charge them with a specific offence, or to bring them before any type of court,
religious or secular.
What occurred during their detention has never been acknowledged officially. If
the notes of Zabidi Mohamed's personal experiences are credible, they provide
clear indications of the operating culture of the Malaysian police force. Allegedly,
Zabidi was questioned continuously for weeks, threatened and abused. During his
detention, he was told by one officer: "Ok, if you don't want to cooperate by
giving information, we will use forceful methods. All of us have belonged to CD,
so you don't want us to use our CD experience!" 65 Another officer threatened him
saying: "I hate your face, if you don't cooperate with us I will ask my boys to kick
you!"66 Yet another, resorted to the following mixture of temporal and religious
threats:
"I hate looking at your face, people like you, if you die, are not fit to be
bathed, prayed for, and are not fit to be buried; because even the earth will
not accept you. It's appropriate for your carcass just to be thrown in a
ditch. I will remember you Zabidi, so long as I work in the police force, for
as long as that I will make sure that you will be under arrest until you die,
This claim was followed quickly by another allegation that Arqam women were "sex slaves," and
the more damaging allegation (supported by a tape recording) of a so-called "conversation"
between Asaari and Prophet Muhammed; ibid, pp 3 1-37.
65Ibid., p. 137.
66Zabidi Mohamed reports this threat in English; ibid, p. 142.
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whatever island it is. Are you prepared for that, Zabidi? You will be
imprisoned on an island separated from your wife and children, are you
prepared for that? Are you willing to spend forty years in jail? I don't
know what to do with you, Zabidi, STUPID! IDIOT! STUBBORN.. I hate
looking at your face! Do you know that according to Islamic law, people
like you can be executed by me, you're lucky that the Hudud has not been
implemented; if it had been, I know what your fate would have been.. .Your
prayer is not valid, your fasting is not valid...
No details were ever published regarding the treatment of Asaari while in police
custody. It appears, however, that police interrogation methods were successful in
securing his "confession," along with the confessions of other senior members of
aI-Arqam, on live television at Masjid Negara before a nationwide audience of
millions.68
Owing to the biased nature of the account, it is necessary to look for additional
evidence to support the allegations of a coercive, and secular culture operating
within the Malaysian police force. I suggest that further light can be shed on this
issue by examining statements given by witnesses during the trial of the former
Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim who, in November 1998, was charged
with four counts of corruption and five of sodomy.
67Ibid., pp. 149-150. The implication of all these threats, is that the officer regarded Zabidi
Mohamed as an apostate.
68The transcriptions of the confessions are given in chapter 10 of Zabidi Mohamed's book.
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During their testimony, prominent members of Malaysia's Special Branch stated
that they used "turning over" and "neutralising" 69 techniques, but "only.. .in cases
of communist ideology, religious fanaticism and extremism." 70 Yet, who is
labelled a "communist", "religious fanatic" or "extremist" will be a question of
interpretation that is left to certain sectors within the government. 7 ' Moreover, it
appears that these categories have been drawn too narrowly. The black eye which
Anwar Ibrahim received while in police custody, 72 for example and, if true, the
torture suffered by Sukma Darmawan and Dr Munawar Ahmad Anees, 73 were not
the result of an allegiance to communist ideology or to a form of religious
extremism. Rather, they were the product of a general set of values operating
within the police force in which the protection of accused persons was clearly
subordinate to the political needs of the state to maintain its authority.74
69Per Special Branch Director, Datuk Mohd Said Awang, reported in New Sunday Ti,nes, 8/11/98,
p. 3; The Sun, Megazine, 3 1/12/98, p. 14. One of the corruption charges against Anwar Ibrahim
related to his alleged instructions to senior police officers to force two members of the public to
withdraw their sexual allegations against him. One of the Special Branch investigating officers,
ASP Mazlan, admitted to "turning over" the witnesses responsible for the allegations. He
attempted to justify his actions, saying: "I had to follow the order" (New Straits Times, 13/11/98, p.
4). The precise details of these "turning over" operations are unclear. Datuk Amir Junus stated
merely that they involve "going for the truth of the facts pertaining to the case;" The Sun, 26/11/98,
p.4.
70Ibid.
71 All of the police officers who gave evidence during the Anwar Ibrahim trial stated that they were
following orders. See: New Sunday Times, op. cit; New Straits Times, op. cit; The Sun 26/11/98, p.
4.
72The Sun, 21/12/98, p. 2.
73 The Sun, Megazine, 3 1/12/98, p. 14. Both were charged on counts of sodomy with Anwar
Ibrahim; both claimed that they were forced to make admissions.
74The pressure group ALIRAN claims that the incidences of police abuse and brutality are
"numerous;" The Sun, 9/1/99. Allegations of brutality against the Malaysian police force are not
new. Before the "Salleh System" of policing was introduced in 1968, for instance, one researcher
noted that laws were imposed by force rather than by cooperation and trust; Hasan Yusoff, (1983),
Perhubungan Polis Dan Orangranzai Di Malaysia - Satu Kajian Kes Tentang Sikap Penduduk-
Penduduk Kuala Lumpur, Masters thesis, UKM, Bangi, Malaysia, pp. 73-90. I suggest, therefore,
that the treatment meted out to Zabidi Muhamad and to Anwar Ibrahim are not explicable on
political grounds alone. It is part of the operating culture of the Malaysian police.
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I argue that these experiences of al-Arqam and Anwar Ibrahim (who was a former
President of the Muslim organization, ABIM) demonstrate the dominance of
Za'ba's Modernist grouping in the current administration of criminal justice.
There is no recourse to religious criteria either in the allocation or application of
police powers. These powers are not limited by the extent to which an accused
adheres, ostensibly, to the religion. Rather, the institutional framework is secular
in orientation and one in which political considerations can determine when
coercive state powers are triggered against the individual.
It appears from the above, therefore, that the values of Islam have not been
incorporated within the general structure of Malaysian criminal justice. This does
not mean, however, that Islamic rules relating to confessions and questioning no
longer exist. Indeed, the Modernist institutional framework has continued to
identify Islam as a separate and distinct feature of Malaysian life, with its own
laws, courts and set of officials, but which is subordinate to the overarching
secular structure. 75
 Their rules of questioning and of confessions are expressed
instead as part of a "personal law." The next section of this chapter charts the
development of this "personal law" up to the 1980s when a series of reforms
began.
75 UntiI the amendment to Article 121 of the Federal Constitution, this subordination to secular
values was given official and legal sanction through the courts which continued to uphold the right
of the Civil Law to determine matters within the jurisdiction of Islamic law. See: Myriam v
Muhammad Ar?ff[ 1969] 2 MU 174; Tengku Mariam v Commissioner of Religious Affairs,
Terrangganu [1969] 1 MU 110, [197011 MU 222; Nafsiah v Abdul Majid [1969] 2 MU 174;
Boto v Jaafar [1985] 2 MU 98.
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3. The Role of the Accused in the Rules of the Syariah Courts of Pre-
Reformist Malaysia
According to the Federal Constitution, the power to administer Islamic law is left
to individual states. The exception is the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and
Labuan where the law is enacted by the Federal Parliament. 76 Their powers,
however, are limited to those areas set out in the State List (Ninth Schedule, List
II) and are specifically confined to "persons professing the religion of Islam". In
terms of criminal jurisdiction, the Syariah Courts have been subjected to
limitations imposed by federal law that restrict their powers to offences punishable
with short terms of imprisonment, fines or whipping. 77 These criminal matters
relate to sex offences, such as khalwat (close proximity), unlawful sex, incest,
prostitution, consumption of alcohol and failures to perform religious obligations,
such as obligatory fasting and payment of zak_wY 8 The Syariah Courts are presided
over by a Kadi or Chi ef Kadi, who hears complaints or prosecutions brought by a
prosecutor, or Pendakwa Agama. Investigation of offences is carried out by a
combination of personnel that may include: Penyelia Ugama79(Religious
Supervisor); Pegawai Masjid (Mosque Officer); Penggawa (Village Headman or
76See: Ahmad Ibrahim, (1992), "Islamic Law in Malaysia since 1972", in Developments in
Malaysian Law - Essays to Commemorate the Twentieth Anniversary of the Faculty of Law,
Universiti Malaya, (1992), Petaling Jaya.
77Current provisions provide up to three years imprisonment, fines up to $5000, or whipping up to
six strokes, or a combination thereof; Muslim Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, section 2
(as amended in 1984).
78Wu Mm Aun, op. cit., p. 41.
791n other states, this officer is called the Pemeriksa Agama (Religious Examiner). See further, the
Administration of the Syariah Court Enactment 1985 of Malacca (No.6 of 1985).
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Captain); Pen ghulu (Village Headman); Guru Ugana (qualified Religous
Teacher), or a police officer.8°
Until the mid 1980s, the rules of procedure and evidence governing questioning
powers and the receipt of confessions (iqrr) in Syariah Courts were unclear. The
only legislation on the administration of Muslim law in the states was the
Administration of Muslim Law Enactment, which generally required Kadis, if in
doubt, to refer to rules of evidence and procedure applied in the secular courts.81
According to research carried out in 1983 by Abdullah Bin Abu Bakar 82 in Pahang,
Terengganu, Kelantan, Johor, Melaka, Pinang and Kedah, Kadis did not refer to
Islamic sources 83
 when making their decisions in run-of-the-mill cases. The usual
practice was to base their decision on state legislation.84
Yet, if we examine cases on iqrr from the 1970s that have been reported in
Jurnal Hukum, we observe different approaches taken by adjudicating officers.
These differences are rooted in fundamental disagreements over the nature of the
state legislation, and their relationship to Islamic Law. These approaches also
accord different roles to the accused in the legal process.
80 See, for instance, the Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment 1983 of Kelantan (no. 9 of 1983),
section 9.
81 Ahmad Ibrahim and Ahilemah Joned, (1995, revised), The Malaysian Legal System, 2nd Edition,
Dewan Bahasa Dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur, p. 59. This implies that rules of evidence and
investigation powers were determined by the Criminal Procedure Code and the Malaysian
Evidence Act 1950.
82 
"Pentadbiran Keadilan Di Mahkamah-Mahkamah Syariah Malaysia", Jurnul Hukuin [1404H1, p.
149.
83The Qur'an, Sunnah, and books of fiqh by well-known Islamic scholars.
84Abdullah Abu Bakar, op. cit., pp. 176-177.
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In Che Lah v Pendakwa Jenayah, Kelantan (1978), 85the appellant had pleaded
guilty to a charge of "unlawful sexual intercourse" (persetubuhan harain) with a
young girl under section 94(2) of the 1966 Kelantan Syariah Enactment. In the
Kadi's court, the Chief Kadi, Haji Yusoff bin Haji Mohd Othman, held that a
guilty plea was sufficient to prove guilt under the terms of the Enactment, 86
 and
fined the appellant $1000 and pronounced a six month jail sentence if he
defaulted. 87
 It appears from the decision of the Chief Kadi, that "unlawful sexual
intercourse" was not regarded in the same terms as "zina," 88so he had not
questioned the accused to verify that knowingly, and in full presence of mind, he
had physically penetrated his co-accused "as a bucket enters a well."89Nor was
there any evidence that the Chief Kadi had dissuaded the accused from making the
confession. The prosecutor had merely read out the report of the Penyelia Ugama
containing the appellant's confession, which the latter had accepted as a correct
version of events.90
It should be remembered that the offence with which the accused had been
charged did not carry the hadd penalty, for the Chief Kadi had pronounced the
maximum sentence available. This was a ta'zir offence which had been so defined
by the state, so it was deemed unnecessary to refer to the values and the
protections which Islm provided for accused persons in the context of the hudud.
What appears paramount in his judgment is the need to enforce the substantive
85 [1401H] Jurnul Hukum 86.
86There was no reference to Islamic precepts or sources.
871n recognition of the appellant's position as a teacher, and the abuse of the teacher/pupil
relationship, the Chief Kadi regarded this as a very serious matter, and pronounced the maximum
sentence available.
88The word "zina" is not mentioned anywhere in his judgment, op. cit., p. 87.
89See chapter five, ante, and the famous case of MaAiz bin Malik.
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law, and to reduce the prevalence of actions which Allah has prohibited. He
states:
"In this matter, the Court regrets and feels saddened that this very serious
matter occurred between a teacher and a pupil when the teacher educates
and is a leader within a school. Yet, they allow themselves to do or
commit something prohibited by Allah, subhanahu wa ta Aala. For these
reasons, there is no other option but to pronounce the maximum sentence
in order that a essori is taken and an example se br other young peop\e so
that this matter does not happen again."9'
The individual nature of zin, with its stress on individual repentance, has been
superceded by a concern to enforce a collective morality, which has redefined the
offence in terms of abuse of power and trust. This could be interpreted in two
ways. First, it could provide an illustration of the second approach that we
observed in chapter five, the primary concern of which is active enforcement of
the obligation to "bid the good and to prohibit the forbidden." The stated concern
is to send a message to "other young people" not to "allow themselves to do or
commit something prohibited by Allah." Alternatively, the Chief Kadi is merely
giving religious justification to an offence framed within secular criteria and
formats. He has not referred to any Islamic sources in making his determination
because he regards this as an offence defined by the state. References are to
statute, guilty pleas and aggravating circumstances. In other words, this is another
90p. 87.
91pp. 87-88.
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example of hybridity, enforcing Islamic precepts through secular formats and
concepts.
On appeal, the Justice Committee, headed by the Mufti of Kelantan, Dato' Haji
Mohd Noor Flaji Ibrahim, reversed the Chief Kadi's decision. They held that a
guilty plea (pen gakuan salah) to a charge of "unlawful sexual intercourse"
(persetubuhan haram) had to satisfy the conditions of iqrar for the offence of
zina. The Mufti stated:
"the guilty plea that has been made by the accused cannot be used to prove
unlawful sexual intercourse (zina) in relation to this accused, according to
what has been stated in books of fiqh about an iqrr made in respect of
zina. Nevertheless, we accept that khalwat has taken place between the
first accused (the appellant) and the second accused."92
In the opinion of the Justice Committee, "unlawful sexual intercourse" and "zina"
were the same substantive offence. Moreover, as "guilty pleas" were unknown in
Islamic terminology, the statements of the accused had to be presented in terms of
an iqrar, the conditions of which had not been established for zina. It was valid
only to establish the offence of khalwat (close proximity), which carried a lighter
sentence.
The approach of the Justice Committee seems more "Islamic" than the approach
of the Chief Kadi. Primary reference is to Islam rather than to secular legislation.
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This is evident in their utilisation of Islamic as opposed to English legal
terminology and procedures. Although the judgment is lacking in detail, it also
makes some reference, however cursory, to "books of fiqh" and thus implicitly, to
the opinions of Muslim scholars. They are followers of taqild, therefore, and
belong to Za'ba's Kaum Tua typology. It might also be argued that their views are
in line with the majority opinions that were given in chapter five. They make a
clear distinction between zina, which is a hudud offence where the rights of Allh
predominate, and khalwat which is a ta"zjr offence where the type and extent of
punishment, if any, is left to the discretion of the state. They have afforded more
protections to the accused in the former than in the latter.
Yet, there is also evidence of a hybrid approach even here. The majority opinions
of the Muslim scholars that were set out in chapter five were in the context of
complete implementation of the Shar"iah. In this instance, because of the limited
criminal jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts, the Justice Committee have fused
Islamic procedures and rules of evidence with state legislated punishments that
have no origin in revealed scripture. According to Islamic Law, the punishment
for zina is either stoning to death or one hundred lashses plus a year's
banishment. 93 There is no unabrogated provision in the religious sources for
imprisonment, a fine, or a combination of the two.
92per Dato Haji Mohd Noor Haji Ibrahim.
93Shaykh AAbdullah al-Harariyy, (1996), Bughyat-Talib, Dar-ul Mashari"a, Beirut, p. 410; AAbdur..
Rahman I. Doi, (1984), Shari'ah: The Islamic Law, Ta Ha Publishers, London, pp. 237-238.
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Similar tensions are evident in another case on iqrjr from Kelantan that was
decided on the same day. In Faridah v Pendakwa Jenayah, Kelantan (1 978),94the
appellant had pleaded guilty to attempted unlawful sexual intercourse with her
father (mencuba melakukan persetubuhan). After her conviction, she tried to
retract her plea and the issue before the Kadi's court, and then Appeal Committee,
was whether the retraction vitiated the initial judgment and sentence.
In the Kadi's court, the presiding Deputy Chief Kadi held that the guilt and
sentence of the accused remained valid for five reasons. First, the conviction was
based on legislative authority. Sections 31(2) and 30(3) of the 1966 Kelantan
Enactment provide that if someone has been accused, they must be formally
charged, and where they plead guilty, they can be sentenced on the basis of that
plea. Section 173(b) of the Federal Criminal Procedure Code also provided that
after a guilty plea has been noted, it could be used to confirm guilt so long as the
Court was satisfied that the accused understood what was taking place and the
consequences that would follow. 95 Second, if the Court were to accept her
lawyer's application to withdraw the guilty plea, it would encourage people to do
criminal acts as they pleased (men ggalakkan orang yang melakukan jenayah
den gan sewenang-wenangya). 96Third, the most severe sentence available to the
court was a $1000 fine or a six month jail sentence, which could not be compared
against the very heavy sentences prescribed by Islamic Law (tidak dapat
mengimbangi hukuman Syara' yang memandang sangat berat). 97Fourth, the
sentence would help a little to reduce similar sins from occurring within the
94 [1401H] Jurnul Hukum 89.
95 Per Haji Mustapha bin Haji Idris, p. 89.
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state.98 Fifth, the offence was a disgraceful (keji) act that occurred between a
father and daughter, and which was condemned by the whole community, Muslim
and non-Muslim.99
As with the Chief Kadi in the Che Lah case, Haji Mustapha bin Haji Idris has
taken state and federal legislation rather than Islamic sources as his first point of
reference. He has proceeded to view the offence as a state-defined offence which
does not conform to Islamic law because the sentence is too lenient. He has
assumed, therefore, that the protective procedures which Islm provides for
accused persons when determining the admissibility of confessions in such cases,
are irrelevant. Other than legislative authority, the main reasons for his decision
lie in the temporal consequences, and the need to enforce a collective morality.
He is attempting to enforce Islamic prohibitions though secular forms and
concepts.
The Justice Committee, however, reversed the Deputy Kadi's decision on the
ground that the guilty plea to the charge was the same as "Iqrar bizzina"°°that had
been mentioned in books of fiqh.'° t The rules which applied to iqrr therefore
applied to guilty pleas. They stated that in cases where the rights of Allh
predominated, such as theft, drinking alcohol and zina, the accused was allowed to
retract his iqrar. It necessarily followed that this accused should be allowed to
96Ibid.
97Ibid, p. 90.
98Ibid.
99Ibid.
'°°Ibid.
'°'He refers to Sharwani's explanation of aI-Mughni and al-Raudat, Vol. 9, p. 113, and to two other
texts, the authors of which are not mentioned.
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withdraw her guilty plea.'°2 As with its other decision, the Justice Committee had
interpreted Islam according to the Kaum Tua perspective; that is in terms of
previous juridical opinion. It also sought to apply the first position set out in
chapter five which emphasised a procedure that sought to encourage genuine
repentance of an individual accused, over punishments enforced for the public
benefit. They had applied the voluntarist position which stressed the need for
individuals to willingly accept the sinful nature of their actions. But in the current
context, this represented another hybrid. Voluntarist positions were being applied
without the context of hudud punishments.
Kelantan is not the only jurisdiction where confessions were discussed in the
Syariah Courts before the changes in the 1980s. In Pendakwa v Awang Mat isa
(1979),'° the Syariah Courts in Penang had to decide a case in which the
appellant had been charged with unlawful sexual intercourse (persetubuhan
secara haram) with a woman contrary to section 150(3) of the Penang
Administration of Islamic Law Act 1959. The appellant had made a written and
oral confession (iqrar) before two Kadis but at the trial, he refused to plead guilty.
Apart from the Kadis who had listened to and noted his confession, the
prosecution did not call any other witnesses to establish that a confession had been
made. The apellant was found guilty and given a three month jail sentence.
There is no evidence from the case report that the accused received any legal
advice in making his appeal, and it appears from the judgment of the Chief Kadi
'°2p. 90.
'°3 [ 1401H 1 Jurnul Hukum, 80.
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that he appealed only on the basis of mitigation of sentence. 104 There was no
challenge to the legality of the initial judgment. Nevertheless, the Chief Kadi was
prepared to offer his reasons for confirming the decision (and sentence) in the
lower court. He stated'°5
"The Court has weighed the evidence provided by the witnesses, in
particular that of the first witness who is a Kadi and who confirmed that
the admission made before the Kadi was correct. That admission ought to
have been accepted for passing judgment, but due to the fact the law limits
the Kadi's power, this case had to be brought before the Court of the Chief
Kadi. An iqrar can be given in two ways, orally and in writing. In this
case, both methods have been used. The law of iqrar, such as has been
mentioned in the book Tahrir by Sharkawi, volume 2, p. 140, (as
translated), states:
'And any valid iqrar cannot be retracted except in matters of
apostacy, drinking alcohol, theft and robbery in cases where there
is a heavy sentence, but not in property cases. This is based on the
hadith narrated by Abu Daud, <You must avoid and drop the iiadd
punishment where there are doubts in the evidence,>"°6(emPhaSeS
added).
'°4The accused appealed to reduce his sentence because he had to look after his sick mother; p. 80.
'°5 p. 80.
'°6The Sharkawi text has been translated from the Arabic to Malay, and is unclear. The translation
given, therefore, is approximate. However, it remains problematic because the text does not
mention that one can retract a confession in cases of zina. This does not reflect the position of the
Sunni schools that was outlined in chapter five. Only the Dzahiris refused to accept a retraction,
but they applied it to all cases.
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The reference to the Islamic rules relating to retraction of an iqrr seems to
suggest that the Chief Kadi had considered the refusal to plead guilty following
the appellant's earlier confession, as a retraction. Yet, because the confession had
been witnessed by the two Kadis (thus valid), and the offence which the accused
had been charged did not carry the hadd punishment, the retraction was deemed
ineffective. This supports the basic approach taken by the Kadis in Kelantan.
Namely, this is a state-defined offence, so the confessional rules and the additional
protections that IsIm provide for the accused in matters of the hudnd do not
apply. What matters is the enforcement of the substantive prohibitions.
It is submitted that the above analysis of these three cases'° 7establishes a tension
between the different levels of decision-making that existed in the Syariah Courts.
These disagreements were not on facts, but on matters of fundamental approach.
Deputy Kadis, Kadis and Chief Kadis, at least in Kelantan and Penang, were more
concerned with enforcing Islamic prohibitions than in adhering to Islamic
procedure and form. The role played by the accused was not an important factor in
their decision-making process. Yet, the reverse was true in the case of State
Muftis and appellate boards. They sought a more voluntarist approach in which
Islamic procedure was emphasised.
In one sense, these approaches of the 1970s (and perhaps earlier) appear reflective
of the differences which I observed in chapter five. In their desire to enforce
Islamic prohibitions, Kadis had interpreted state legislation as ta"zjr offences
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because the terminology of hudud had not been used by legislators. Words such as
"persetubuhan secara haram" (unlawful sexual intercourse), for instance, were
used rather than "zin" which had a specific definition in Prophetic hadith.'° 8
 As
a consequence, they regarded the offence as state-defined, and did not look to the
protections which Islm had provided for persons accused of zina. Muftis, on the
other hand, in their desire to facilitate the role of the accused, interpreted the
legislation in terms of the nature of the offence and saw no material distinction
between "unlawful sexual intercourse" and "zina." Consequently, they provided
the concomitant protections for the accused which the majority of Islamic scholars
had set out.
Such an observation, however, would not take into account the hybridity which
was evident in all of these decisions. Rather, what we see is a process of
interaction between the different elements of the Kaum Tua and the Modernist
typologies. Inevitably, the positions taken were subordinated to the constitutional
and legislative framework in which they had to operatc. That structure was
established by elements within the secular-minded Modernist typology, which, in
turn, filtered into the decision-making process of the Kadis. Thus, they referred
either exclusively, or in part, to state legislation to justify their decisions.'° 9
 The
decisions of the Muftis were expressed through Islamic terminology and justified
according to texts from Islamic scholars. Previous Islamic scholars, however, had
made their interpretations in the context of full implementation of the Shar"jah.
'°7These are the only reported cases on iqrar before the 1980s.
'°See the hadth relating to M'iz bin M1ik that was mentioned in chapter five.
'°9This was confirmed by Abdullah bin Abu Bakar in his observational study, op. cit.
110That is, there was no necessary structural impediment. I do not mean to imply that there was
always an exact convergence between what was said by Islamic scholars, and what was
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State Muftis, on the other hand, were confronted with state legislation that
restricted sentencing powers to the parameters that Federal Government, rather
than Islam, had provided.
It will be apparent from the above discussion of the 1970s, I did not observe any
influence from the Kaum Muda. It would be wrong to imply from this, however,
that the Kaum Muda were having no effect on the contextualisation of Islamic law.
Indeed, in the 1970s, as in the 1920s and 1930s, they were manifested as "reform
groups" which were to operate in the forefront of government and opposition
strategies of "Islamisation" in the 1980s and 1990s.
4. Re-orientating the system in a climate of reform
In the I 970s, a number of Muslim reformist and missionary organizations became
prominent in Malaysia, such as ABIIvI (Malaysian Youth Movement), al-Arqam
and "Da"wah India" (Indian Mission). Their main object was to put pressure on
the Malaysian government to change its policy towards Islamic beliefs and to re-
orientate the people in the direction of Islam." This was successful not only in
triggering greater Islamic awareness within Malaysia's existing Malay political
parties, PAS (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) and UMNO (United Malay National
Organisation), but also in changing their party agendas.
implemented by Islamic rulers. Much would have depended on the piety and knowledge of the
particular ruler.
"See Mahmood Zuhdi bin Haji Abdul Majid, (1984), op. cit., pp. 269-270; Alias Mohamed,
(1994), PAS' Platform: Development and Change 1951-1986, Gateway Publishing, Shah Alam,
pp. 167-177.
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Before the late 1970s, the PAS leadership had concentrated more on ethnic issues
and Malay rights than implementation of Islam. This approach alienated a section
of their Dewan Pemuda (Youth Wing), which had become attached to
ABIM, 112who wanted to see Islm figure more prominently in Malaysian society.
ABIM was a "revivalist" movement very reminiscent of the Kaum Muda, and
which sought the re-introduction of Islamic law as the law of general application
in Malaysia. In its ranks, it included Haji Hadi Awang, Haji Fadzil Noor, Haji
Nakhaie Ahmad and Anwar Ibrahim. Hadi Awang and Fadzil Noor, came to
dominate the Youth wing of PAS and eventually, were successful in pushing the
political party in a more radical direction. Educated in Saudi Arabia and the
Azhar, Hadi Awang, in particular, condemned the traditional leadership of
"straying from the true path of Islam." In the minds of him and his supporters,
"true" Islam was defined primarily in contrast to the status quo; Islm was to be
implemented in its entirety, including the hudd. Poverty, injustice, corruption,
racism, promiscuity and illiteracy all existed because the state was not Islamic; it
was secular." 3 In 1982, they took over the PAS leadership, and the establishment
of an Islamic State, therefore, became its central goal."4
The change in PAS' leadership was expressed as a return to leadership by the
"ulema" (Muslim scholars) to ensure that "the PAS struggle would never run from
the path of Islam." 5 Hadi Awang, Fadzil Noor and Nakhaie Ahmad had all
witnessed the events and success of the Iranian revolution, which had convinced
" 2ABIM was founded in 1971 by the leaders of the National Association of Islamic Students of
Malaysia (Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Islam MalaysiaIPKPIM) which at that time was
led by former Deputy Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim; Alias Mohamed, op. cit., p. 167.
" 3 lbid, pp. 185-189.
'' 4lbid, p. 189.
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them that religious elites could form a strong and viable leadership in the
administration and politics of a modern state. 116 They argued it was Aulema who
would determine what was "Islamic", using the Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijma" and Qiys,
as their sources. They would ensure that Islni would be the sole criterion of
social change; social change and new circumstances would not be the basis of
Islamic interpretation.' 17
UMNO was forced to respond to the new PAS agenda by adopting their own
"Islamic" initiatives," 8that were the product of a broad "shpra"(consultation)
between secular politicians and the Muslim intelligentsia." 9
 BERJASA
(Malaysian-Islamic Front), because of its moderate approach to the Islamic
movement, was incorporated by UMNO into the ruling National Front in order to
balance the so-called "fundamentalist" approach of PAS.' 2° Anwar thrahim,
former leader of ABIM, was also head-hunted and appointed as a deputy minister
"5lbid.
6Ibid.
117 See their 1986 election pamphlet entitled: "The struggle for Islam: The Islamic Party of
Malaysia's Perspective", cited in Alias, op. cit., p. 192.
" 8Mahmood Zuhdi bin Haji AbdulMajid, op. cit., p. 271.
" 9Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed has condemned PAS's "narrow" approach to ijtihad, and
has explained in public seminars that the Malaysian government is more "flexible" and "inclusive"
in its approach. He has stated: "The problems that arise due to the multi-racial nature of the
society of this country needs serious and special consideration. The types of crimes committed,
besides sentencing under common law, also have to be reckoned with.. .To satisfy all these
parameters, views and contentions from experts in criminology - not only in Kelantan but also
nationwide - have to be sought in the process of ijtihad. Such a move is imperative since the law to
be legislated will involve the whole nation, directly or otherwise. There is no proof that these
experts have taken an active part in creating PAS law; in other words, this aspect of the ijtihad
process was ignored...The whole consultation process was superficial and did not comply with the
proper spirit of ijtihad"; cited in Rose Ismail (ed), (1995), Hudud in Malaysia - The issues at
Stake, SIS Forum (Malaysia Berhad), Kuala Lumpur, p. 74.
' 20Ibid, p. 270.
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within the Prime Minister's department as an attempt to reconcile the different
Islamic groups.'2'
This "Islamic" re-orientation of the political parties directed attention towards and
sparked a number of reforms in the administration of Islamic Law in the various
Malaysian states. A government committee was set up which suggested measures
to improve and raise the status of judges and officers of the Syariah Courts. It
recommended that the Syariah Courts be separated and made independent from
the Council of Muslim Religion;' 22 that steps be taken to improve the training of
and recruitment of judicial and legal officers of the Syariah Courts, and that
existing facilities of the Syariah Courts be improved.' 23
 Legislation was passed
subsequently which upgraded the existing system of Kadi courts, reorganizing
them into a three-tier system of Subordinate, High and Appeal Courts. Linkages
were formalized with Islamic legal institutions and with secular bodies, such as
the Legal Aid Bureau, Police, law firms and the High Court.' 24 The Syariah
judiciary were also "professionalised," sent on training courses to the newly
established International Islamic University, to "upgrade" their knowledge of the
legal system, the Constitution, laws of evidence and procedure and their
professional skills in legal administration.' 25 Syariah lawyers (Peguam Syarie)
' 21 Ibid., p. 272. Many ABIM members subsequently left the organization and joined PAS where
they thought the cause of Islam could be best pursued; see Alias, op. cit., p. 182.
' 22Before the changes, the Syariah courts were under the control of the Council of Islamic Religion
or the Religious Department of the state; see Ahmad Ibrahim (1992), "Islamic Law in Malaysia
Since 1972", op. cit., p. 307. This made the courts formally independent of government. Arguably,
however, it was also an attempt by the federal government to take further power away from PAS
which had sizable electoral constituencies in Kelantan, Terrangganu and Kedah.
' 23Ahmad Ibrahim, (1995), The Malaysian Legal System, 2nd Edition, op. cit., pp. 5 8-59.
124Sharifah Zaleha Syed Hassan, (1990), "Towards a Syariah-based Society: Religious
Rationalization and the Development of the Islamic Legal Order in Malaysia,"Jurnal Antropologi
Dan Sociologi, Vol. 18, pp. 49-50.
' 25Ahmad Ibrahim (1995), op. cit., p. 62.
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with degrees in Malaysian and Islamic Law from the International Islamic
University were also introduced to the courts, thereby exposing more of the lay
public to the Shar"iah and removing the monopoly enjoyed previously by state
Aulema . ' 26As an important symbolic gesture (if nothing else), Article 121 of the
Federal Constitution was also amended which stated that the High Courts, and
courts subordinate to it, would not have jurisdiction in any matter that came within
the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts.'27
These changes, however, did not represent moves to implement Islamic law
proper; rather, they provided evidence of the secular system "co-opting" Islamic
law for its own purposes. Kaum Muda "revivalism" (through the agency of ABIM)
had integrated with the structures, personnel and procedures of the secular legal
system. Hence, rules of evidence and criminal procedure in the Syariab Courts
were rationalized in many states, 128using the Evidence Act 1950 and the Code of
Criminal Procedure as their respective templates. For instance in Kelantan, the
rules that related to questioning,' 29
 apart from a few amendments, replicated the
pre-1976 rules of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence, it stated that no statement
made by any person to a Penyelia Ugama in the course of an investigation would
be admissible at his trial,' 30
 and that no Penyelia Ugama or "person in authority
' 26Syarifah Zaleha Syed Hassan (1990), op. cit., p. 51.
' 27Act A 704. The Act was designed to prevent any of the non-Syariah courts from making
decisions on Islamic law. The distinct jurisdictions of these courts were confirmed in Mohanied
Habibullah v Faridah [1992] 2 MU 793.
128For examples, see: Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment of Kelantan 1983 (no.9 of 1983);
Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment of Malacca 1985 (no. 2 of 1986); Syariah Criminal
Procedure Enactment of Sarawak 1991 (no. 8 of 1991); Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment of
Selangor 1991 (No. 6 of 1991); The Evidence Enactment of the Syariah Court of Kedah 1990 (no.
8), of Pahang 1990 (no. 1), of Kelantan 1991 (no.2) and of Sarawak 1991 (No.2).
' 29No. 9 of 1983.
' 30Scction 59(1).
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shall offer or make any inducement, threat or promise." 3 ' Only the Qadhi was
empowered to record a statement or confession of the accused, and then only after
satisfying himself that the confession or statement was made voluntarily.' 32 But at
the same time, the accused could be arrested, 133
 detained and questioned,'34
without a caution, 135 by a Penyelia Ugama for Up to twenty four hours'36without
any lawyer present. The Penyelia Ugama Was also legally obliged not to
discourage the accused from making a statement.'37
It has been assumed, therefore, that for all intents and purposes rules of
questioning in Malaysian criminal procedure pre-1976 and Islamic law were the
same. Yet, there were some notable discrepancies with the positions that we set
out in chapter five. In particular, no account appears to have been taken of the
religious criteria in questioning of accused persons. Moreover, no account has
been taken of the Sunnah in discouraging persons accused of certain offences from
making any statement. Other than the terminology and the provision for making
an oath at the end of the prosecution's case in place of the submission of no case
to answer, there is very little to indicate that this is an Islamically-inspired piece of
legislation.
' 31 Section 60(1). This section represents an amended version of section 1l3(i)(a) of the CPC
because it has removed that portion of the section which allowed an officer or person in authority
to administer religious threats to the accused.
' 32Section 61, subsections (1) and (3).
' 33Section 11.
' 34Section 5 8(1).
' 35Although section 58(4) states that a Penyelia Ugama "shall first inform" the suspect he is
questioning that he may refuse to answer questions on grounds of self-incrimination, there are no
legal sanctions for failing to do so nor any lawyer present who could otherwise enforce it.
Moreover, this "caution" would be confusing in any event because the Penyelia Ugama is also
obliged to tell him that "such person shall be bound to answer all questions" (emphasis added),
section 5 8(2).
' 36Section 22(3).
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One can make similar observations of the Kelantan Evidence Enactment of 1991
and the provisions which relate to confessions. Although sections 17 to 19 are
otherwise in line with the Sh4f"i school,' 38 there is no reference to any right of the
accused to retract his confession, and the distinctions which the scholars made
between the rights of persons and the rights of Allah. It represents, therefore,
either a rationalization of the religious texts or an unintended omission.
A deeper analysis of these changes may be viewed by examining the judgment of
the leading case on iqrr that was given while the Islamisation programme was in
full flow. In Pegawai Pendakwa Muis v Haji Adib Datuk Said Besar Sigoh
(1988),' 39the accused was a famous Sabah politician and a Muslim convert who
had been charged with "sexual intercourse oustide of marriage" (persetubuhan
luar nikah) under Sabah's Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1977, ss
47(3), 54(1) and 102(3). Circumstantial evidence, witness testimony and the
confession of a co-accused were all presented by the prosecution to substantiate
the charge, in addition to an alleged signed confession made by the accused
himself before the investigating officer.
In acquitting the accused of the charge, the Hakim Syariah, Ahmad bin Lakim,
interpreted the offence as zina, prefacing his decision with comments on the sinful
' 37Section 60(2) states: "No Penyelia Ugama or other person shall prevent or discourage by any
caution or otherwise any person from making in the course of an investigation under the Chapter
any statement which he may be disposed to make on his own free will."
' 38Section 17(2) states that a confession may be made outside of court if witnesses by two Aadil
witnesses. Section 18(5) states that a confession is inadmissible unless made voluntarily "without
coercion".
' 39 [1410H] Jurnul Hukum 306.
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nature of the offence, the importance of repentance and the seriousness of the
consequences. He stated:
"Whoever is guilty of zin (and) is released from its Had repents to Al1h;
the repentance will be accepted in every respect and the sins forgiven by
Allh. There are also sins committed against people, from which (an
accused) will not be released and which will not be eliminated until the
Day of Judgment so long as the person (in question) does not pardon him.
In this case, the act of zin has very serious consequences. Whether the
accused committed it or not, it has certain consequences. Therefore,
according to Islamic Law, the process and procedure for proving a case of
zina is very strict and must be (followed) very carefully."4°
He continued:
"Even though the punishment is lenient' 41 and not based on Islamic Law,
the Court is still tied to the principles of proof and procedure according to
Islamic Law. This is because of s. 54(1) which requires and thus provides
that the Court must comply with all the provisions of Islamic Law relating
to the number, standard and quality of witnesses or evidence@bayinnah in
order to prove a fact" 42(His emphases).
'40pp. 309-3 10.
' 41 Under the Sabah Enactment of 1977 (s. 102(3)), a person found guilty was liable only to a $500
fine or six month jail sentence.
'42p. 310.
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The approach of this Hakim Syariah mirrors, in some respects, the approaches of
the Muftis of Kelantan before the 1 980s. Contrary to his statement of feeling
"tied" to these principles of proof and rules of evidence, this was not the only
interpretation of the legislation he could have made. As with the Kadis in
Kelantan and Penang, he could have held that first, "sexual intercourse outside
marriage" did not constitute the same substantive offence as "zina" because the
words used connoted different actions (however slight); and second, the absence
of a hadd penalty. If this had been his interpretation, we might have seen less
attention given to voluntarism and more to the needs of the state in enforcing
Islamic precepts. By defining the offence as "zina", however, the need for
individual repentance through a willing acknowledgement of guilt was given
precedence. In conformity with the first position noted in chapter five, the rules he
stated regarding the admission of iqrar were very protective of the accused.
Hence, the burden of proof was on the prosecution to establish beyond any doubt
that he had made the confession. Ordinarily for an extrajudicial confession to be
admitted in accordance with the school of Shaf'i, it would need two Aadil (just)
male witnesses. In the current circumstances, the investigating officer was the
only witness, and because he belonged to "Wilayah al-Hisbah," 43(the religious
police) his testimony was void on grounds of doubt (tohmah)' 44
 or suspicion
(keraguan), even though he was satisfied in all other respects that the confession
had been given voluntarily ("sukarela"), consciously ("sedar") and in full
knowledge of the consequences of making such a confession ("tahu akibat dan
pengakuanya"). Moreover, even if the confession had been witnessed in the
'43p. 314.
'44p. 316.
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appropriate manner and the accused had repeated his confession four times before
a judge, he was still entitled to retract ("tank balik") his confession.' 45
 In his
opinion, there was still doubt in the evidence, which entitled the accused to an
acquittal in line with the meaning of the Prophetic hadith: "Reject cases in hudud
where there is doubt." 146
On the basis of the substance of this decision and the sets of values which it
expresses, it appears that the majority position within the Kaum Tua has merged
with the Modernist secular legal structure. If we analyse the judgment more
carefully, however, one can observe traces of Kaum Muda methodology. In the
cases before the 1980s, there were no direct references to the Qur'an or to the
Sunnah. The Muftis, in particular, made their decisions in the light of previous
juridical opinion only (consistent with the Sh4f'i school). In line with the rules of
taqljd, they did not attempt to offer their own interpretation of the original sources,
nor did they state whether one scholar's opinion was more accurate than another.
They merely reported the juridical opinion and applied it to the facts. At times in
this case, however, the Hakim refers directly to the Sunnah, without referring to
any juridical opinion to justify his interpretation and application. For instance,
when referring to the evidential effect of the confession of the co-accused, the
Hakim refers to the meaning of the following Prophetic hadith:
145 
pp. 316-317.
146p. 318.
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"0 Unais! Go to that woman and question her; if she confesses stone her.
The aforementioned woman confessed, and the Prophet ordered that she be
stoned."47
According to him, these words imply that a confession is evidence only against its
maker; it cannot implicate a co-accused.' 48
 There is no reference to a famous text,
or known scholar to justify his interpretaj 0n of this hadith. According to the rules
of taqljd, this methodology is valid only for the judge who has reached the level of
"mujtahid." 49Yet, according to one famous Muslim academic, it is highly unlikely
that any of the Malaysian judges have satisfied the criteria to be given that title.'5°
When the opinions of previous Muslim scholars are mentioned, loyalty to one
particular school has also disappeared. By tradition, Malaysians follow the school
of Imam Shaf'i, so we might have expected reference to scholars such as an-
Nawawi, al-Ghazzali, ar-Ramli, ash-Shirazi and al-Mawardi. Instead, we find the
kim has "mixed" schools. Although he cites opinions of ash-Shaf"i himself, as
stated in the anba1i text "Al Mughni" by Ibn Qudamah, he prefers to base part of
his judgment on opinions found in the Hanafi text, "Bada"i as-Sana"i fi Tartib
ash-Shara"i" by al-Kasani, and on the Maliki text, "ad-Dakhirah," by al-Qarafi.'5'
'47p. 314.
' 48Ibid. I am not saying that a confession of a co-accused can be used as evidence; the point is in
relation to methodology only.
' 49Shaykh 'Abdul1ah al-Harariyy, (1993), ,Sirgj-ul Mustaqi,n, Dar-ul MashariAa, Beirut, p. 104.
' 50Dr Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, "Syarat Menjadi Kadi," JurnuiHukum [1409] 29, at 42-
43.
' 51 pp. 3 16-317.
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I suggest that the jkim's willingness to refer directly to the primary sources for
legal rulings and the move away from a single school of juridical thought, is
demonstrative of a shift of perspective; from the "traditional" to the "revivalist";
from the "Kaum Tua" to the "Kaum Muda." It also introduces more uncertainty
as to the role which the accused will play in the "Islamisation" process, because
this approach lifts many of the restrictions in the interpretation of the religious
texts. Although the Hakim was very protective of the accused in the instant case,
and it appeared to follow the values of the majority opinion discussed in chapter
five, that is no reason to suggest he would apply the same values in a later case.
Adherents of the Kaum Muda argue that justice is secured through "ijtihad" which
would imply, necessarily, that he would not be bound by his previous decision
even where the point of law was the same. if, for instance, we substituted a Sabah
politician with a teacher accused of having sexual intercourse with one of his
pupils, the approach could be different.
The extent to which this approach represents a more general shift, is difficult to
assess as this is the only reported decision on iqrr since the reforms in the 1980s.
Although there are signs that the decision was intended as a "model", because of
its high profile,' 52
 the length of the judgment' 53 and its attention to detail,' 54
 further
data are required before we can arrive at a more definitive conclusion.
521t should not be forgotten that the accused was a well-known politician in Sabah. His case,
therefore, would have attracted a lot of attention.
' 53The case is fourteen pages long; the majority are two or three at most.
' 54The judgment even sets out the system of proof in Islamic law, and the role that iqrar plays
within it; p. 310. There was no attempt to do this in any of the previous reported judgments.
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I submit that further evidence of a more general shift in perspective, if any, might
be obtained by examining the most recent legislative attempts at "Islamisation":
first, the PAS opposition "Hudud Bill" of 1993' 55and second, the Federal
Government-sponsored Syariah Criminal Procedure (Federal Territories) Act 1997
and the Syariah Evidence (Federal Territories) Act 1997. 156Ostensibly, these laws
have their origin at completely opposite ends of the political spectrum in Malaysia
and represent opposing interpretations of Islam. One might expect, therefore, a
number of differences in the rules that have been mentioned in relation to
questioning and confessions, and the role which the accused appears to play. The
following analysis will show that although differences do exist, the ground
separating the two sides has narrowed, and that they are both operating,
essentially, within a framework where Kaum Muda and Modernist perspectives
dominate.
The Hudud Bill of Kelantan 1993
The Shari"ah Criminal Code Bill 1993 of Kelantan was passed unanimously by
the PAS-led state legislature on 25 November 1993. Although the Kelantan
government was aware that the enactment would never be implemented while the
current Federal Government remained in power,' 57and had been passed merely to
force the Federal Government's hand, the rules pertaining to questioning and to
' 55 Syariah Criminal Code Bill 1993 of Kelantan.
156ACt no. 560.
' 57The Chief Minister of Kelantan admitted to the New Straits Times that the Bill "could not be
implemented until the Federal Government of Malaysia made changes to the Federal Constitution"
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confessions that are contained within still provide an insight into PAS
interpretations of Islamic Law and the role which they think the accused should
play in the legal process.
The Enactment represents an attempt to codify Islamic Criminal Law and is
divided into six parts. Part I sets out "hudud offences" which are stated to include:
sariqah (theft), hirabah (robbery), zina (unlawful sexual intercourse), qadhf
(unlawful imputation of sexual intercourse outside of marriage), liw (sodomy),
musaqah (sexual gratification between females), ittiyan al-maitah (necrophilia),
ittiyan al-bahimah (bestiality),' 58syurb (consumption of intoxicants) and riddah
(apostacy). Part II contains provisions on qi
	 (homicide and intentional injuries)
and diyat (monetary compensation for death or injuries following a pardon); Part
Ill refers to rules of evidence; Part IV details the procedure for carrying out
punishment; Part V mentions miscellaneous matters, and Part VI sets out the
Court structure and rules for the appointment and qualifications of the judiciary.
In terms of jurisdiction, the Enactment states that it does not apply to non-Muslims
unless they "elect" for the Enactment to apply.' 59 Further, all of the offences and
provisions relating thereto are to be interpreted in accordance with the Syariah
Law, and where any ambiguities or difficulties arise in their interpretation, the
Court trying the case has jurisdiction to resolve them.'6°
(NST, 25/11/93, p. 8, cited by Mohamed Hashim Kamali (1995), Punishment in lsla,nic Iziw. An
Enquiry Into the Hudud Bill of Kelantan, Institut Kajian Dasar, Kuala Lumpur, p. 7).
' 58Musahaqah, ittiyan al-maitah and ittiyan al-bahimah are included within the section titled "hudud
offences", but their punishment is stated as "taAzir."
' 59Section 56(2).
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Sections 44 and 45 set out the rules on confessions. Section 44 provides:
"(1) The best evidence to convict the accused and make him liable to
hudud punishments is his own confession.
(2) The confession must be made voluntarily and without any force before
a judicial officer and shall afterwards be repeated before the trial judge
during the course of the trial, and if the trial is one of zina the confession
shall be repeated four times before the judge during the course of the trial:
Provided that both the making and the repetition of the confession
must be without any threat, promise or inducement and must
clearly prove in detail that the accused has actually committed the
offence with which he is charged and that he understands that he
will be punished for making such a confession.
(3) The confession shall be admissible only against the accused who
makes it, and cannot be used against any other person; and to be valid the
confession must not be a retracted confession."
Section 45 mentions further rules which relate specifically to the evidential
consequences on retraction of a confession. It states:
' 60Section 62, sub-sections (1) and (2).
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"(1) A confession may be retracted by the accused who makes it at any
time even while he is undergoing the punishment.
(2) If the confession is retracted before the execution of the punishment on
him, the accused shall no longer be liable to punishment and if he retracts
the confession at the time when he is undergoing the punishment such
execution shall forthwith cease.
(3) If at any time before or at the time when the punishment is being
executed the accused manages to escape from the authorities, he shall be
deemed to have retracted the confession and as such the provision of
subsection (2) shall apply."
In some respects, these provisions correspond with the values and majority
position of previous juridical opinion. Confessions are the "best evidence", but
they must be "voluntary" and given without any force, which specifically refers to
any threat, promise or inducement.' 61 Judicial officers' 62 and trial judges receive
confessions, rather than police officers or members of the jisbah. If a confession
has been made outside of court, the accused has to repeat it at trial, four times in
the case of a charge of zina. The accused is also given the opportunity to retract
his confession.
' 61 There are no definitions of "force" or intimations whether it would include handcuffing,
detention and starvation.
162 
"Judicial officer" is not defined anywhere in the enactment. It is possible, therefore, that this
section could be construed as allowing police officers to receive confessions, so long as they have
been delegated by a judge.
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Not all of these provisions, however, are in accordance with the school of Shaf"i.
According to the Shaf'i school, for instance, there is no requirement for a
confession to be repeated four times or for it to be made before a judge. An extra-
judicial confession made on one occasion can be used to convict the accused so
long at it was made before two Aadil male witnesses. The rules stated in the
section have borrowed from the school of Abu Hanifah.
There are also provisions that have no basis in any of the Sunni schools of
jurisprudence. Section 44(3) states in general terms that for a confession to be
valid it "must not be retracted." This certainly includes all offences which carry
the hadd punishment. It also seems to include qisas because there is no provision
to qualify its operation. Although the Sunni schools disagreed over the scope of
retraction, none of them allowed a retraction to vitiate the punishment for offences
categorised as "Haqqun-Ns", such as qadhf and qi.' 63 Sections 44 and 45
appear to have rationalised the rules pertaining to confessions by removing the
distinction between aqq Allah and Haqqun-Nas.'64
The state government has engaged, therefore, in its own process of ijtihad'65and
appears to have gone out of its way to emphasise the protective nature of
evidential rules, particularly for hudud and qip offences.'66
' 63See chapter five.
' 64Yet this distinction is found in the religious sources. According to Shaykh AAbdullah al-
Harariyy (meeting 11 March, 2000), the evidence is derived from a mashhjir hadith of the Holy
Prophet that allocates rights to a Muslim where he has become the victim of his fellow Muslim's
tongue (eg. qadht) or hand (eg. qi) ["Al-muslimu man salima-1 muslimuwna mm 1isnihi wa
yadahi"].
165j suggest that this refutes Hashim Kamali's statement that the Kelantan Enactment is "typically
imitative and taqlidi"; op. cit., p. 1.
' 66The standard of proof required for these offences is "absolute certainty and free from any
ambiguity or doubt"; section 42(1). Although the provisions appear protective, there is nothing
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The role which the accused plays generally in the PAS scheme of things, however,
remains unclear. The framework for determine guilt in ta'zir offences is not set
out in this enactment, other than the rules pertaining to witnesses.'67The
confessional rules are very ambiguous as it is not clear whether they refer only to
hudiid, to hudud and qisas, or to hudud, qi 	 and ta"zlr. If ta"zir offences are not
included, it means that the admissibility of confessions will be determined
according to the Evidence Enactment of the Syariah Court 1991)68 This is based
on the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950, as adapted. That Enactment does not
require confessions to be made before a judge, nor for them to be repeated, nor to
be retracted. The only relevant requirements are that the confession should be
witnessed by two Aadil witnesses, 169
 that it was made "voluntarily without
coercion," t70and by a person who is "akil baligh." 71 The role which pre-trial
detention, powers of arrest and of questioning may have in obtaining these
confessions has not been explained. While the judd Enactment 1993 states:
"The Syariah Criminal Procedure Enactment 1983 shall apply to all proceedings
of the Courts with or without such modifications as the Courts think
fit,"(emphases added)' 72it seems to make no provision for what occurs outside of
courts.
explicit or implicit which requires or encourages the judge to dissuade the accused from making a
confession to a hudud or qisas offence. For further details on this issue, see chapter five.
7Two male and Aadil eye witnesses to the commission of the actual offences are required; section
40(1).
' 68Section 39(1).
' 69Section 17(2).
' 70Section 18(5).
' 71 Section 18(1).
' 72Section 65.
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There is a general lack of detail in these provisions and much would depend on
judicial interpretation of the sections. Section 62(1), for instance, states that
reference to the Syariah law "shall be made in respect of any matter not provided
for in this Enactment," and section 62(2) empowers the trial court to "give
meaning" to any word, expression or term relating to Syariah Law, if any doubt or
"difficulty" arises in their interpretation. On one construction, this appears to give
the judges carte blanche to give alternative interpretations. "Difficulty" could
mean any problem relating to the enforcement of Islamic precepts. In the event of
a "crime wave," this could enable a Kadi to avoid the apparently voluntarist
approach that has been taken. He might point, in particular, to an absence of
provisions in the Enactment relating to enforcement and the powers of the fjisbah
to "bid the good and prohibit the bad." This could entail a compromise on rules of
questioning and an application of the opinions of al-Mawardi or other scholars
who allowed or tolerated degrees of duress. It might also enable a Kadi to ignore
even the religious categorisations which the scholars made, because the PAS
legislators have evidently released judicial interpretation from being bound by
previous juridical interpretation.
There would be no religious objection to this position if all of the judges in
Kelantan were "mujtahids." Yet, under Part VI of the Enactment this is not made a
condition for their appointment. At the trial court level, a case is to be heard by
three judges, two of whom must be "ulamak" (section 66). At the appeal level, a
case is heard by five judges, three of whom must be "ulamak" (section 67).
"Ulamak" is defined in section 68 as a person "who holds or has held office as a
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Qadhi' 73Besar or Mufti Kerajaan or any one who has the qualification to hold any
of those offices and is known to have a deep knowledge of Syariah Law." The
extent of the required knowledge depends on the judgment of the Sultan after
consultation with the State Service Commission and the Jumaa Ulama (section
69). There is nothing explicit or implicit in the Enactment that requires any of the
"ulamak" to be "mujtahid", as traditionally defined.' 74 In fact, the Enactment
allows one who is "jhil" 75to sit in judgment. Under section 68, persons who
have been appointed as judges of the High Court of Malaya or Borneo or the
Supreme Court of Malaysia are allowed to sit with "ulamak" in the trial court or
the appeal court.	 This represents a distortion of the schools of Islamic
jurisprudence, some of whom allowed a "muqallid" 76to sit if he consulted a
mujtahid' 77
 or in instances of darlrah.'78 None of them allowed someone who
was ignorant of the details of Islamic Law. It is especially disturbing when one
remembers that "judicial officers" are allowed to sit alone and receive
confessions.'79
There is, I suggest, some truth to the assertion that the perspective which PAS
seeks to implement is not a traditionalist view; that in similar fashion to other so-
' 73The alternative Malaysian spelling is "Kadi."
' 74See chapter five.
' 75Linguistically, this means "ignorant", but in law it refers to someone who is not a faqih or
mujtahid.
' 76This means ajudge who follows and applies the opinions of a particular school; see Ghulam
Murtaza Azad (1994), Judicial System of Islam, Kitab Bhavan, New Delhi, p. 26.
' 77For details of this, see Ghulam Murtaza Azad, ibid pp. 24-27. See also the comments made in
chapter five.
' 78Per Shaykh "Abdullah al-Harariyy; meeting 11 March, 2000.
' 79These observations seem to support former Vice-President of PAS (now UMNO deputy
information chief), Haji Nakhaie Ahmad, that PAS lacked the infrastructure to implement hudud
laws, as well as an in-depth understanding necessary for successful implementation; cited in Maria
Luisa Seda-Poulin, (1993), "Islamization and Legal Reform in Malaysia: The Hudud Controversy
of 1992," SoutheastAsian Affairs, pp. 224-242, atp. 236.
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called "ideologues of Islamisation," their vision is "not so much of the past itself
but of the future as a restoration of the past.. .from a past that has been re-imagined
and also legitimated through the mediation and meaning of modern political
concepts and terms." 80 In its stated desire to establish a so-called "Islamic State,"
it has reinterpreted the sources and reassessed previous juridical opinion in the
light of contemporary circumstances and conditions. The Enactment does not
represent a complete implementation of Islamic Law, first and foremost.
According to the scholars of Islamic Law,' 81 hadd and qisas cannot be imposed
without a Caliph. Yet, according to the Kelantan Enactment, even a judge from the
Malaysian High Court can assist in passing the sentence; a choice made for the
simple reason that the Muslim world, currently, does not have a Caliph. Similarly,
according to Islamic scholars' 82the public laws of Islam, including most hudlld
offences and qisas, must be applied to non-Muslims as well as Muslims. The
Kelantan Enactment, however, makes application of the udud and Qi
voluntary. The Kelantan Government has not given reasons for thjs,' 83but it could
be based on their attempts to woo non-Muslim voters in the elections 184in addition
to its recognized difficulties over the Federal Constitution.
' 80Norani Othman (1993), "The Socio-Political Dimensions of Islamisation in Malaysia: A Cultural
Accommodation of Social Change?" JurnalAntropologi Dan Sociologi ,Vol. 20, PP. 109-127, at
pp. 113-114.
' 81 See chapter five. This was confirmed by Shaykh AAbdullah; meeting 11 March, 2000.
' 82See al-Shafi's Kitab al-Um,n, and al-Mawardi's al-A hkam al-Sultaniyyah.
' 83According to Kamali (op. cit., p. 21), the original enactment applied to non-Muslims, but the
state government changed its mind a week before it was tabled without giving any reasons.
' 84There has been a concerted effort to get the support of non-Muslims ever since PAS changed
direction; see Alias Mohamed, op. cit., pp. 185-191.
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These modifications to modern circumstances, the move away from taqljd, as well
as the rationalizations on rules relating to retraction of confessions, provide
evidence of a shift in the direction of the Kaum Muda perspective.
The "Islamic" Response of the Federal Government
In 1997, the Federal Government passed a series of laws in the Federal Territories,
as part of its competition with PAS as to which party was the most "Islamic."85
Rather than set out its own version of the hudud,' 86and its respective rules and
procedure, the Federal Government chose to pass an Act detailing "Syariah
Criminal Qffences," 87 none of which carried hudd or qi 	 punishments. The
Act included offences relating to matters of belief and doctrine ("aqidah),' 88
 to
failures to respect the basic practices of Islm or to perform basic religious
obligations,'89offeflCes against decency' 9° (including "sexual intercourse out of
wedlock" 191 ), qazaf' 92 (false imputation of zin)' 93 and other offences classified as
"miscellaneous." 94 Offences that had their parallel in the Penal Code, such as
sariqah (theft), hirabah (robbery), and qi	 (homicide and non-fatal offences
against the person), however, were omitted.
' 85 See further, the party political positions and debates presented in Rose Ismail,ed, (1995) Hudud
in Malaysia - The Issues at Stake, SIS Forum (Malaysia Berhad), Kuala Lumpur.
1861he Chief Minister of Kelantan challenged the Federal Government to come with its own
version of the law (New Straits Times, 2/10/1994, p. 6, cited in Kamali, op. cit., p. 17).
' 87 Syariah Criminal Offences (Federal Territories) Act 1997 [Act 559].
' 88Sections 3-6.
' 89Sections 7-19.
' 90Sections 20-29.
I9l Section 23.
l92This is the Malaysian spelling; the alternative is "qadhf."
I93 Section 41.
l94Sections 30-42.
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The Syariah Criminal Offences Act 1997, was accompanied with "sister"
legislation on criminal procedure and evidence: the Syariah Criminal Procedure
(Federal Territories) Act 1997' 95and the Syariah Court Evidence (Federal
Territories) Act 1997.196 These were based on the Criminal Procedure Code and
the Malaysian Evidence Act 1950, respectively. The Syariah Criminal Procedure
Act empowers Religious Enforcement Officers, Police Officers and Pegawai
Masjid to arrest suspects without warrant.' 97Religious Enforcement Officers and
Police Officers also have the power to detain a suspect for up to twenty four
hours.' 980fl1y Religious Enforcement Officers are explicitly given the power to
question "any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts," 99but there is
nothing to prohibit a Police Officer or Pegawai Masjid from asking questions.
The latter is important because section 60(1) states:
"No statement made by any person to a Religious Enforcement Officer in
the course of an investigation under this Chapter shall.. .be used as
evidence."
It does not prevent from being admitted statements made to a Police Officer or
Pegawai Masjid. If the statement amounts to a confession, it will be admitted so
long as there are at least two male Aadjl witnesses present, 200and the confession
' 95Act No. 560.
' 96ActNo. 561.
' 97Section 18.
' 98Section 22, subsections (2) and (3).
' 99Section 59(1).
2°°Syariah Evidence Act 1997, section 17(2)(b). There is no mention that the witnesses have to be
other than police officers.
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has been made voluntarily. 201 Section 55 of the Syariah Evidence Act 1997,
however, appears to give Religious Enforcement Officers and Police Officers,
ample opportunity to get round this. Sub-section two states:
"An admission made in a document which is written or caused to be
written by a person under his signature or seal and handed over to another
person shall be admissible as an iqrar, provided that subsection 17(2) is
complied with."
Once the accused signs any statement, this seems to suggest that the statement will
be admissible and presumed to be voluntary. The only safeguard is the necessity of
two male Aadil witnesses. When we remember, however, that no Malaysian police
officers are appointed according to religious criteria, that no lawyers are present,
and that even Religious Enforcement Officers have not been appointed by officials
properly delegated according to Islamic rules, 202 illegal coercion of an accused
remains a real prospect. If some of the offences, such as "unlawful sexual
intercourse outside marriage," had been categorised as "hudnd" rather than as
"ta"zir,"
 there may well have been provisions relating to retraction of the
confession which would have mitigated some of the potential for abuse. As it is,
the existing provisions appear to have invested the state with a lot of powers over
an accused who has been given very little protection in the event of their abuse.
201 1bid section 18(e).
202Sce chapter five.
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Although the majority of its laws are determined according to the Penal Code,
Criminal Procedure Code and the Evidence Act 1950,203 and are secular in origin,
the Federal Government seems to suggest their Continued application alongside
the Syariah Laws, is justified according to Islam and, therefore, is "Islamic." They
state that it is not possible to apply the hudlld in a just manner according to current
circumstances. They purport to justify this position according to the Qur'n, the
Prophet's Sunnah and to the "maqid Aam Shari'a (underlying purposes of the
Shari'a)."204 In the words of the Malaysian Prime Minister:
"In this instance, there is a fiqh view that says: 'Laws may vary due to
changes with regard to time, place and situation', while yet another states:
'The actions of an imam or head of state on the populace depend on the
maslahab.' Both of these methods are contained in major principles
known as siyasah shari'ah."205
Islam is now interpreted as a system of broad values and principles the application
of which depend on political convenience, rather than as a set of immutable rules.
Previous juridical opinion is deemed irrelevant 206and the primary sources are
interpreted anew in the light of current circumstances and modern understandings.
203For the role of the accused as expressed by these rules, see the earlier part of this chapter.
204Pcr Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed, cited in Rose Ismail (1995), op. cit., p. 68.
2051bid., p. 69. In this instance, the Prime Minister is merely repeating the methodology of the
Kaum Muda in his government coalition, and who belong to his advisory bodies. The stress is on
usul ul-fiqh (principles of Islamic jurisprudence), ijtihad, siyasah al-shari'ah (the politics of the
shari"ah) and securing the "maslaijah". See further the guidelines in the working paper of the
technical committee set up by the Government to discuss the implementation of "the politics of the
Shari'ah": Ijtimak Haiah Ulama Malaysia (1994), Garispanduan Perlaksanaan Siasah Syariyyah
Dala,n Pentadbi ran Negara, Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia (YADIM).
206He states: "Only the Qur'an and the Prophet's Sunnah form the basis and source of Islam" (ibid.,
p. 70).
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Hence, he refers to meanings of the Qur'n 207and of the Hadith208that apply to
equal application of the law and relaxation of rules in the event of hardship or
necessity, to show that,
"Islam is not a religion that simply ignores prevailing conditions or
problems faced by its adherents wherever they reside... .If there are
concessions pertaining to acts of devotion, shouldn't the same apply to
legal matters?"209
The posited solution, therefore, is not application of the hudud. "Islamisation" in
this context refers to a re-appraisal of the secular law in the light of Islamic values
and principles. Where the two are seen to conflict, the former is replaced by a rule
inspired by the latter until there is a new body of "Malaysian Common Law." 210 It
seems that this meeting ground of Modernists with Kaum Muda has thus either
jettisoned the Shari"ah, or re-defined it without hudud, qi, or diyat in favour of
a new "Islamic" hybrid.
207He mentions the meaning of Surah al-Hajj, verse 78, which states that Allah "..hath not laid upon
you any hardship" (ibid., p. 70).
208 "Verily, the destruction of people of the past was brought about by their deeds of letting go the
well-heeled among them who stole, and amputating the hands of the weak who stole," (ibid.).
2091bid
210See further: Zainur Zakaria (1992), "Dan Common Law Kepada Common Law Malaysia,"
Seminar Syariah Dan Common Di Malaysia, sponsored by UKIvI, the Malaysian Lawyers
Association and the Prime Minister's Islamic Department, Dewan Muktamar, Pusat Islam, Kuala
Lumpur.
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Conclusion:
Over the past two chapters, I have suggested that the role which the accused plays
in the "Islamisation process" cannot be examined solely in the light of Islamic
Law, as it is conventionally understood. Since the collapse of the 'Abbsid
caliphate in the twelfth century, Muslim states have ruled autonomously which has
enabled non-Islamic influences, either from indigenous cultures, or from external
colonial powers, or from secularist values generated locally, to have an impact on
their criminal justice systems.
In the Malaysian context, the protections which Islam gave to accused persons
through a religious construction of the individual and through strict criteria in the
appointment of officials have never been apparent whether before colonialism,
during colonialism or after independence. 	 Rather, it has been the needs of
political authority, however constituted, and of state power that have been given
primacy. Even in the new climate of reform, of "Islamisation," traditional
interpretations which sought to adhere to the rules and values of previous
generations have been supplanted by a new system of interpretation which,
although perhaps unintended, has given a state inspired by secular values, the tools
to reassert and legitimise its power.
PAS and the Malaysian Government may appear to be at opposite ends of the
political and religious spectrum; in reality, however, they are merely different
faces of a process which is taking place within the same secular framework. The
PAS government has not stated at any stage how they would enforce their laws in
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detail, and what the role of the police will be, and the extent of their powers. In the
light of the secular orientation of the current police force, and their tendency to
follow orders irrespective of their legality or relationship to the ShariAah, I suggest
that this is a serious omission.
I also suggest that their version of hudud laws are ostensibly so protective of the
accused, that it is highly likely that law and order concerns will operate to convert
most of the offences to ta'zir. The 1993 hudud legislation is not free from
ambiguity and it gives Syariah judges every opportunity to take a more
enforcement-driven approach.
If the developments of Malaysian history can be our judge, there is unlikely to be
much real change in the foreseeable future. Even if PAS were to win a general
election, the old system and pattern of traditional authority would soon dominate,
albeit in Islamic form and with purported Islamic justifications.
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Conclusion
Over the past six chapters, I have explored, examined and interpreted rules
pertaining to powers and limits on questioning of accused persons in two different
and unrelated systems of criminal justice with a view to comparing the role played
by the accused in each respective system. Some authors'might argue such an
enterprise is unlikely to yield reliable data from which meaningful comparisons
could be made. This is especially true when, as in the current case, the two
systems are not deemed to fall within the same "legal family" or "legal culture";
for it can be difficult to know whether you are comparing like with like.
Formally, rules and concepts in the two systems may look the same, but on closer
analysis fulfil very different functions. Any perceived similarities and differences,
therefore, would be distortive and misrepresentative of the systems being
compared.
One method for avoiding the fallacies of the "law as rules" approach, 2therefore, is
to compare only those rules which fulfil the same function. Zweigert and Kotz
write:
"The proposition rests on what every comparatist learns, namely that the
legal system of every society faces essentially the same problems, and
solves these problems by quite different means...The question to which
'See, for instance, M. Van Hoecke and M. Warrington, "Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and
Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law," International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, (1998), Vol. 47, pp. 495-536, at pp. 508-509.
2Van Hoecke and Warrington, op. cit., p. 495.
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any comparative study is devoted must be posed in purely functional
terms; the problem must be stated without any reference to the concepts of
one's own legal system...One must never allow one's vision to be clouded
by the concepts of one's own national system; always in comparative law
one must focus on the concrete problem."
In this thesis, the concrete problem has been the role played by the accused in
criminal justice systems and the relationship this expresses between the individual
and the state. The assumption has been that in both English and Islamic Criminal
Justice, the criminal process describes more than the formal mechanics by which
the community or an individual seeks redress for a wrong that has been inflicted.
It assumes that in both systems the rules which determine how evidence is
collected give powers to persons other than those immediately involved, and
which, in some respect, represent and reflect the interests of the wider society in
which those individuals exist. The scope and limitations of those powers
inevitably impact upon the individuals concerned, and upon those who have been
accused in particular. They reflect the degree to which they participate in the
process and include the criteria that must be satisfied before their freedom is
affected, if at all. The level of participation and those criteria which are set,
provide an indication4 of the relationship of accused persons to the wider
community.
K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, (1993), An Introduction to Comparative Law, 2nd Edition (trans. Tony
Weir), Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 31.4j do not suggest that these rules express the role of the accused necessarily. Rather, they have to
be examined in context. See the later comments.
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How this is expressed and articulated, however, will depend on the overarching
values of the system. These values, in turn, are products of "world views" 5 and of
the interaction between social, cultural and political forces in points of time and
place. The methodology which I adopted, therefore, sought to place these rules
within their historical, cultural and structural contexts.
Nevertheless, this functionalist approach combined with a sociological
understanding of the various forces in which rules are framed will not exempt the
comparatist from distortion and from misrepresenting the systems that are studied.
The cultural and personal experiences of the writer also play a role in attempts to
view "the other." Separate histories, value systems, as well as personal and
collective experiences all play a part in constructing the lens through which "the
other" is viewed. Indeed, the usual practice of placing one particular legal system
within one "legal family" or "legal culture" as opposed to another, 6 involves
processes of definition, of categorisation and generalisation that are, by nature,
exclusionary. One "legal family" is said to carry certain general features which
distinguish it from another. Thus, it emphasizes boundaries and difference, rather
than linkages and similarity. These generalisations are not representations of
objective "truth," but the product of the author's conscious choice to present a
particular system in a particular way. 7 	Where conscious choices are
acknowledged, the reader becomes aware that "the other" has been placed within
an interpretative framework that advocates a certain "world view," and can make
5These include, among others, the "material" vs the "spiritual"; the "secular" vs the "religious;" the
"individualist" vs the "collectivist."
6For examples of the "legal family" approach to comparative law, see: Van Hoecke and
Warrington, ibid; Zweigert and Kotz, ibid., chapter five.
7Zweigert and Kotz criticized Rene David's classification of broad ideology in particular for being
too "one-dimensional;" op. cit., p. 68.
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the appropriate judgment. Where, however, they remain unacknowledged,
observations are given an objectivity and neutrality that are rarely deserved. They
become instead part of the propaganda machine that asserts its own supremacy at
the expense of dehumanising "the other." 8 I hope that my acknowledgement in
chapter four to certain working assumptions and background values serves to
reduce that possibility.
The danger of distortion is at its most acute when the object of comparative law is
to illustrate the supremacy of one system over the other, or to seek legal reform.
Invariably, the writer is committed to some universal principles, or some variant
of "natural law," and hopes either to change the "other" in the light of these
preferences, or to effect reform in the "domestic" legal system. 9 This is not the
object of the current thesis. When two systems are perceived as essentially
"alien" to each other, which I would suggest is true in the current instance,
proposals for any legal reform as a result of one's findings must be deemed
premature. Rather, the object of such a study is to explicate the similarities and
dissimilarities of two legal traditions from which a greater understanding of the
"other" may be fostered and informed judgments made'°by dispelling some of the
myths and distortions that have evolved in a historical climate of enmity. My
emphasis, therefore, has been on building bridges of communication and a
8See further, Edward Said, Covering Islam, (1997) op. cit; Orientalism (1995), op. cit. See also
chapter four.
9See: M.B. Hooker (1975), Legal Pluralism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 458; Van Hoecke and
Warrington, op. cit., p. 497; Zweigert and Kotz, op. cit., pp. 23-27.
'°On the need for this even between the different European legal systems, see Basil Markesenis
(1997), Foreign Law & Comparative Methodology, Hart Publishing, Oxford, p. 6; John Henry
Merryman, (1985), The Civil Law Tradition, 2nd Edition, Stanford University Press, Stanford, p.
150.
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common framework of analysis that can stimulate reflection and understanding on
both sides."
Such a common framework of analysis, however, can only be achieved if both
sides share the same problem.' 2The unit of analysis throughout this thesis has
been the "individual," an emphasis which, it might be thought, reflects only the
concerns of a society whose values purport to revolve around notions of individual
freedom; a liberal society which claims that freedom is an end in itself and which,
in its rhetoric, legislates only to protect the freedom of others. One might argue
that in an Islamic community, freedom is valued differently. It is constrained by
religious precepts and norms which impose individual and community
obligations.' 3 In the English secular state, individuals are encouraged to tolerate
that which they disapprove; in the Islamic, they are exhorted to "bid the good and
prohibit the bad." The freedom to commit hated behaviour is not a freedom that is
deemed worth having. This would appear to illustrate, therefore, the fundamental
problem of cultural perspective, and the danger of imposing one set of values
upon another.
But such criticism, I suggest, misses the point. The object of the analytical
framework has not been to advocate notions of individual freedom or liberty, far
11 This corresponds with new movements within the comparative tradition, in which observation,
description and critique, are coupled with theoretical insights to shed light on another legal system
or one's own. See further: P. Legrand (1995), "Comparative Legal Studies and Commitment to
Theory," 58 Modern Law Review, pp. 262-273. On the need for reflection and understanding as a
"two-way" process, see Dr Raif Rogowski, "The Art of Mirroring Comparative Law and Social
Theory" in Challenges to European Legal Scholarship: Anglo-German Legal Essays, (1996),
Blackstone Press, London, pp. 2 15-232 at p. 229.
2That problem may or may not be recognized in the legal culture; much will depend on the
orientation and state of current scholarship.
' 3This is expressed by the Islamic concepts of "fard Aain" (individual obligation) and "fard
kifyah" (community obligation).
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from it; but to examine relationships between individuals and the organised
community to which they "belong." These relationships are often more complex
and "layered" than is commonly assumed and require further illumination.
In chapter one, I set out common assumptions regarding the values of the English
criminal justice system that were expressed through rules relating to confessions
and questioning, and focused on the opinions of leading writers such as Stephen,
Wigmore,Williams and Mirfield (the "consensus"). They believed the spectre of
the Star Chamber had so affected judicial and legislative minds that, by the late
eighteenth century, the individual, including the accused, was constructed as a
"citizen." According to them, liberal sentiment had reached such levels that
between 1800 and 1852 English judges were excluding confessions en masse
"upon the slightest pretext." 4 I argued in chapter two that this historical
presentation of English criminal justice based on notions of individual freedom
and liberty was without evidential foundation. They had relied on polemical
writings, ignored the inherent ambiguity of existing case law and legislation, and
cited only those data which supported their pre-conceived notions. In chapter
three, I demonstrated through a historical and structural analysis of nineteenth
century case law on confessions and questioning, that the reality was more
complex and reflected the ideological competition between Benthamite
utilitarianism and liberal laissez-faire in a secular reconfiguration of the English
state.
' 4Wigmore, op. cit.
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The whole nineteenth century was a time of transition and I observed these
ideological conflicts operating throughout. For liberal-minded judges, the accused
was regarded as an equal "citizen" and a "prisoner" who needed an armoury of
rights to protect him/her from an increasingly expansionist state. The case of
Warickshall had set a liberal precedent at the end of the eighteenth century in
which any violation of the principle of voluntarism warranted exclusion of a
confession. "Voluntariness" was a state of mind that was free from any type of
external influence. The reliability and truth of the confession did not make an
involuntary confession admissible. As we passed into the nineteenth century, this
approach to confessions was reflected in a number of decisions.' 5
 Yet, it should
not be thought that the principle of voluntarism applied only to the "law of
confessions." Indeed, it was reflected in different ways in order to account for the
structural changes within the English criminal justice system. In the first half of
the century, for example, liberal judges also focused on the role of magistrates and
sought to curtail their questioning powers.' 6
 In the second half of the century,
their concern shifted to curbing questioning powers of the New Police as they had
become part of the "state" apparatus.'7
' 5 See, for instance: Dunn (1831), op. cit; Drew (1838),op. cit; Morton (l843),op. cit; Furley
(1843), op. cit, Harris (1844), op.cit.
' 6 See: Wilson (1817), op. cit.; Gilham (1828), op. cit; Clewes (1830), op. cit; Webb (1831); Green
(1832), op. cit; Drew (1838), op. cit; Arnold (1838), op. cit; Kimber (1848), op. cit; Higson (1849),
op. cit.; Pettit (1850), op. cit; Stripp (1856), op. cit.
' 7Although the need for some restrictions on police powers of questioning had been stated soon
after the formation of the New Police in 1829; see Swatkins (1831), op. cit.. These concerns were
given fuller expression in Baldry (1852), op. cit, [in the judgment of Campbell LCJ]; Berriman
(1854), op. cit., Toole (1856), op. cit.; Hassett (1861), op. cit; Bodkin (1863), op. cit; Johnstone
(1864), op. cit [minority judgments of O'Brien J, Lefroy J, and Pigot CB]; Gillis (1866), op. cit.,
and The Yeovil Murder Case (1877), op. cit.; Gavin (1885),op. cit; Thompson (1893),op. cit; Male
and Cooper (1893), op. cit.,and Morgan (1895), op. cit. all of which are discussed in chapters two
and three.
290
Yet, values of liberal individualism and of laissez-faire were not universally held
by English judges. Many of them inclined towards more state-orientated theories
which did not regard the expansion of state power as necessarily inimical to the
interests of the individual. Indeed, they located the individual within the
collective welfare. Law and order was a pre-requisite to individual freedom,
which required "criminals" to be convicted and law enforcement officers to be
"empowered."
The law relating to confessions and questioning reflected this value framework.
For these judges, therefore, voluntariness was meaningful only in the context of
"reliability" and the likelihood of a false confession. Threats and inducements
were analysed "objectively" (ie. according to the court) rather than from the
subjective standpoint of the accused. Thus, not every perceived threat excluded a
confession.' 8
 Unless the threats or inducements issued from "persons in
authority" 9 and were temporal in nature, 2°
 it was assumed that any subsequent
confession was true and therefore admissible. In contrast to the liberal-minded
members of the Bench, the voluntariness principle was given limited scope and
hardly applied to rules of questioning. Cautioning was an optional extra, essential
only where a confession had been preceded by a threat or inducement. 2 ' Custodial
interrogation of the accused without a lawyer present, intimidation and particular
vulnerability were also condoned. 22
 According to this line of judicial thinking, the
accused was not accorded the same constitutional status as other individuals
' 8This approach is seen explicitly in the leading judgments of Baron Parke and Erie J in the famous
case of Baldry (1852), op. cit., discussed in chapters two and three. See also Court (1836), op. cit;
Holmes (1843), op. cit.
' 9See: Row (1809), op. cit; Gibbons (1823), op. cit.; Wilde (1835), op. cit.
205ee: Gilham (1828), op. cit.; Wilde (1835), op. cit.; Sleeman (1853), op. cit.
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within the English state. Concerns for "crime control" and "law and order" had
divested the accused of his/her equal status.
Conventional wisdom, in its description of the values underlying the English
criminal justice process, had over-emphasised the accused as a "citizen" and
almost ignored the growing momentum among the judiciary for making accused
persons a separate constitutional category deserving of less protection. The
judiciary were not making decisions in isolation from the political and ideological
controversies of their time. They were contributing to or reacting against a re-
configuration of the system. This constant conflict, however, was not conducive
to systemic efficiency and inevitably generated confusion among the police force.
It was necessary, therefore, to establish the mechanisms out of which a
compromise could be forged and a consensus communicated. The formation of
the Court of Appeal in 1907 provided a new hierarchy of judicial opinion which,
in conjunction with a more uniform system of law reporting, facilitated judicial
agreement and communicated the consensus. By 1912 and the publication of the
Judges' Rules, the means for a judicial consensus on the appropriate role of the
accused had been reached. Liberal judges had won the right to exclude statements
of any person questioned after being formally arrested, charged or when in legal
custody, but they had not emasculated police powers of questioning. By
restricting protection to these categories, the reformers had succeeded in
empowering the police in relation to "suspects" who had not been charged, who
were not technically "under arrest" and who were not in "legal custody." As the
twentieth century progressed and liberal laissez-faire lost its currency, even those
21 There are no decisions before 1848 which excluded a confession because no caution had been
administered; see chapter two.
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distinctions became blurred and "the suspect" was entrenched as an intermediate
constitutional category with little protection against the power of the state.
It was noted in chapter four, that western commentators commonly construed
Islamic criminal justice in secular terms, defining it as a "religious law" rather
than as a "religion." 23They had concluded that as the number of juristic writings
far outweighed the number of writings on religious doctrine, that the religion's
creed was not central to the operation of its Law. 24 According to this perspective,
it seemed to follow that the "Islamic Legal System" or "Islamic Law" was not a
fixed system of religious rules that had originated from religious scripture and
Prophetic practice and which had supported a unified system of faith. Rather,
"Islamic Law" was deemed to express an Arab society's rules, 25
 which were
rationalised and modified by "ulama" and by its rulers to fit in with the changing
circumstances of society.
This secular perspective was further expressed by their separation of the "Islamic
Legal System" from the "Sharf'ah." 26The latter was seen as a juristic construction
and an ideal that was never realised in practice. Although the "Sharj"'ah" was
deemed generally protective of the accused,27 they argued that qadis often
circumvented its rules in their attempts to achieve "justice." 28Moreover, a "dual
system of courts"29 obtained in which the majority of criminal cases were
22See: Thornton (1824), op. cit.; Gilham (1828), op. cit..
23See Schacht, J. "Law and Justice", op. cit., p. 539.
24See also the works of Bernard Lewis mentioned in chapter four.
25For the importance orientalists attached to ethnicity, see: Lewis, op. cit., p. 196; Schacht, op. cit.,
pp. 546-547.
26Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions, op. cit., p. 76.
27Ibid., pp. 64-65; Lippman, McConville, Yerushalami, op. cit., pp 60-68.
28See Lippman, McConville and Yerushalmi, op. cit., p. 73.
29Coulson, N.J. (1964), A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, p. 128.
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determined according to the "extra-Shari'ah jurisdiction" 30of the rulers. Coulson
wrote:
"These courts considered circumstantial evidence, heard the testimony of
witnesses of dubious character, put them on oath and cross-examined
them; they imprisoned suspects, convicted them on the basis of known
character and previous offences, might make the accused swear the oath by
a local saint instead of on the Qur'an, and in general could take measures
to discover guilt, including the extortion of confessions, as they saw fit."31
Indeed, the orientalist perception of the "Islamic Legal System" defined the
accused as an object of political authority, rather than as a citizen protected by
rights or as a religious individual whose interests were protected by the Shari"ah.
Legal proceedings took place close to government buildings, rather than in the
mosque, and before government-appointed officials (eg the ahib al-Madzlim)
rather than before independent judges. Political concerns for speed and efficiency
in the administration of justice were thought to predominate to such an extent, that
torture was regarded as a "fixed institution."32
In chapter five, I observed that the orientalist association of Islam with temporal
and secular concerns rather than with the religious and spiritual, was a distortion
of the values espoused by the various schools of Islamic Law. Through an
30Coulson, Conflicts and Tensions, op. cit., p. 66.
31 Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, op. cit., pp. 127-128.
32Schacht J., op. cit., p. 561.
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analysis of the rules pertaining to iqrr (confessions) and questioning, 331 found
religious and non-material values clearly evident. The accused was not
constructed as a "subject" or an object of political power, but as a religious entity
whose protections depended first on the extent to which he or she could be
presumed to adhere to the faith and teachings of Islam and second, on the
religious knowledge, status and integrity of the person receiving the iqrçjr.
The iqrar was not simply an admission of guilt that could form the sole basis for a
conviction. It was a particular procedure by which a case could be determined
and was separate from, and better than, cases decided upon testimony (shahgdah),
oath (yamin and qasamah) and circumstantial evidence (qar'in). If made
willingly, it was a form of spiritual purification (taharah) which constituted part
of a Muslim's repentance (tawbah). Within the different schools, I observed
confessional rules requiring absence of coercion (which included freedom from
torture, from detention, from imprisonment, and from hunger), repetition and non-
retraction. Qadis, Imams, or delegated officials were encouraged to dissuade the
accused from confessing for aqq Allh offences and to exculpate the accused
through detailed questioning. Inculpatory questioning was reserved for those with
a known history of contravening the Shar''ah. According to the majority of the
It might be thought that a comparison between the oath in English Law and the confession in
Islamic law would provide a more suitable comparison because of the linkage between religious
belief and conditions of evidence. But this would be distortive because the oath in English law
operates to validate testimony either from the accused or from a witness (see Williams, G. (1963),
op. cit., pp. 66-71); it is nota form of proof or species of evidence. In Islam, the confession is a
form of proof (see chapter five). Even if we compared the English oath with "al-yamn" or
"qasamah" in Islamic law, the comparison would not be the same. In certain offences, both
operate as a form of proof which either exculpates (as in the "yamjn") or inculpates ("qasamah")
the accused (see: Anwarullah, (1994), op. cit., pp 74-78; Mahmassani, (1987), op. cit., pp. 189-
195). Although Islamic rules pertaining to questioning and confessions perform more than one
function because of the religious nature of its system, (see below), I suggest that, in part, they form
the same function as in English Law. Both sets of rules lay out the conditions by which
information from accused persons can be elicited, and what use, if any, can be made of them in the
determination of guilt or innocence.
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scholars (jumhur), the iqrar served an important religious purpose that was to be
facilitated by religious officials, rather than frustrated. That purpose was not
determined by independent rational means, but was found in the primary religious
texts themselves: the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
Yet, it might be said that this emphasis on voluntariness and its relationship with
spirituality and individual salvation is a distortion. First, there was a sufficient
number of Muslim scholars who validated coercion as a means for securing a
confession in one form or other. Second, even where voluntariness was stressed,
the majority of Muslim scholars included the confessions of non-Muslims who did
not share in the community of faith (Imgn). Whatever they confessed to, it would
have had no bearing on the salvation of their soul because they did not accept, or
state a belief in, the basic tenets of the Faith. 34 According to this view,
voluntariness must have served an ulterior purpose.
Although I accept that individual salvation could not have been the sole purpose
behind the rules of iqrar, that does not mean that the confessional rules as
expounded by the second group of scholars or those that were applied to the non-
Muslims were any less religious. In relation to the group that allowed duress in
certain circumstances, their primary concern was to enforce Islamic precepts,
beliefs and values throughout the community: to bid the good and prohibit the
bad. They believed that if certain degrees of coercion were applied to particular
people whose piety was in question, the "truth" would will out 35and Allah's
commands would be enforced. These commands, or the substantive law, were not
34Although as individuals, they might think it did if repentance was central to their particular
religious belief.
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secular in origin, but were found in the religious texts.36 With respect to the first
group's requirement of voluntariness for the non-Muslim, this arose as an aspect
of their covenanted status with the Islamic State rather than as a means to achieve
spiritual purification. It operated, therefore, as an exception to the general rule.
Yet, even their constitutional rights to security of the person 37originated from
Prophetic practice38 and from the practices of the pious sabah who established
peace agreements with their Christian and Jewish citizens. 39
 Their constitutional
rights, therefore, were religious in nature.
In addition, there were, of course, rational reasons behind the rules of iqrar.
Confessions were also regarded as the best evidence because it was assumed that
individuals, who were aware of the serious consequences of their actions, would
not willingly confess to something which they had not done. 4° Moreover,
according to some scholars, voluntariness was an important requirement as a
confession obtained by a beating had doubtful reliability and could be false. 4 ' The
mere reason a rule may have such "rational" explanations, however, should not
preclude the operation of religious values. Indeed, as I have shown, they may co-
exist and complement one another.
The developmental arguments of the Orientalists hinge, I suggest, on their secular
stereoptype of the Islamic state and their decision to ignore the structural context
of Islamisation. The enforcement and contextualisation of Islamic Law was
35 See the views of al-Mawardi, mentioned in chapter five, pp. 22-23.
36See chapter five, pp. 13-14.
37For a full elucidation of their obligations and rights; see al-Mawardi, op. cit., pp. 207-2 12.
38See: "Abdur-Rahmn I. Doi, op. cit., pp. 430-435.
39See al-Mawardi, op. cit., p. 210.
40See chapter five, p. 10.
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divorced from the piety of its rulers and from the historical ruptures in the
thirteenth century.
	 Hence, the term "Islamic" was applied to any legal
development within a state ruled by Muslims, irrespective of the Islamic qualities
and knowledge of the ruler. An "Islamic Legal System" properly called, however,
required its political and military leaders, and its legal officials, to satisfy strict
criteria of appointment. It also required those leaders to delegate, under specified
conditions for monitoring, to facilitate appropriate enforcement of the religious
law. Yet, even before the Mongol invasion, these conditions and responsibilities
were not satisfied under every ruler. Correct enforcement and application of
Islamic Law depended on the individual ruler and the people who supported him.
The situation was aggravated in the thirteenth century when, for all intents and
purposes, links were severed between the Caliphate and its satellite states. This
de facto independence enabled those rulers to continue or establish legal systems
in their own image.
In chapter six, I looked at the contextualisation of the Islamic criminal justice
system in more detail, and in a non-Arab context. In one respect, my observations
of Islamisation in Malaysia tended to confirm the comments of traditional
Orientialists: that there was a separation between Islamic law in theory and the
law that was applied in practice; and that Muslim states had gone through a
process of reform and change to account for new circumstances and conditions.
Yet, we part ways in how we analyse and term those developments.
41 See the opinion of al-Ghazzali, chapter five, p. 16.
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In their adoption of linear theories of progress, they assume that all states,
religious and secular, go through a process of reform. The "Islamic" state, like any
other, they argue, had to amend its procedures, rules of evidence and
categorisations as a reaction to current realities. According to them, in the
"Islamic" context, this had the effect of jettisoning the Shari"ah, and replacing it
within an "Islamic legal system" in which power rested firmly with the political
state, rather than with the individual.
Yet, this separation of "Sharja''h" from the "Islamic Legal System" does not
appear anywhere in the traditional texts; the former was seen as an intrinsic aspect
of the latter. 42
 The Shari t'ah itself, always allowed for flexibility and variety of
opinion within and between its schools of jurisprudence, 43so long as that opinion
adhered to juristic consensus (ijma"). This plurality of opinion, in turn, was
reflected in different enforcement structures which changed according to the
ijtihad of the Caliph. Any separation of the Shari"ah from the applicable law,
however, was strictly non-Islamic.44
That is not to say such separation, or partial separation did not occur, nor that it
did not receive the legitimating appellation of "Islamic," or some other religious
label to justify it. Indeed, I observed in the "Islamic/"adat" hybrid system of pre-
colonial Melaka, where the Sultan and his ministers were not appointed according
to religious criteria, the text writers still gave the Sultan the title of "Caliph of the
42Sce 'Abdur-Rahrnan I. Doi, op. cit., pp. 1-6.
43Sce chapter five.
44Ibid., pp. 448-475.
45See above.
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Faithful."46
 In post-independence Malaysia also, this partial separation from the
rules and values of Islam has been manifested in the development of an
"Islamic/Secular" hybrid, in both government and opposition strategies for
"Islamisation." The balance between these elements may be different, but there is
no doubting that both sides have utilised secular procedures, concepts and
"rationalities,"47with Kaum Muda methodology and "reformist" ideas providing
the "Islamicity."
There is also no doubt that both sides are operating within a constitutional
framework, and within a system of values that is orientated upon a secular and
authoritarian paradigm. The Malaysian state was forged in a climate of "crisis,"
and sought to suppress ethnic and ideological conflict through a commitment to
the nation state. The association of Islm with the Malays led, therefore, to the
adoption and continuation of the colonial secular framework and a constitutional
settlement that limited the operation of Islm and the operative scope of Islamic
values. In the absence of a referendum or some fundamental constitutional reform,
and recognizing the current composition and ethnic mix of the Malaysian state,
this is likely to continue even if PAS were to win future general elections.
Although the reasons for a strong and centrally-directed state are understandable
in light of Malaysia's history and current circumstances, that should not blind us
to the reality of Malaysian "Islamisation," and the role which the accused in fact
plays within it. In contrast to the general position that was stated in chapter five,
there is no evidence that the individual is construed in religious terms. Rather, the
46Chapter six.
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evidence suggests, certainly within the Federal Government's programmes,48that
the individual is deemed an object of executive and political authority. The
reforms that have been set in motion have released the interpretation of Islam
from previous juridical opinion, and from the interpretative constraints of taqlid in
particular. 49
 This has enabled governmental authority to co-opt and sponsor 5° the
developments of "Islamic" Law in the region. Although this does not necessarily
imply that accused persons will be denied protection, 5 ' it suggests that the
religious values behind Islamic criminal justice may be trumped when deemed
politically inconvenient. This is especially a danger when the agencies of
enforcement follow executive leads irrespective of their tangential relationship
with, or violation of Islamic rules, norms and values.52
My response to the Orientalist argument, therefore, is not that there has been no
separation between Islamic Law in theory and the law that has been applied in
practice, but that when there is no authentic, over-arching Islamic
authority53which has the power and capacity to enforce an Islamic framework, it is
inevitable that such separation, in total (that is, through renunciation 54) or in part
47j define this as a state of mind which seeks to reconcile systems and procedures with "modern"
circumstances.
48There is no evidence yet of a cross-party consensus on "Islamisation" and the role which the
accused may play. It was stated in chapter six that the reforms proposed by PAS appear very
protective of the accused, but many of the sections remain ambiguous and could be interpreted in
different ways. There is also a lack of detail, particularly with respect to enforcement. Any
construction of the accused will depend, therefore, on future developments.
49See chapter six and the case law from Jurnal Hukum.
50Financially, as well in terms of intellectual and official support. The International Islamic
University, which was established by Mahathir Mohamed, is pivotal in the secular state's
"acquisition" of Islam. Syariah Court judges receive training and are now employed directly
through the institution.
51 lndeed, Pegawai Pendakwa Muis v Haji Adib Datuk Said Besar Sigoh, op. cit., suggests a
voluntarist approach.
52See chapter six.
53 ie.a Caliph who complies with all of the pre-conditions of appointment; see chapter five.
" Kemalist Turkey provides the best example.
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(that is, through hybridisation 55), will occur. I argue that it necessarily follows
that one should hesitate to call such separations "Islamic."
So far, I have attempted to shed light on common assumptions of the two systems
and the role which the accused was perceived as playing, and have argued that a
more accurate portrayal is achieved by examining systems in their structural and
historical contexts. 	 The fostering of greater understanding between different
traditions, however, requires more than dispelling myths and mistaken
assumptions; it also needs to emphasize similarities, where they exist, in order to
build "communicative bridges."
It might be thought that a similarity exists in the relationship in both systems
between the severity of punishment and the protection afforded to the accused.
The greater the punishment, the more protection the accused receives.
Superficially, this seems an attractive thesis because of the Benthamite
rationalization of English criminal law in the nineteenth century (see chapter
three) and the distinction between hudud and ta"zlr punishments in Islam (see
chapter five). Yet, I suggest that this similarity is more apparent than real. If it
was true of English Law, then one would have expected the courts to be especially
protective of the accused prior to the 1850s when this rationalization was
expedited. Yet, it was noted that there has never been a moment in English Law
when protection of the accused was the primary or sole concern (see chapter
three). If it was true of Islamic Law, I would have expected more protection for
Eg. Malaysia.
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the accused in hudud cases than for ta"zir. Yet, the majority of scholars offered
the same protection for the accused in both types of cases.56
Nevertheless, a cursory examination of the chapters 57on English and Islamic
criminal justice does reveal a similarity of underlying tensions with which both
systems purport to deal. Although they define "crime" differently and the
background values are different, because of the nature of their sources of law, the
same tensions have existed within both legal frameworks. In each system, the role
of the accused has shifted between a voluntary and participative approach, and
one which is more coercive; each competing with the other. In the English
context, this has been a product of competing ideological positions over the proper
relationship between the individual and the state; one liberal laissez-faire, the
other welfarist or utilitarian. In the Islamic, it has resulted from different
emphases by different jurists on their interpretations of the religious texts; some
stressing individual repentance and salvation, others collective enforcement of
Islamic precepts. This has had a concomitant effect on the powers which they
give to officials of the state, and the relationship which the individual is projected
as having with the state.
Where that relationship is posited 58 in any given time, however, is contingent, in
both systems, upon historical circumstances and their effects upon enforcement
structures. In times of transition and "reform," it is evident that no core set of
values has emerged. Different roles for the accused have competed for
56 
suggested that the distinctions in evidential rules rested not on the severity of punishment, but
on the nature of the offence; ie. whether it was categorised as llaqq Allah or llaqq-un-Nas.
57Chaptcrs three and five. I stress that "Islamic" should be interpreted as what the scholars have
deemed as conforming to the primary sources, the Qur'an and the Sunnah.
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supremacy. As that configuration of the state has come to completion, it has
allowed a consensus 59to form and to be communicated. This has effected a
construction of the individual and crystallized his or her relationship with the
state.
Hence, in the English criminal justice system, its period of transition was the
nineteenth century. The change from a religious, decentralised and patriarchal
society6° to a secular, urban-based, and centrally-directed "popular democracy"
was controversial and gave rise to response and counter-response. This was
particularly evident in the case law from the late 1840s to the 1860s and from
1880 to the early 1900s as the judiciary reacted to changes in local and central
government, and to the powers which had been delegated to the New Police. 6
 'It
was not until the 1930s and after the collapse of the gold standard, that a
consensus over the role of the state in the life of the individual had its full effect.
By that time, governmental and legal structures had changed fundamentally to
facilitate the transmission of a "welfarist" consensus 62which held that the agencies
of enforcement were to be helped rather than hindered. Universal citizenship and
the general allocation of rights that would follow, was deemed obstructive of law
and order concerns. This necessitated separating accused persons from the status
of "citizens" and placing them within the new intermediate constitutional category
of "suspects" where protection of the individual was subordinated to systemic
concerns.
58By this, I mean the contextualisation of the role of the accused.
591n the Islamic context, I do not mean "ijma" here as technically defined. Rather, I am referring
to an "agreed working compromise" between executive, legislative and judicial actors.
60See Langford, P., op. cit, pp. 43-47; E.P. Thompson (1977), Whigs and Hunters - The Origin of
the Black Act, Harmondsworth, Penguin, p. 263. See also, chapter three.
61 See chapter three.
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Islamic criminal justice has been in a state of transition and flux whenever a
Caliph is absent from the centre directing and delegating operations. Thus, when
"gaps" between Caliphates occur, this has enabled matters, unconnected with
religious concerns, to shape the role which the accused has played. In the
Malaysian context, where Islam developed "indigenously" and external to the
Caliphal framework, Islamic values had to compete with values that had not
originated in Islam.
	 The competition was not just between different
interpretations of and emphases on the Islamic texts, but also between Islam and
traditional Malay culture, or Islam and secular culture. In pre-colonial Melaka
and its satellites, Islm had won a victory but not in totality. A working
compromise had been reached in which Malay rulers (ie. not Caliphs) determined
that Islamic rules and values were targets and ideals to work towards, rather than
the operative "law," which was based on traditional Malay culture. Over time,
this "law" began to incorporate different aspects of Islam but this reform had not
been completed. Hence, there is no evidence of detailed investigation and
questioning procedures which employed the religious categorisations of the
individual referred to in chapter five. Within this incomplete process of reform,
the accused remained an object of traditional authority.
Colonial intervention further retarded the "Islamisation" process and brought
about a set of "ethnic" and "ideological" tensions. Fear of instability required
cross-cultural mechanisms for consensus, such as the "nation state," and
"secularism," which inevitably sidelined religious gradation in the construction of
62See chapter three, pp. 18-21.
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the individual. The perceived need to maintain peace and security ensured that
state bodies, such as the Royal Malaysian Police Force, were equipped with wide
powers and that the accused was stripped of rights and protections. The latest
reform process sought to continue with "Islamisation", but within pre-existing
frameworks. This hybrid re-configuration of the Malaysian state remains
incomplete and, as Syariah case law indicates, different sets of values pertaining
to the relationship between the individual and the state are still jostling with each
other for position. The role of the accused within the "new" Malaysian state,
therefore, remains unclear.
Although these similarities exist, it would be facile to state that there are no
differences between the role played by the accused in English and Islamic
criminal justice. English criminal justice is orientated towards secular concerns
and values, whereas the Islamic "ideal" and "state," when realised in practice,
clearly views the world and constructs frameworks with a view to a life in the
Hereafter. In the English system, we have observed the emergence of the category
"suspect" which leaves the protection of the individual to the "good sense" or
discretion of a police officer. 63
 Yet, who becomes the object of police suspicion is
unrestricted in practice which allows factors such as race, ethnicity, gender, social
status, class as well as a prior criminal record to influence police decision-
making.64 In Islamic criminal justice, it is the Kgjlrun (unbelievers) and the
63 See: Lustgarten, L. (1986), The Governance of Police, London, Sweet & Maxwell.
See further: Steven Box, "The Criminal Justice System and 'Problem Populations" in Lacey, N.
(1994), Criminal Justice, Oxford Readings in Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, pp. 49-56. For an account of the problems of such 'targeted policing,' see Choongh, S.
(1997), op.cit., pp. 230-237; Rawlings, P., "Bobbies, 'Aliens' and Subversives: The Relationship
Between Community Policing and Coercive Policing" in Baxter J. and Koffman L.(eds) (1985),
Police - The Constitution and the Community, Abingdon, Professional Books, pp. 74-77; Smith,
D.J., "Race, Crime and Criminal Justice," in Maguire M., Morgan R. and Reiner R. (eds), (1994),
The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, p. 1088.
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Fasiqun (known big-sinners) who provide the comparator. They are accorded less
protection than others because they have chosen a particular path rather than
because of any arbitrary criteria chosen by a police officer. The Islamic
framework is there to encourage the "right" choices and discriminates where
individuals have chosen to take a different path.
The Islamic criminal justice system also recognizes that the over-arching values
and integrity of those applying the rules plays just as or more important a role than
the existence of the rules themselves. I suggest that this is an important insight in
contexts of miscarriages of justice and their proposed solutions. After all, it is not
the voluntariness rule which questions the accused, but a police officer who is
often in a position to side-step them.
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